



**Sprawozdanie roczne z postępów w realizacji strategii Unii Europejskiej przeciw  
rozprzestrzenianiu broni masowego rażenia (2022 r.)**

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**STRESZCZENIE**

W 2022 r. międzynarodowy system nieproliferaacji i rozbrojenia podlegał coraz większej presji. Pomimo że spotkania na forach wielostronnych znowu zaczęły się regularnie odbywać po dwóch latach przerwy spowodowanej pandemią COVID-19, nielegalna wojna napastnicza Rosji przeciwko Ukrainie – rażąco naruszająca prawo międzynarodowe i zasady Karty Narodów Zjednoczonych – jeszcze bardziej zmniejszyła zaufanie między podmiotami oraz miała bezpośredni i poważny wpływ na wszystkie instrumenty i mechanizmy. Rozpowszechniając dezinformację, stosując agresywną retorykę, blokując konsensus lub rezygnując ze zobowiązań do wdrożenia istniejących instrumentów – w zależności od przypadku – Rosja w znacznym stopniu przyczyniła się w 2022 r. do erozji międzynarodowych mechanizmów nieproliferaacji i rozbrojenia, które muszą obecnie sprostać największym wyzwaniom od dziesięcioleci.

W obliczu tej złożonej i wymagającej sytuacji UE konsekwentnie stosowała zasady przewodnie określone w istniejących dokumentach strategicznych, takich jak globalna strategia na rzecz polityki zagranicznej i bezpieczeństwa UE (dok. 10715/16), strategia UE przeciw rozprzestrzenianiu broni masowego rażenia (dok. 15708/03) lub nowe kierunki działania (dok. 17172/08), a mianowicie:

- skuteczny multilateralizm, zachowanie centralnej roli i propagowanie powszechnego charakteru światowego porządku nieproliferaacji i rozbrojenia, za pośrednictwem działań dyplomatycznych i pomocy finansowej dla państw trzecich i organizacji międzynarodowych;
- ścisła współpraca z poszczególnymi państwami na rzecz wzmocnienia międzynarodowego reżimu nieproliferaacji;
- zajmowanie się kwestiami związanymi z nieproliferaacją podczas prowadzonych przez UE na szczeblu dwustronnym posiedzeń w ramach dialogu politycznego oraz dialogów dotyczących nieproliferaacji i rozbrojenia, jak również w drodze mniej formalnych kontaktów; oraz
- skuteczne i komplementarne wykorzystywanie wszystkich dostępnych instrumentów i zasobów finansowych z myślą o wsparciu celów polityki zagranicznej UE.

W 2022 r. – wraz z przyjęciem strategicznego kompasu na rzecz bezpieczeństwa i obrony z 21 marca (dok. 7371/22) – UE w jeszcze większym stopniu skoncentrowała swoje strategiczne podejście na kwestii nieproliferaacji i rozbrojenia. W dokumencie tym UE i jej państwa członkowskie zobowiązują się między innymi do podtrzymywania, wspierania i dalszego rozwijania ram rozbrojenia, nieproliferaacji i kontroli zbrojeń, z myślą o wyzwaniach globalnych i regionalnych, przy zastosowaniu skoordynowanego podejścia we współpracy z partnerami. W strategicznym kompasie wskazano wśród tych wyzwań programy jądrowe KRLD i Iranu; powtarzające się przypadki użycia broni chemicznej; opracowywanie i rozprzestrzenianie nowych zaawansowanych rakietowych pocisków balistycznych, pocisków manewrujących i hipersonicznych; rozbudowę arsenałów jądrowych Rosji i Chin; rosyjskie groźby jądrowe w kontekście inwazji na Ukrainę; oraz erozję struktury kontroli zbrojeń w Europie.

Przez cały 2022 r. UE wraz ze swoimi państwami członkowskimi i partnerami o podobnych poglądach broniła globalnego porządku nierozprzestrzeniania i rozbrojenia w odniesieniu do broni masowego rażenia (BMR). Zaledwie kilka dni po jej wybuchu UE potępiła rosyjską wojnę napastniczą i jej wpływ na Konferencję Rozbrojeniową. UE aktywnie uczestniczyła w negocjacjach dokumentu końcowego dziesiątej konferencji przeglądowej Układu o nierozprzestrzenianiu broni jądrowej, na której nie udało się osiągnąć konsensusu z powodu jedyne go sprzeciwu – sprzeciwu Rosji. UE przyczyniła się do sukcesu dziewiątej konferencji przeglądowej konwencji o zakazie broni biologicznej, uzgadniając dokument końcowy i decyzję o powołaniu grupy roboczej ekspertów, która ma – prócz innych kluczowych aspektów – opracować mechanizm przeglądu i oceny osiągnięć naukowych i technologicznych istotnych dla konwencji oraz wznowić prace nad weryfikacją.

Jeżeli chodzi o broń konwencjonalną, UE wniosła wkład w prace głównych forów wielostronnych mających na celu zapobieganie nielegalnemu handlowi tą bronią i ograniczanie go (Traktat o handlu bronią, program działania Organizacji Narodów Zjednoczonych na rzecz zapobiegania nielegalnemu handlowi BSIL, zwalczania i eliminowania go, konwencja o zakazie stosowania min przeciwpiechotnych). Kontynuowała realizację projektów budowania zdolności w zakresie bezpieczeństwa fizycznego, zarządzania zapasami, znakowania, rejestrowania lub śledzenia w kilku regionach świata. Przede wszystkim w 2022 r. UE utrzymywała współpracę z Ukrainą w zakresie zagrożeń wynikających z przenikania BSIL i nielegalnego handlu nią.

UE nadal zdecydowanie broniła wielostronnych systemów kontroli eksportu jako jednego z kluczowych elementów walki z proliferacją i uczestniczyła w międzynarodowych wysiłkach na rzecz zarządzania powstającymi technologiami, które mogą mieć wpływ na rozbrojenie. We wszystkich tych obszarach prac UE utrzymywała stały dialog z państwami trzecimi i ściśle współpracowała ze społeczeństwem obywatelskim. W dalszym ciągu propagowała również priorytety przekrojowe, takie jak wspieranie i promowanie równouprawnienia płci oraz wzmocnienia pozycji kobiet w całej dziedzinie nieproliferaacji i rozbrojenia.

## WPROWADZENIE

Niniejsze sprawozdanie opisuje postępy poczynione w 2022 r. w realizacji strategii UE przeciw rozprzestrzenianiu broni masowego rażenia, przyjętej przez Radę Europejską w grudniu 2003 r. (dok. 15708/03), uzupełnionej „Nowymi kierunkami działań Unii Europejskiej na rzecz zwalczania rozprzestrzeniania broni masowego rażenia i systemów jej przenoszenia”, zatwierdzonymi przez Radę 8–9 grudnia 2008 r. (dok. 17172/08). Aby dać pełny obraz, poruszono również inne aspekty dotyczące broni konwencjonalnej.

Sprawozdanie nie ma charakteru wyczerpującego i koncentruje się na najważniejszych kwestiach.

Europejska Służba Działań Zewnętrznych (ESDZ), pod kierownictwem Wysokiego Przedstawiciela do Spraw Zagranicznych i Polityki Bezpieczeństwa, aktywnie przyczynia się do tych wspólnych wysiłków wraz z państwami członkowskimi i Komisją Europejską. Specjalna wysłannik UE ds. nieprolifracji i rozbrojenia oraz jej zespół współpracuje z państwami trzecimi, organizacjami międzynarodowymi i społeczeństwem obywatelskim, aby zmniejszyć światowe zapasy broni, zapobiec przenikaniu jej do przestępców i terrorystów oraz uregulować opracowywanie stosowanych w broni nowych czynników i technologii.

Działająca w Radzie Grupa Robocza ds. Nieprolifracji i Wywozu Broni – zarówno w podgrupie ds. rozbrojenia i nieprolifracji (CONOP), jak i ds. wywozu broni konwencjonalnej (COARM) – odgrywa kluczową rolę w koordynowaniu stanowisk UE, utrzymaniu umów międzynarodowych i wspieraniu wysiłków na rzecz nieprolifracji i rozbrojenia. Delegatury UE w Wiedniu, Genewie i Nowym Jorku reprezentują UE na forach zajmujących się nieprolifracją i rozbrojeniem, przygotowują i koordynują dziesiątki oświadczeń UE oraz organizują wydarzenia towarzyszące propagujące cele UE, przyczyniając się do kształtowania polityki.

### KWESTIE ZWIĄZANE Z BRONIĄ JĄDROWĄ

W 2022 r. UE nadal była w pełni zaangażowana w realizację swoich wieloletnich celów w dziedzinie rozbrojenia jądrowego i nierozprzestrzeniania broni jądrowej, obejmujących upowszechnienie oraz całkowite, pełne i skuteczne wdrożenie Układu o nierozprzestrzenianiu broni jądrowej (NPT), wejście w życie i upowszechnienie Traktatu o całkowitym zakazie prób jądrowych (CTBT), a także natychmiastowe rozpoczęcie i szybkie zakończenie na Konferencji Rozbrojeniowej negocjacji w sprawie Traktatu o zakazie produkcji materiałów rozszczepialnych dla broni jądrowej lub innych jądrowych urządzeń wybuchowych. Jednym z priorytetów pozostawało również ustanowienie na Bliskim Wschodzie strefy wolnej od broni masowego rażenia i środków jej przenoszenia. Ponadto UE zdecydowanie wsparła prace grupy roboczej I Komisji ONZ ds. Rozbrojenia dotyczące kwestii jądrowych.

Zachowanie Rosji w kontekście agresji wobec Ukrainy, stanowiące poważne naruszenie prawa międzynarodowego, w tym gwarancji bezpieczeństwa udzielonych Ukrainie w ramach memorandum budapeszteńskiego z 1994 r., poważnie wpłynęło na wielostronne prace w tej dziedzinie, w tym na rozbrojenie, nieprolifrację i pokojowe zastosowania. UE i jej państwa członkowskie, we współpracy z partnerami o podobnych poglądach, potępiły tworzone przez Rosję zagrożenia jądrowe, dezinformację i rażące lekceważenie bezpieczeństwa i ochrony w obiektach jądrowych na Ukrainie i wokół nich, a także współpracowały z resztą społeczności międzynarodowej, by zachować i dalej konsolidować międzynarodowy system w tej dziedzinie. UE potępiła również zmianę statusu Białorusi jako kraju niejądrowego jako kolejne niepokojące zjawisko, które przyczynia się do niedopuszczalnych prób ponownego zdefiniowania opartego na zasadach europejskiego porządku bezpieczeństwa.

### Układ o nierozprzestrzenianiu broni jądrowej

Układ o nierozprzestrzenianiu broni jądrowej (NPT) pozostaje dla UE zasadniczym elementem światowego systemu nieprolifracji, podstawowym fundamentem realizacji rozbrojenia jądrowego zgodnie z art. VI NPT oraz istotnym elementem dalszego rozwijania zastosowań energii jądrowej do celów pokojowych zgodnie z art. IV NPT. Wszystkie państwa członkowskie UE są państwami stronami NPT.

1–26 sierpnia 2022 r. w Nowym Jorku odbyła się 10. konferencja przeglądowa NPT, trzykrotnie przekładana z powodu pandemii COVID-19. UE aktywnie uczestniczyła w konferencji przeglądowej, wydając sześć oświadczeń, brała udział w negocjacjach na forum trzech głównych komitetów, koordynowała działania swoich państw członkowskich, przedkładała dokumenty robocze <sup>(1)</sup> i organizowała wydarzenia towarzyszące <sup>(2)</sup> służące realizacji celów politycznych zawartych w konkluzjach Rady w sprawie 10. konferencji przeglądowej stron Układu o nierozprzestrzenianiu broni jądrowej (NPT), zatwierdzonych 15 listopada 2021 r. Obejmują one zobowiązanie do przyspieszenia rozbrojenia jądrowego zgodnie z art. VI NPT, do wspierania zintensyfikowanego dialogu propagującego dalsze postępy w rozbrojeniu, korzyści płynące z konkretnych prac nad zmniejszeniem ryzyka strategicznego i jądrowego, wartość wielostronnej współpracy na rzecz postępów w weryfikacji rozbrojenia jądrowego oraz natychmiastowe rozpoczęcie i szybkie zakończenie negocjacji w ramach Konferencji Rozbrojeniowej w sprawie Traktatu o zakazie produkcji materiałów rozszczepialnych dla broni jądrowej lub innych

(1) UE przedłożyła na konferencji przeglądowej dwa dokumenty robocze: „Priorytety Unii Europejskiej na 10. konferencję przeglądową stron Układu o nierozprzestrzenianiu broni jądrowej” oraz „Traktat o całkowitym zakazie prób jądrowych na 10. konferencję przeglądową stron Układu o nierozprzestrzenianiu broni jądrowej”.

(2) UE zorganizowała lub współorganizowała następujące wydarzenia towarzyszące: „Wzmocnienie globalnego porządku jądrowego bezpieczeństwa fizycznego: upowszechnienie Międzynarodowej konwencji w sprawie zwalczania aktów terroryzmu jądrowego (ICSANT)” wraz z Biurem Narodów Zjednoczonych ds. Przeciwdziałania Terroryzmowi (UNOCT); „Wsparcie Unii Europejskiej dla Traktatu o całkowitym zakazie prób jądrowych (CTBT) i jego organizacji”; „Zabezpieczenia w ramach uzgodnień regionalnych”; oraz „Wizje strefy wolnej od broni masowego rażenia na Bliskim Wschodzie: rys historyczny, czynniki i tematy” wraz z Instytutem ONZ ds. Badań nad Rozbrojeniem (UNIDIR).

jądrowych urządzeń wybuchowych. Ponadto UE potępiła rażące naruszenie przez Rosję memorandum budapeszteńskiego, lekkomyślne groźby użycia broni jądrowej i inne nieodpowiedzialne działania przeciwko bezpieczeństwu jądrowemu i jądrowemu bezpieczeństwu fizycznemu na Ukrainie, w szczególności nielegalne zajęcie elektrowni jądrowej w Zaporozżu, jako zagrażające NPT.

Pomimo wysiłków UE i jej państw członkowskich, partnerów o podobnych poglądach i innych państw stron, które zaangażowały się w merytoryczne dyskusje w celu potwierdzenia znaczenia Układu o nierozprzestrzenianiu broni jądrowej, dokonania przeglądu jego wdrażania i określenia przyszłych działań, nie można było przyjąć ostatecznego dokumentu ze względu na jedyny sprzeciw – sprzeciw Rosji – dotyczący odniesień w tekście do ukraińskiej elektrowni jądrowej w Zaporozżu. Uzgodniono, że następna konferencja przeglądowa NPT odbędzie się w 2026 r. w Nowym Jorku, sesje Komitetu Przygotowawczego będą miały miejsce w 2023 r. w Wiedniu, w 2024 r. w Genewie i w 2025 r. w Nowym Jorku oraz powołana zostanie grupa robocza ds. dalszego wzmocnienia procesu przeglądu.

### Międzynarodowa Agencja Energii Atomowej

UE przywiązuje wielką wagę do technicznych, niezależnych i bezstronnych prac Międzynarodowej Agencji Energii Atomowej (MAEA) w ramach całego jej mandatu, obejmujących zarówno nierozprzestrzenianie broni jądrowej, jak i pokojowe zastosowania technologii jądrowej. UE wspiera MAEA i jej państwa członkowskie na wiele sposobów. UE i jej państwa członkowskie zapewniają wsparcie polityczne, lecz należą także do największych darczyńców Agencji, w tym jej Funduszu Współpracy Technicznej. Ponadto od 2003 r. UE wsparła działania MAEA kwotą ponad 60 mln EUR, przyjmując osiem kolejnych stosownych decyzji Rady. Ostatnia z nich, obecnie obowiązująca, to decyzja Rady (WPZiB) 2020/1656 <sup>(3)</sup> z dnia 6 listopada 2020 r. w sprawie wspierania przez Unię działań MAEA w zakresie jądrowego bezpieczeństwa fizycznego oraz w ramach wdrażania strategii UE przeciw rozprzestrzenianiu broni masowego rażenia („MAEA VIII”). Obejmuje ona znaczne wsparcie finansowe dla programu stypendialnego MAEA im. Marii Skłodowskiej-Curie, którego celem jest zachęcanie młodych kobiet do studiowania i pracy w dziedzinie nauk i technologii jądrowych, bezpieczeństwa jądrowego i jądrowego bezpieczeństwa fizycznego, nierozprzestrzeniania broni jądrowej oraz prawa atomowego.

W 2022 r. ze względu na poważny wpływ rosyjskiej agresji wobec Ukrainy na bezpieczeństwo jądrowe i jądrowe bezpieczeństwo fizyczne przesunięto 2,2 mln EUR z budżetu przewidzianego w decyzji (WPZiB) 2020/1656 na *Pomoc dla Ukrainy w zapewnianiu utrzymywania jej systemu jądrowego bezpieczeństwa fizycznego* <sup>(4)</sup>.

System zabezpieczeń MAEA jest jednym z podstawowych elementów systemu nierozprzestrzeniania broni jądrowej, a działania weryfikacyjne Agencji odgrywają ogromnie ważną rolę w realizacji NPT. UE popiera wzmocnienie systemu zabezpieczeń MAEA i nadal jest zdania, że umowy o zabezpieczeniach wszechstronnych wraz z protokołem dodatkowym stanowią obecny standard weryfikacji w ramach NPT; nadal wzywa również do powszechnego przystępowania do nich. W 2022 r. działania informacyjne skierowane do państw trzecich koncentrowały się na propagowaniu upowszechnienia umowy o zabezpieczeniach wszechstronnych i protokołu dodatkowego do niej, a także zmienionego protokołu w sprawie małych ilości (SQP).

Ścisła współpraca między Euratomem a MAEA w oparciu o porozumienie MAEA/EURATOM z 1973 r. umożliwia wdrożenie w Europie skutecznych i wydajnych zabezpieczeń.

UE aktywnie wspiera system zabezpieczeń MAEA, w tym zapewnia wsparcie finansowe dla sieci laboratoriów analitycznych MAEA, a także aktywnie wspiera promowanie krajowego systemu ewidencji i kontroli materiałów jądrowych (SSAC) w krajach partnerskich. Europejskie Stowarzyszenie Badań i Rozwoju w Dziedzinie Zabezpieczeń (ESARDA), prowadzone przez Komisję Europejską, również kontynuuje swoje działania informacyjne na arenie międzynarodowej poprzez protokoły ustaleń z Afrykańską Komisją ds. Energii Jądrowej (AFCONE) i z Siecią Regionu Azji i Pacyfiku w zakresie Zabezpieczeń w ścisłej współpracy z Instytutem Zarządzania Materiałami Jądrowymi. W tych ramach finansowany jest duży projekt szkoleniowo-edukacyjny w dziedzinie zabezpieczeń jądrowych w ramach europejskiej sieci kształcenia jądrowego (ENEN), w tym pierwszy w historii akademicki program podyplomowy w zakresie zabezpieczeń jądrowych – we współpracy z MAEA. W 2022 r. uruchomiono nowy ambitny program UE mający na celu zwiększenie zabezpieczeń jądrowych w Afryce, we współpracy z AFCONE i Finlandią.

<sup>(3)</sup> Dz.U. L 3721 z 9.11.2020, s. 4.

<sup>(4)</sup> Dz.U. L 257 z 5.10.2022, s. 10.

W latach 2021–2027 w ramach Instrumentu Współpracy w dziedzinie Bezpieczeństwa Jądrowego UE przeznaczyła 300 mln EUR na promowanie bezpieczeństwa jądrowego, ochrony radiologicznej oraz stosowania sprawnych i skutecznych zabezpieczeń w państwach trzecich, w tym w regionie Azji Środkowej.

Wspólne Centrum Badawcze Komisji Europejskiej (JRC) i MAEA kontynuowały wdrażanie „Praktycznych uzgodnień w sprawie współpracy w zakresie zastosowania technologii jądrowych”, podpisanych 15 lutego 2017 r., mających na celu rozwijanie wspólnych działań i unikanie powielania wysiłków m.in. w dziedzinach takich jak gleboznawstwo, zastosowania medyczne, oceanografia, dane jądrowe i materiały referencyjne, bezpieczeństwo żywności, obserwacja Ziemi i monitoring środowiska.

UE i jej państwa członkowskie nadal zdecydowanie popierają program współpracy technicznej MAEA, w tym poprzez znaczne wkłady na rzecz Funduszu Współpracy Technicznej i inicjatywy na rzecz pokojowego wykorzystania technologii jądrowej, które są ważnymi narzędziami umożliwiającymi bezpieczne, pewne i pokojowe wykorzystanie technologii jądrowej oraz realizację celów Agendy na rzecz zrównoważonego rozwoju 2030.

UE i MAEA regularnie organizują doroczne posiedzenia urzędników wysokiego szczebla w celu dokonania przeglądu szeroko zakrojonej współpracy i dalszego jej zaplanowania. Choć doroczne posiedzenia w 2020 r. i 2021 r. nie mogły się odbyć ze względu na pandemię, UE i MAEA utrzymywały ścisły kontakt, a 15 marca 2022 r. w Wiedniu odbyło się posiedzenie urzędników wysokiego szczebla.

### **Traktat o całkowitym zakazie prób jądrowych**

Wejście w życie i upowszechnienie Traktatu o całkowitym zakazie prób jądrowych (CTBT) są kluczowymi celami strategii UE przeciw rozprzestrzenianiu broni masowego rażenia. Wszystkie państwa członkowskie UE wykazały swoje zaangażowanie na rzecz traktatu przez jego ratyfikowanie i dążenie do osiągnięcia jego podstawowych celów jeszcze przed jego wejściem w życie. CTBT jest silnym środkiem budowy zaufania i bezpieczeństwa, przyczyniającym się zarówno do rozbrojenia jądrowego, jak i do nieprolifracji.

W 2022 r. UE angażowała się w działania dyplomatyczne wspierające CTBT i w oświadczeniach wygłaszanych na odnośnych forach, a także w ramach stosunków dwustronnych z odpowiednimi państwami wymienionymi w załączniku II i nieobjętymi tym załącznikiem UE wielokrotnie apelowała o ratyfikowanie traktatu, także podczas spotkania grupy przyjaciół CTBT w Nowym Jorku we wrześniu 2022 r. Propagowanie wejścia w życie CTBT było jednym z działań w ramach planu Sekretarza Generalnego ONZ „Zabezpieczenie naszej wspólnej przyszłości: plan rozbrojenia” (ang. „Securing our Common Future: an Agenda for Disarmament”), który UE postanowiła wspierać.

UE konsekwentnie propaguje korzyści z CTBT i wkład, jaki wnosi on w zapewnianie pokoju, bezpieczeństwa, rozbrojenia i nieprolifracji, także poprzez jego zastosowania cywilne. W 2022 r. UE kontynuowała zdecydowane polityczne i finansowe zaangażowanie na rzecz traktatu i CTBTO poprzez wdrożenie decyzji Rady (WPZiB) 2020/901 w sprawie wspierania przez Unię działań Komisji Przygotawczej Organizacji do spraw Traktatu o Całkowitym Zakazie Prób Jądrowych (CTBTO) w celu zwiększenia jej zdolności w zakresie monitorowania i kontroli oraz w ramach realizacji strategii UE przeciw rozprzestrzenianiu broni masowego rażenia<sup>(\*)</sup>. Wsparcie finansowe UE na rzecz CTBT pomogło w utrzymaniu i wzmocnieniu międzynarodowego systemu monitoringu poprzez udzielanie wsparcia technicznego, budowanie zdolności i ułatwianie udziału ekspertów w posiedzeniach CTBTO, w szczególności na rzecz krajów rozwijających się. UE aktywnie uczestniczyła w posiedzeniach Komisji Przygotawczej CTBTO oraz jej grup roboczych A i B.

### **Jądrowe bezpieczeństwo fizyczne i powiązane kwestie**

UE podkreśla potrzebę dalszego wzmocnienia jądrowego bezpieczeństwa fizycznego na całym świecie, aby zapobiegać terroryzmowi jądrowemu i ułatwiać pokojowe wykorzystywanie technologii jądrowej. UE nadal w pełni popiera wyniki międzynarodowej konferencji poświęconej jądrowemu bezpieczeństwu fizycznemu (ICONS 2020), która odbyła się w lutym 2020 r. W oświadczeniu ministerialnym będącym wynikiem konferencji przypomina się o zobowiązaniu na rzecz utrzymania i wzmocnienia skutecznego i kompleksowego jądrowego bezpieczeństwa fizycznego wszystkich jądrowych i innych materiałów i obiektów promieniotwórczych, a także uznaje się centralną rolę MAEA w ułatwianiu i koordynowaniu międzynarodowej współpracy w dziedzinie jądrowego bezpieczeństwa fizycznego. UE rozpoczęła przygotowania do następnego posiedzenia ICONS, które odbędzie się w maju 2024 r.

(\*) Dz.U. L 207 z 30.6.2020, s. 15.

UE z całą stanowczością potępiła, w wielu oświadczeniach, podczas posiedzeń Konferencji Ogólnej MAEA i Rady Zarządzających niczym niesprobowaną i nieuzasadnioną agresję Rosji wobec Ukrainy, która stanowi poważne i bezpośrednie zagrożenie dla działań weryfikacyjnych w zakresie bezpieczeństwa jądrowego i jądrowego bezpieczeństwa fizycznego oraz weryfikacji zabezpieczeń materiałów jądrowych w Ukrainie. UE wspierała działania dyplomatyczne dyrektora generalnego MAEA mające na celu zapewnienie bezpieczeństwa jądrowego i jądrowego bezpieczeństwa fizycznego ukraińskich obiektów jądrowych oraz stałą obecność misji wsparcia i pomocy MAEA we wszystkich ukraińskich elektrowniach jądrowych, do których to misji UE wniosła wkład finansowy.

UE pomagała Ukrainie zarówno w ramach współpracy dwustronnej, jak i za pośrednictwem MAEA. Od początku wojny UE jest jednym z głównych darczyńców Ukrainy, przekazała jej prawie 53 mln EUR pomocy na bezpieczeństwo jądrowe i jądrowe bezpieczeństwo fizyczne, z czego 5,6 mln EUR za pośrednictwem MAEA, w tym 2,2 mln EUR w wyniku zmiany decyzji (WPZiB) 2020/1656.

W 2022 r. w ramach Europejskiego Instrumentu Współpracy Międzynarodowej w dziedzinie Bezpieczeństwa Jądrowego (INSC) na Ukrainę przeznaczono 13 mln EUR, a także dodatkowe 3,4 mln EUR dla MAEA w celu wsparcia między innymi rozmieszczenia personelu MAEA w głównych obiektach jądrowych w tym kraju, pomocy dwustronnej w celu przywrócenia zdolności w zakresie monitorowania i analiz, a także odnowienia finansowania wspólnego biura wsparcia w Kijowie. Ponadto UE jest obecnie największym darczyńcą rachunku do celów międzynarodowej współpracy w Czarnobyli (ICCA), którego celem jest odbudowa infrastruktury związanej z bezpieczeństwem jądrowym.

UE jest zdania, że ważne jest, by wszystkie państwa przystąpiły do kluczowych instrumentów bezpieczeństwa jądrowego i jądrowego bezpieczeństwa fizycznego, takich jak zmieniona Konwencja o ochronie fizycznej materiałów jądrowych i obiektów jądrowych (A/CPPNM) <sup>(6)</sup>, Międzynarodowa konwencja w sprawie zwalczaniu aktów terroryzmu jądrowego (ICSANT), Konwencja bezpieczeństwa jądrowego (CNS) <sup>(7)</sup> lub Wspólna konwencja bezpieczeństwa w postępowaniu z wypalonym paliwem jądrowym i bezpieczeństwa w postępowaniu z odpadami promieniotwórczymi (JC) <sup>(8)</sup>. UE będzie nadal wspierać państwa w ich wysiłkach na rzecz pełnego wdrożenia tych konwencji.

UE w znacznym stopniu przyczyniła się do osiągnięcia porozumienia w sprawie dokumentu końcowego posiedzenia przeglądowego A/CPPNM, przyjętego pomimo trudnej sytuacji politycznej w marcu 2022 r. Z zadowoleniem przyjęła ten dokument. Poważne zagrożenia dla bezpieczeństwa jądrowego i jądrowego bezpieczeństwa fizycznego wynikające z agresji Rosji wobec Ukrainy zostały uwzględnione w odrębnym dokumencie zainicjowanym przez UE, który spotkał się z szerokim poparciem państw stron.

W 2022 r. UE nadal wspierała upowszechnianie i skuteczne wdrażanie ICSANT na mocy decyzji Rady (WPZiB) 2018/1939 <sup>(9)</sup>, realizowanej przez Biuro ONZ ds. Przeciwdziałania Terroryzmowi (UNOCT) i Biuro ONZ ds. Narkotyków i Przestępczości (UNODC). Wspomniana decyzja ma zwiększyć liczbę państw, które przystąpiły do ICSANT, zwiększyć wśród krajowych polityków i decydentów wiedzę na temat ICSANT, a także zbudować potencjał po to, by przyczynić się do poprawy przepisów krajowych i wzmocnić zdolność podmiotów krajowych, w tym urzędników wymiaru sprawiedliwości w sprawach karnych do prowadzenia dochodzeń, ścigania i orzekania w sprawach dotyczących terroryzmu jądrowego. Wraz z Kanadą i UNODC UE finansowała 20. rocznicę ICSANT w Wiedniu 12 grudnia 2022 r.

UE w dalszym ciągu wspierała globalną inicjatywę na rzecz zwalczania terroryzmu jądrowego (GICNT) i jej misję polegającą na wzmacnianiu globalnych zdolności w zakresie zapobiegania terroryzmowi jądrowemu, wykrywania go i reagowania na to zjawisko. UE i jej państwa członkowskie są aktywnie zaangażowane w prace inicjatywy GICNT we wszystkich obszarach: wykrywanie materiałów promieniotwórczych, forensyka jądrowa oraz reagowanie i łagodzenie skutków.

UE podpisała w 2013 r. z MAEA praktyczne ustalenia w sprawie współpracy w kwestiach technicznych związanych z jądrowym bezpieczeństwem fizycznym, które mają na celu m.in. zwiększenie koordynacji działań szkoleniowych i budowania zdolności w celu propagowania i wdrażania zrównoważonych praktyk kultury jądrowego bezpieczeństwa fizycznego. Europejski Ośrodek Szkoleń w zakresie Jądrowego Bezpieczeństwa Fizycznego zajmujący się wykrywaniem nielegalnych działań z użyciem materiałów jądrowych i innych materiałów promieniotwórczych oraz reagowaniem na takie działania (EUSECTRA) od 2013 r. jest w pełni operacyjny i działa na rzecz państw członkowskich Unii Europejskiej i krajów partnerskich, w tym kilku członków GICNT. Ośrodek jest również wykorzystywany do przeprowadzania ćwiczeń praktycznych dotyczących głównie przeciwdziałania przemytowi materiałów jądrowych, a także do działań z forensyki jądrowej w celu oznaczenia przechwyconych materiałów jądrowych. Komisja Europejska nadal odgrywa także ważną rolę w ramach Grupy Roboczej ds. Monitorowania Granic w odniesieniu do jądrowego bezpieczeństwa fizycznego. Współprzewodniczy zarówno tej grupie, jak i jej dwóm podgrupom zajmującym się technologiami służącymi do wykrywania oraz budowaniem zdolności.

<sup>(6)</sup> Wszystkie państwa członkowskie UE są stronami A/CPPNM.

<sup>(7)</sup> Wszystkie państwa członkowskie UE są stronami CNS.

<sup>(8)</sup> Wszystkie państwa członkowskie UE są stronami JC.

<sup>(9)</sup> Dz.U. L 314 z 11.12.2018, s. 41.

## Systemy i inicjatywy w zakresie weryfikacji

UE uważa, że dalszy rozwój wielostronnych zdolności w zakresie weryfikacji rozbrojenia jądrowego mógłby pomóc w osiągnięciu rozbrojenia i zapewnieniu świata bez broni jądrowej. W tym kontekście UE i jej państwa członkowskie w pełni poparły utworzenie grupy ekspertów rządowych ONZ ds. weryfikacji rozbrojenia jądrowego, a także decyzję o kontynuowaniu jej prac w latach 2022 i 2023, by zorganizować sesję, które nie mogły się odbyć ze względu na pandemię COVID-19. UE nadal uczestniczyła w międzynarodowym partnerstwie na rzecz weryfikacji rozbrojenia jądrowego (IPNDV), w ramach którego zorganizowano w Brukseli 27–29 czerwca 2022 r. pierwsze fizyczne posiedzenie w ciągu ponad dwóch lat, tj. ćwiczenie symulacyjne JUNEX 22.5–9 grudnia 2022 r. odbyło się posiedzenie plenarne IPNDV w Sydney (Australia), na którym partnerzy ocenili postępy poczynione w trzecim etapie prac, skupili się na ocenie koncepcji weryfikacji za pomocą zastosowań opartych na scenariuszach oraz identyfikacji i ocenie technologii służących realizacji celów weryfikacji.

## Kwestie i aspekty regionalne

### Iran/JCPOA

Pomimo politycznego wsparcia ze strony państw członkowskich UE i intensywnych międzynarodowych wysiłków dyplomatycznych na rzecz przywrócenia pełnej realizacji Wspólnego kompleksowego planu działania (JCPOA), w tym negocjacji w Wiedniu, wspieranych przez Wysokiego Przedstawiciela UE jako koordynatora wspólnej komisji JCPOA, w 2022 r. nie udało się osiągnąć porozumienia. Kolejne sprawozdania MAEA udokumentowały alarmujące przyspieszenie irańskiego programu jądrowego, poważnie odbiegające od zobowiązań podjętych w ramach JCPOA, w szczególności w odniesieniu do zwiększenia zdolności w zakresie wzbogacania paliwa jądrowego i produkcji uranu wysoko wzbogaconego. Jeżeli chodzi o nierozstrzygnięte kwestie dotyczące zabezpieczeń (cząsteczki uranu zidentyfikowane w trzech niezgłoszonych lokalizacjach), Rada Zarządzających MAEA przyjęła rezolucje 8 czerwca i 17 listopada 2022 r. wzywające Iran do współpracy z Agencją.

Jednocześnie UE nadal wspierała również długoterminową misję MAEA polegającą na weryfikowaniu i monitorowaniu zobowiązań Iranu związanych z kwestiami jądrowymi. UE nadal współpracowała z Iranem w zakresie cywilnych zastosowań energii jądrowej na mocy załącznika III do JCPOA w dziedzinie bezpieczeństwa jądrowego. Współpraca ta obejmuje wsparcie dla irańskiego organu regulacji ds. bezpieczeństwa jądrowego (INRA), testy wytrzymałościowe elektrowni jądrowej Buszehr oraz dostawę sprzętu dla irańskiego centrum bezpieczeństwa jądrowego INRA. Operacyjny pozostaje utworzony na mocy JCPOA kanał dostaw, który dokonuje przeglądu transferów produktów jądrowych lub produktów podwójnego zastosowania do Iranu.

W konkluzjach Rady z 12 grudnia 2022 r. UE potwierdziła swoje zaangażowanie na rzecz pełnego i skutecznego wdrożenia przywróconego JCPOA i stałe poparcie dla tego procesu, a także wezwała wszystkie państwa do wsparcia wdrażania rezolucji Rady Bezpieczeństwa Organizacji Narodów Zjednoczonych nr 2231 (2015). Wysoki Przedstawiciel UE działający w charakterze koordynatora JCPOA jest nadal w pełni zaangażowany na rzecz współdziałania ze społecznością międzynarodową w celu utrzymania JCPOA i zapewnienia jego pełnego wdrożenia.

### Koreańska Republika Ludowo-Demokratyczna (KRLD)

W 2022 r. UE podkreślała, że każdy przypadek z bezprecedensowej liczby raketowych pocisków balistycznych wystrzelonych przez KRLD stanowił rażące naruszenie rezolucji Rady Bezpieczeństwa ONZ i oznaczał poważne zagrożenie dla pokoju i bezpieczeństwa w regionie i na świecie. W oświadczeniach wydanych w imieniu UE w kwietniu i listopadzie Wysoki Przedstawiciel potępił wznowienie wystrzeliwania przez KRLD międzykontynentalnych raketowych pocisków balistycznych. W oświadczeniach UE wyrażono również solidarność z Republiką Korei i Japonią w obliczu wystrzeliwania przez KRLD nowych i starszych rodzajów pocisków balistycznych krótkiego zasięgu oraz stwierdzono, że niektóre z nich mogą być wykorzystywane do przenoszenia głowic jądrowych. UE wyraźnie stwierdziła, że takie działania, w tym dalsze eksploataowanie elektrowni jądrowych KRLD, nigdy nie zostaną uznane za uzasadnione. UE podkreślała, że jedynym sposobem na osiągnięcie trwałego pokoju i bezpieczeństwa jest podjęcie przez KRLD działań mających na celu wywiązanie się z obowiązku zrezygnowania z wszelkiej broni jądrowej, innej broni masowego rażenia, programów dotyczących raketowych pocisków balistycznych i istniejących programów jądrowych, w sposób kompletny, weryfikowalny i nieodwracalny, oraz zaprzestanie wszelkich powiązanych działań.

Państwa członkowskie UE nadal zachęcały wszystkich członków Organizacji Narodów Zjednoczonych, zwłaszcza członków Rady Bezpieczeństwa, do nakłaniania KRLD do zmiany kursu, podkreślając, że najskuteczniejszym instrumentem do osiągnięcia tego celu jest pełne wdrożenie sankcji Rady Bezpieczeństwa ONZ. Jako że Rada Bezpieczeństwa w dalszym ciągu nie podjęła działań, UE zintensyfikowała konsultacje z partnerami na temat innych sposobów ograniczenia prze-

plywu do KRLD środków finansowych, wiedzy i komponentów, które mogłyby zostać wykorzystane do wspierania jej programów dotyczących nielegalnej broni. W tym duchu w kwietniu i grudniu UE przyjęła dodatkowe środki ograniczające wobec osób fizycznych i podmiotów z KRLD. Do grupy 80 osób fizycznych i 75 podmiotów objętych sankcjami Rady Bezpieczeństwa ONZ dodano 73 osoby i 17 podmiotów objętych unijnymi środkami ograniczającymi.

UE w pełni wykorzystwała możliwości, które dały jej międzynarodowe fora ds. nieprolifracji, i wezwała KRLD jako państwo niedysponujące bronią jądrową do natychmiastowego powrotu do pełnego przestrzegania NPT oraz umowy z MAEA o zabezpieczeniach wszechstronnych, do wprowadzenia w życie protokołu dodatkowego oraz podpisania i ratyfikowania Traktatu o całkowitym zakazie prób jądrowych. UE nadal podkreślała, że sytuację można rozwiązać jedynie za pomocą środków pokojowych. UE wezwała KRLD do wznowienia dialogu z głównymi stronami i potwierdziła swoją gotowość do wspierania lub ułatwiania nowego procesu dyplomatycznego mającego na celu pełną, weryfikowalną i nieodwracalną denuklearyzację Półwyspu Koreańskiego.

### ***Strefa na Bliskim Wschodzie wolna od broni jądrowej i innych rodzajów broni masowego rażenia***

UE, która zobowiązała się do wdrożenia rezolucji w sprawie Bliskiego Wschodu przyjętej na konferencji przeglądowej NPT w 1995 r., z zadowoleniem przyjęła wynik trzeciej konferencji ONZ w sprawie ustanowienia na Bliskim Wschodzie strefy wolnej od broni jądrowej i innych rodzajów broni masowego rażenia, która odbyła się w Nowym Jorku 14–18 listopada 2022 r.

Decyzją Rady (WPZiB) 2019/938 <sup>(10)</sup> z dnia 6 czerwca 2019 r. w sprawie wsparcia procesu budowy zaufania prowadzącego do ustanowienia na Bliskim Wschodzie strefy wolnej od broni jądrowej i wszelkich innych rodzajów broni masowego rażenia, dobrowolnie uzgodnionej przez wszystkie państwa w regionie, UE wspierała w 2022 r. projekt UNIDIR dotyczący bliskowschodniej strefy wolnej od broni masowego rażenia, mający na celu wypełnienie istotnej luki badawczej dotyczącej ewolucji tej kwestii w miarę upływu czasu, budowania zdolności analitycznych do wspierania nowego myślenia o kwestiach bezpieczeństwa regionalnego i strefy, gromadzenia pomysłów i opracowywania nowych propozycji dotyczących dalszych działań, a także wspierania inkluzywnego dialogu między ekspertami i decydentami politycznymi na temat kwestii bezpieczeństwa regionalnego i strefy. Do końca roku UE rozpoczęła dyskusje na temat drugiego etapu projektu, którego celem jest dalsze wspieranie strefy po 2022 r.

### **BRONŃ CHEMICZNA**

29 kwietnia 2022 r. przypadała 25. rocznica wejścia w życie Konwencji o zakazie prowadzenia badań, produkcji, składowania i użycia broni chemicznej oraz o zniszczeniu jej zapasów (CWC). W oświadczeniu wydanym z tej okazji w imieniu UE Wysoki Przedstawiciel przypomniał, że niezależnie od miejsca, czasu i okoliczności użycie broni chemicznej stanowi naruszenie prawa międzynarodowego i może być uznane za najpoważniejszą zbrodnię wagi międzynarodowej – zbrodnię wojenną i zbrodnię przeciwko ludzkości.

Przez cały 2022 r. UE nadal była w pełni zaangażowana w przeciwdziałanie rozprzestrzenianiu broni chemicznej i wspieranie walki z bezkarnością za stosowanie broni chemicznej. UE utrzymała swoje zdecydowane polityczne, dyplomatyczne i dobrowolne wsparcie finansowe dla Organizacji ds. Zakazu Broni Chemicznej (OPCW), organu wykonawczego CWC. Poparcie wyrażono w oświadczeniach, démarche i dobrowolnych wkładach finansowych w drodze decyzji Rady. Dobrowolne wkłady finansowe pomogły sfinansować podstawowe działania OPCW, w szczególności w zakresie weryfikacji i budowania zdolności, operacji OPCW poprzez dostarczanie obrazów satelitarnych, a także aktualizacji zdolności OPCW w zakresie cyberbezpieczeństwa i ochrony informacji. UE i jej państwa członkowskie pozostały największymi dobrowolnymi darczyńcami finansowymi wspierającymi utworzenie nowego laboratorium OPCW – Centrum Chemii i Technologii.

14 listopada 2022 r. Unia nałożyła kolejne środki ograniczające związane z otruciem Aleksieja Nawalnego i produkcją systemów przenoszenia broni chemicznej w Syrii <sup>(11)</sup>. Do końca 2022 r. środki w ramach unijnego systemu sankcji dotyczącego broni chemicznej objęły łącznie 25 osób i trzy podmioty.

<sup>(10)</sup> Dz.U. L 149 z 7.6.2019, s. 63.

<sup>(11)</sup> Rozporządzenie wykonawcze Rady (UE) 2022/2228 z dnia 14 listopada 2022 r. wykonujące rozporządzenie (UE) 2018/1542 w sprawie środków ograniczających proliferację i stosowanie broni chemicznej (Dz.U. L 2931 z 14.11.2022, s. 1).



W kontekście OPCW, w ramach agresji na Ukrainę, Rosja uczestniczyła w kampanii dezinformacyjnej i kontrolowanej przez państwo kampanii propagandowej, rozpowszechniając niepoparte argumentami i bezzasadne zarzuty wobec Ukrainy i innych dotyczące programów broni chemicznej. Przeciwdziałając rosyjskiej dezinformacji, UE przypomniła w swoich oświadczeniach, że powszechnie wiadomo, że Ukraina jest odpowiedzialnym członkiem konwencji o zakazie broni chemicznej i w pełni przestrzega tej konwencji.

## **BROŃ BIOLOGICZNA**

Konwencja o zakazie broni biologicznej i toksycznej (BTWC) zakazuje opracowywania, produkcji, nabywania, przekazywania, składowania i stosowania broni biologicznej i toksycznej. Był to pierwszy wielostronny traktat o rozbrojeniu zakazujący stosowania całej kategorii broni masowego rażenia. Wszystkie państwa członkowskie UE są państwami stronami BTWC.

UE i jej państwa członkowskie aktywnie uczestniczyły w 9. konferencji przeglądowej BTWC, która odbyła się w Genewie 27 listopada – 16 grudnia 2022 r. Ważnym osiągnięciem było to, że ówczesne 184 państwa strony były w stanie uzgodnić dokument końcowy, zwłaszcza biorąc pod uwagę globalne napięcia i impas na innych forach w kontekście rosyjskiej wojny napastniczej przeciwko Ukrainie. Jednym z kluczowych rezultatów była decyzja o powołaniu grupy roboczej, która w latach 2023–2026 określi konkretne i skuteczne środki, w tym ewentualne środki prawnie wiążące, dotyczące mechanizmów wdrażania współpracy i pomocy na podstawie art. X oraz Rady Konsultacyjnej ds. Naukowo-Technicznych, oraz wznowi dyskusje na temat przestrzegania i weryfikacji, a także przedstawi zalecenia dotyczące wzmocnienia i zinstytucjonalizowania konwencji we wszystkich jej aspektach.

W 2022 r. UE odegrała aktywną rolę w przeciwdziałaniu rosyjskiej kampanii dezinformacyjnej dotyczącej broni biologicznej, która to kampania obejmowała wykorzystanie mechanizmów przewidzianych w art. V i VI BTWC do celów rozpowszechniania dezinformacji, by uzasadnić agresję Rosji na Ukrainę.

Zgodnie ze strategią UE przeciw rozprzestrzenianiu broni masowego rażenia oraz jako podmiot od wielu lat wspierający BTWC, UE kontynuowała w 2022 r. swoje konsekwentne wsparcie poprzez wdrażanie dwóch decyzji Rady, finansowanie działań UNODA wspierających budowanie zdolności w celu wzmocnienia realizacji BTWC na szczeblu krajowym, wspieranie sieci bezpieczeństwa biologicznego w krajach globalnego Południa, wspieranie międzysesyjnego programu i przygotowań do dziewiątej konferencji przeglądowej, zwiększanie gotowości państw stron do zapobiegania atakom z użyciem czynników biologicznych i reagowania na takie ataki, a także zapewnianie narzędzi upowszechniania wiedzy, edukacji i zaangażowania. W 2022 r. UE nadal wspierała również inicjatywę UNODA „Młodzież na rzecz bezpieczeństwa biologicznego”. Innym ważnym aspektem wsparcia unijnego było upowszechnianie konwencji. W 2022 r. UE pomogła sfinansować oenztetowskie warsztaty dla Afryki poświęcone upowszechnianiu konwencji i wydała démarche dotyczące upowszechniania skierowane do państw, które nie były jeszcze stronami konwencji.

## **RAKIETY BALISTYCZNE**

Haski kodeks postępowania przeciwko rozprzestrzenianiu rakiet balistycznych (HCoC) jest jedynym wielostronnym instrumentem służącym wprowadzaniu przejrzystości i budowaniu zaufania w zakresie rakiet balistycznych. Państwa, które są sygnatariuszami HCoC podejmują dobrowolne zobowiązanie do przesyłania ostrzeżeń poprzedzających wystrzelenie rakiet balistycznych i rakiet nośnych oraz do składania rocznej deklaracji w sprawie ich polityki dotyczącej rakiet balistycznych i rakiet nośnych.

UE stanowczo popiera HCoC od jego powstania. Podpisały go wszystkie państwa członkowskie UE. Unia regularnie kontaktuje się z państwami niebędącymi sygnatariuszami, by wspierać dalsze upowszechnianie HCoC. Obecnie 144 państwa członkowskie ONZ przystąpiły do tego kodeksu. Za pośrednictwem pewnych kolejnych decyzji Rady, UE finansuje od 2006 r. działania popularyzatorskie dotyczące HCoC, imprezy towarzyszące, prace naukowe, spotkania ekspertów i regionalne sesje informacyjne. Działania te są prowadzone przez *Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique* z siedzibą w Paryżu. Z reguły uczestniczy w nich również przewodniczący HCoC. W 2022 r. przygotowano nową decyzję Rady przedłużającą do 2026 r. wsparcie UE poprzez nowe działanie <sup>(13)</sup>. Głównym celem działania jest upowszechnianie, pełne wdrożenie, a także lepsze włączenie haskiego kodeksu postępowania do działań na rzecz ograniczenia rozprzestrzeniania rakiet balistycznych.

<sup>(13)</sup> Została przyjęta przez Radę 17 stycznia 2023 r. jako decyzja Rady (WPZiB) 2023/124 (Dz.U. L 16 z 18.1.2023, s. 36).

30–31 maja 2022 r. odbyło się w Wiedniu 21. doroczne posiedzenie zwyczajne w ramach HCoC w kontekście pełnoskalowej rosyjskiej inwazji wojskowej na Ukrainę. Na posiedzeniu UE i jej państwa członkowskie potwierdziły swoje zdecydowane poparcie dla kodeksu, jego upowszechnienia, pełnego wdrożenia i skutecznego funkcjonowania<sup>(13)</sup>. W przeciwieństwie do poprzednich dorocznych posiedzeń zwyczajnych państwa sygnatariusze HCoC nie wydały komunikatu prasowego z tego spotkania.

W 2022 r. 20. rocznica przyjęcia haskiego kodeksu postępowania przeciwko rozprzestrzenianiu rakiet balistycznych (HCoC) była dla UE okazją do zwrócenia większej uwagi społeczności międzynarodowej na ten kodeks, w tym poprzez intensywniejsze działania informacyjne skierowane do państw, które jeszcze go nie podpisały<sup>(14)</sup>. UE, Niemcy i Francja obchodziły tę rocznicę, organizując 1 czerwca w Wiedniu międzynarodową imprezę informacyjną poświęconą HCoC oraz – w listopadzie – wizytę na europejskim kosmodromie w Kourou w Gujanie Francuskiej, jako jeden z kluczowych środków służących przejrzystości HCoC.

#### REZOLUCJA RADY BEZPIECZEŃSTWA NARODÓW ZJEDNOCZONYCH NR 1540

UE uznaje rezolucję Rady Bezpieczeństwa nr 1540 za jeden z głównych filarów międzynarodowego porządku nieproliferaacji, który jest jednym z kluczowych elementów globalnych wysiłków na rzecz zapobiegania rozprzestrzenianiu broni masowego rażenia, w tym wśród terrorystów i innych podmiotów niepaństwowych.

Ochrona przed rozprzestrzenianiem materiałów i know-how wymaga nie tylko wdrożenia za pośrednictwem prawodawstwa krajowego, ale również działań i monitorowania ponad granicami i sektorami. UE współpracuje z krajami partnerskimi, by zwiększyć ich zdolności do przestrzegania postanowień rezolucji nr 1540 i wspiera agencje ONZ w ich działaniach na rzecz propagowania zrozumienia i przestrzegania przepisów.

UE była aktywnie zaangażowana w otwarte konsultacje dotyczące kompleksowego przeglądu rezolucji RB ONZ nr 1540, które odbyły się w Nowym Jorku 31 maja – 2 czerwca 2022 r. UE z zadowoleniem przyjęła nowy dziesięcioletni mandat Komitetu przewidziany w rezolucji nr 2663 (2022) przyjętej 30 listopada 2022 r. oraz decyzję, że Komitet dokona przeglądu swoich wewnętrznych wytycznych w kwestiach dotyczących grupy ekspertów. UE z zadowoleniem przyjęła fakt, że w nowej rezolucji nr 2663 (2022) po raz pierwszy podkreślono znaczący udział kobiet w dalszym wzmacnianiu prac Komitetu.

Wsparcie UE na rzecz wdrożenia rezolucji RB ONZ nr 1540 przez państwa członkowskie ONZ obejmuje w szczególności:

- Inicjatywa UE w zakresie centrów doskonałości ds. substancji chemicznych, biologicznych, radiologicznych i jądrowych (CBRJ) zapewnia znaczną pomoc w ograniczaniu ryzyka związanego z przypadkowymi, naturalnymi lub przestępczymi incydentami w krajach partnerskich. Ta inicjatywa oparta na potrzebach i zapotrzebowaniu wzmacnia zarządzanie bezpieczeństwem w przypadku wszystkich zagrożeń, zarówno na szczeblu krajowym, jak i regionalnym. Dysponując budżetem w wysokości prawie 150 mln USD w latach 2021–28, centra doskonałości ds. CBRJ wspierają budowanie zdolności również poprzez ćwiczenia transgraniczne w czasie rzeczywistym z udziałem 64 państw.
- UE pomaga państwom w ograniczaniu zagrożeń CBRJ za pośrednictwem programu EU P2P w zakresie kontroli wywozu towarów podwójnego zastosowania, który koncentruje się na zmniejszaniu ryzyka rozprzestrzeniania broni masowego rażenia poprzez zacieśnienie współpracy międzynarodowej w dziedzinie kontroli handlu produktami podwójnego zastosowania oraz wzmocnienie zdolności krajowych i regionalnych.
- Unijne wsparcie z budżetu WPZiB dla innych państw związane konkretnie z wdrażaniem rezolucji nr 1540 jest od 2006 r. przekazywane za pośrednictwem dwóch wspólnych działań Rady i czterech decyzji Rady WPZiB (zob. załącznik II). Wsparcie to przyczyniło się do zmniejszenia liczby państw, które nie przedłożyły sprawozdania, oraz państw, które nie przedstawiły dodatkowych informacji wymaganych przez Komitet 1540 w następstwie przedłożenia niekompletnych sprawozdań. Do 2022 r. wsparcie to wyniosło łącznie prawie 9 mln EUR.
- UE pomaga państwom trzecim w wypełnianiu ich zobowiązań wynikających z rezolucji nr 1540 poprzez wdrażanie wielostronnych traktatów o nieproliferaacji. Wsparcie z budżetu WPZiB odbywa się poprzez dwustronną współpracę i partnerstwa pomocowe oraz wsparcie dla ONZ i organizacji regionalnych. To wsparcie dla wysiłków na rzecz nieproliferaacji koncentruje się w szczególności na konwencji o zakazie broni biologicznej i toksycznej (BTWC), konwencji o zakazie broni chemicznej (CWC), Układzie o nierozprzestrzenianiu broni jądrowej (NPT), mechanizmie dochodzeniowym Sekretarza Generalnego w związku z domniemanym użyciem broni chemicznej i biologicznej (UNSGM) oraz haskim kodeksie postępowania.

<sup>(13)</sup> Oświadczenie UE na 21. doroczne posiedzenie zwyczajne haskiego kodeksu postępowania przeciwko rozprzestrzenianiu rakiet balistycznych (HCoC) wydane 30 maja 2022 r.

<sup>(14)</sup> UE łączy siły w walce z rozprzestrzenianiem rakiet balistycznych.

- Warto również podkreślić znaczenie kontroli wywozu w kontekście rezolucji RB ONZ nr 1540 dla zapobiegania rozprzestrzenianiu broni masowego rażenia. W rezolucji wzywa się państwa do ustanowienia, rozwijania i utrzymania odpowiedniej, skutecznej krajowej kontroli wywozu i przeladunku materiałów związanych z bronią jądrową, chemiczną lub biologiczną, lub środkami jej przenoszenia oraz do podjęcia wspólnych działań w celu zapobiegania nielegalnemu handlowi nimi. UE aktywnie uczestniczy we wszystkich wielostronnych systemach kontroli wywozu broni masowego rażenia, a także w pracach prowadzonych w ramach inicjatywy partnerstwa globalnego G-7 przeciwko rozprzestrzenianiu broni masowego rażenia.

## **BROŃ KONWENCJONALNA**

### **Broń strzelecka i lekka**

Zgodnie ze strategią UE na rzecz zwalczania nielegalnej broni palnej, broni strzeleckiej i lekkiej (BSiL) oraz amunicji do tych rodzajów broni „Zabezpieczenie broni, ochrona obywateli” z 2018 r. UE była w 2022 r. w pełni zaangażowana w działania służące zapobieganiu nielegalnemu handlowi BSiL i amunicją do tych rodzajów broni oraz ograniczaniu tego handlu, a także propagowaniu rozliczalności i odpowiedzialności w odniesieniu do legalnego handlu nimi.

W 2022 r. UE kontynuowała realizację kilku klasycznych projektów kontroli BSiL, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem dobrowolnych cywilnych kampanii dotyczących rozbrowienia, gromadzenia i niszczenia nadwyżek BSiL i amunicji, bezpieczeństwa fizycznego i zarządzania zapasami BSiL i amunicji oraz budowania zdolności w zakresie znakowania, rejestrowania i śledzenia. Większość tych projektów ma zasięg regionalny i została wdrożona z pomocą organizacji regionalnych.

Wspieranie Ukrainy w obronie jej suwerenności narodowej i integralności terytorialnej przed nielegalną i niczym niesprokowaną rosyjską agresją wojskową poprzez dostarczanie Ukrainie różnego rodzaju broni było priorytetem politycznym i strategiczną koniecznością dla UE i jej państw członkowskich. Państwa członkowskie UE uzgodniły, że wywóz sprzętu wojskowego do Ukrainy jest w pełni zgodny ze zobowiązaniami prawnymi wynikającymi ze wspólnego stanowiska 2008/944/WPZiB w sprawie wywozu broni oraz ze zobowiązaniami wynikającymi z Traktatu o handlu bronią, a także z elementami wstępnymi porozumienia z Wassenaar, zgodnie z którymi „to porozumienie nie będzie ingerować w prawa państw do nabywania legalnych środków obrony zgodnie z art. 51 Karty Narodów Zjednoczonych”. Przepisy te zakazują wywozu do agresora, a nie do państwa będącego ofiarą agresji zewnętrznej. Biorąc pod uwagę liczne poważne naruszenia przez Rosję konwencji genewskich, w tym ataki na ludność i obiekty cywilne, transfer broni do Rosji nie byłby dozwolony na mocy Traktatu o handlu bronią. UE stale wzywa wszystkie państwa strony Traktatu o handlu bronią do powstrzymania się od jakichkolwiek transferów do Rosji.

Prowadzenie rejestrów BSiL i innego sprzętu wojskowego należy do obowiązków krajowych. Sprzęt wojskowy, broń i amunicja dostarczane przez państwa członkowskie UE w ramach Europejskiego Instrumentu na rzecz Pokoju były starannie rejestrowane przez ESDZ na podstawie świadectwa weryfikacji dostawy podpisanego przez władze Ukrainy i dostarczonego przez podmioty realizujące w państwach członkowskich UE. Ponadto UE i Ukraina od dawna współpracowały w zakresie zagrożeń wynikających z przenikania BSiL i nielegalnego handlu nią. W 2022 r. głównymi finansowanymi przez UE projektami wspierającymi wysiłki Ukrainy na rzecz zwalczania nielegalnego handlu BSiL, amunicją i materiałami wybuchowymi są decyzje Rady UE (WPZiB) 2018/1788 <sup>(15)</sup> i 2019/2111 <sup>(16)</sup>, których głównym podmiotem wdrażającym jest SEESAC (UNDP), decyzja Rady (WPZiB) 2019/2009 <sup>(17)</sup> z OBWE jako głównym podmiotem wdrażającym oraz decyzja Rady (WPZiB) 2019/2191 <sup>(18)</sup> wspierająca iTrace IV.

W planie działania UE w sprawie nielegalnego handlu bronią palną na lata 2020–2025 Ukraina została uznana za region o kluczowym znaczeniu dla konkretnych działań na szczeblu zewnętrznym. W tym kontekście Ukraina uczestniczyła w ostatniej konferencji ministerialnej UE–Bałkany Zachodnie, która odbyła się we wrześniu 2021 r., poświęconej zwalczaniu nielegalnego handlu bronią palną w Europie Południowo-Wschodniej, dotyczącej wdrożenia konkretnych działań na rzecz Europy Południowo-Wschodniej przewidzianych w planie działania UE w sprawie nielegalnego handlu bronią palną, w tym realizacji planu działania dotyczącego kompleksowej kontroli BSiL, a także działań dotyczących krajowych punktów kontaktowych ds. broni palnej.

W 2022 r., zgodnie z priorytetami regionalnymi określonymi w strategii UE dotyczącej BSiL, UE nadal wspierała partnerów z Bałkanów Zachodnich za pośrednictwem decyzji UE (WPZiB) 2018/1788 i 2019/2111, przy czym głównym podmiotem wdrażającym był SEESAC (UNDP). Bałkany Zachodnie pozostają największym odbiorcą regionalnego wsparcia UE na rzecz kontroli broni konwencjonalnej. Jednym z priorytetów UE pozostaje realizacja planu działania dla Bałkanów Zachodnich

<sup>(15)</sup> Dz.U. L 293 z 20.11.2018, s. 11.

<sup>(16)</sup> Dz.U. L 318 z 10.12.2019, s. 147.

<sup>(17)</sup> Dz.U. L 312 z 3.12.2019, s. 42.

<sup>(18)</sup> Dz.U. L 330 z 20.12.2019, s. 53.

przeciwko nielegalnemu handlowi bronią palną. Ponadto skuteczne podejście oparte na regionalnym planie działania na Bałkanach Zachodnich stało się wzorem działania dla innych regionalnych inicjatyw w zakresie kontroli broni konwencjonalnej.

UE aktywnie uczestniczyła w 8. organizowanym co dwa lata spotkaniu państw poświęconym Programowi działania ONZ na rzecz zapobiegania nielegalnemu handlowi bronią strzelecką i lekką, zwalczania i eliminowania go we wszystkich aspektach (Nowy Jork, 27 czerwca – 1 lipca 2022 r.). UE wydała oświadczenia dotyczące wszystkich trzech istotnych punktów porządku obrad i aktywnie uczestniczyła w konsultacjach dotyczących dokumentu końcowego.

Dokument roboczy przedłożony przez UE przed posiedzeniem umożliwił odzwierciedlenie w dokumencie końcowym wielu celów Unii. Jednak nie udało się wypracować konsensusu w sprawie stanowiska popieranego przez UE i większość państw uczestniczących w odniesieniu do kwestii takich jak włączenie amunicji do zakresu programu działania ONZ, sformułowanie dotyczące otwartej grupy roboczej ekspertów technicznych oraz odniesienie do „synergii” między programem działania a Traktatem o handlu bronią i protokołem w sprawie broni palnej.

Od 2013 r. UE wspiera iTrace, globalny mechanizm raportowania w zakresie nielegalnej broni konwencjonalnej i amunicji do tych rodzajów broni na obszarach dotkniętych konfliktami. W okresie sprawozdawczym iTrace prowadził operacje w terenie na obszarach objętych konfliktem na Bliskim Wschodzie, w Afryce Zachodniej i Wschodniej, w Zatoce Perskiej, Azji Środkowej i w Ukrainie, wspierając wysiłki na rzecz zakłócenia nielegalnego handlu bronią i amunicją. W ramach operacji w Ukrainie szczegółowo udokumentowano i przesłędzono rosyjskie i irańskie zaawansowane systemy uzbrojenia.

Wspieranie i propagowanie równouprawnienia płci i wzmocnienia pozycji kobiet są centralnym elementem polityki UE, zarówno w kraju, jak i za granicą. Zgodnie ze swoją strategią dotyczącą BSiL UE systematycznie uwzględnia problematykę płci przy opracowywaniu nowych projektów związanych ze zwalczaniem przemocy z użyciem broni palnej i ogólnie z kontrolą BSiL. Ponadto UE nadal wspierała opracowywanie uznanego na poziomie międzynarodowym systemu walidowania zarządzania bronią i amunicją w celu zapobiegania nielegalnej proliferacji

Unia kontynuowała również, w ramach różnych dialogów politycznych, propagowanie upowszechniania i skutecznego wdrażania Traktatu o handlu bronią. UE utrzymała wsparcie finansowe dla programu wsparcia wdrażania Traktatu, udzielając krajom Afryki, Ameryki Łacińskiej oraz Azji Południowo-Wschodniej i Środkowej pomocy technicznej we wzmacnianiu ich systemów krajowych zgodnie z wymogami Traktatu, a także utrzymała swoje wsparcie dla Sekretariatu Traktatu o handlu bronią. Unia nadal promowała również skuteczne kontrole wywozu broni wśród krajów Europy Południowej i Wschodniej, Kaukazu, Bliskiego Wschodu i Afryki Północnej, a także Azji Środkowej.

## **Miny przeciwpiechotne**

W 2022 r. UE nadal przyczyniała się do zapewniania bezpieczeństwa ludzkiego, wspierając realizację Planu działania z Oslo na lata 2020–2024 przyjętego przez państwa strony na czwartej konferencji przeglądowej Konwencji z 1997 r. o zakazie użycia, składowania, produkcji i przekazywania min przeciwpiechotnych oraz o ich zniszczeniu. Opierając się na decyzji Rady 2021/257<sup>(19)</sup>, UE dążyła do następujących celów: a) wspierania wysiłków państw stron na rzecz realizacji badań i rozminowywania, oraz edukacji na temat zagrożenia związanego z minami i zmniejszenia obciążeń regulacyjnych Planu działania z Oslo; b) wspierania wysiłków państw stron na rzecz realizacji tych aspektów Planu działania z Oslo, które dotyczą pomocy ofiarom; c) propagowania powszechnego stosowania konwencji i promowania norm przeciwko jakimkolwiek zastosowaniom wobec jakichkolwiek przypadków użycia, składowania, produkcji i przekazywania min przeciwpiechotnych oraz ich niszczenia; d) wspierania wysiłków tych państw stron konwencji, które zachowują miny przeciwpiechotne do dozwolonych celów, by zwiększać zdolności sprawozdawcze i zapewnić, że liczba takich zachowanych min nie przekroczy minimalnej liczby bezwzględnie koniecznej, oraz – w miarę możliwości – poprzez szukanie alternatyw dla wykorzystywania uzbrojonych min przeciwpiechotnych do celów szkolenia i badań; oraz e) wykazywania trwałego zobowiązania UE i jej państw członkowskich do realizowania konwencji oraz ich zdecydowanej woli współpracy z tymi państwami stronami, które potrzebują pomocy w wypełnianiu ich zobowiązań wynikających z konwencji, i udzielania im takiej pomocy, w ten sposób wzmacniając przewodnią rolę UE w realizacji założenia przyświecającego konwencji: ostatecznego zakończenia cierpień i utraty życia powodowanych przez miny przeciwpiechotne.

Obchodząc 25. rocznicę podpisania konwencji o zakazie stosowania min przeciwpiechotnych i świętując jej duży sukces, społeczność zakazująca min – w tym państwa strony konwencji; organizacje międzynarodowe; społeczeństwo obywatelskie; osoby, które przeżyły wybuch min przeciwpiechotnych, i podmioty zajmujące się rozminowywaniem – podczas 20. spotkania państw stron pokazała, że jest zdecydowana osiągnąć cel, jakim jest świat wolny od min do 2025 r. Ze względu na pandemię COVID-19, znaczne zmniejszenie globalnego finansowania na działania przeciwminowe i poważne wyzwania w zakresie bezpieczeństwa, w tym niedawne użycie min przeciwpiechotnych przez Rosję w Ukrainie, realizacja tego celu oddala się, chociaż zaangażowanie jest nadal silne.

<sup>(19)</sup> Dz.U. L 58 z 19.2.2021, s. 41.

UE jest jednym z największych darczyńców na rzecz rozminowywania, pomocy ofiarom i wspierania realizacji Planu działania z Oslo. Oprócz propagowania wsparcia unijnego w czterech oświadczeniach UE, Unia została uznana za najważniejszego partnera wspierającego reintegrację ofiar min przeciwpiechotnych w codziennym życiu, w szczególności poprzez projekty w Kolumbii, Gwinei Bissau, Bośni i Hercegowinie oraz Kambodży.

## SYSTEMY KONTROLI WYWOZU

UE w pełni popiera istniejące wielostronne systemy kontroli wywozu (Grupa Australijska, System Kontrolny Technologii Rakietowych, Grupa Dostawców Jądrowych, porozumienie z Wassenaar i Komitet Zanggera) <sup>(20)</sup>. Podkreśla ich kluczową rolę w zapobieganiu rozprzestrzenianiu broni masowego rażenia i środków jej przenoszenia, wdrażaniu embarga RB ONZ oraz propagowaniu przejrzystości i większej odpowiedzialności za transfer broni konwencjonalnej oraz towarów i technologii podwójnego zastosowania, zapobiegając w ten sposób destabilizującemu gromadzeniu broni. UE przyczynia się do pełnego wdrożenia trwałych mechanizmów nieproliferaacji przewidzianych w traktatach i rezolucjach RB ONZ, propagując solidne kontrole wywozu i stosowne przepisy na całym świecie. Unia udziela również szerokiego wsparcia krajom partnerskim w tworzeniu lub wzmacnianiu ich własnych systemów kontroli wywozu w celu wdrożenia rezolucji RB ONZ nr 1540 za pośrednictwem centrów doskonałości ds. CBRJ oraz programu EU P2P ATT. Wielostronne systemy kontroli wywozu sprzyjają legalnemu transferowi towarów i technologii podwójnego zastosowania, które mają zasadnicze znaczenie dla współpracy międzynarodowej w zakresie pokojowych zastosowań.

Mając to na uwadze, UE nadal sprzeciwiała się na forum Pierwszego Komitetu Zgromadzenia Ogólnego ONZ chińskiej rezolucji „Promowanie współpracy międzynarodowej w zakresie pokojowego wykorzystania w kontekście bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego”, w tym poprzez globalne działania informacyjne i spotkania z grupami regionalnymi państw członkowskich ONZ przed głosowaniem. Unia postrzega rezolucję jako próbę osłabienia systemów kontroli wywozu poprzez fałszywe oznaczanie jako „nadmierne ograniczenia” w odniesieniu do pokojowych zastosowań tych kontroli wywozu, które są konieczne i wymagane na mocy prawnie wiążących instrumentów międzynarodowych do celów nierozprzestrzeniania broni jądrowej. Nie ma dowodów na poparcie twierdzenia, że istniejące kontrole wywozu dotyczące nieproliferaacji i wielostronne systemy kontroli wywozu są niewłaściwie wykorzystywane ze szkodą dla pokojowych zastosowań lub że hamują zrównoważony rozwój.

## Grupa Dostawców Jądrowych

Grupa Dostawców Jądrowych stara się przyczynić do nierozprzestrzeniania broni jądrowej poprzez wdrożenie dwóch zestawów wytycznych dotyczących wywozu materiałów jądrowych i wywozu związanego z energią jądrową, które są wdrażane przez każdy uczestniczący rząd zgodnie z jego krajowymi przepisami i praktykami dotyczącymi wymogów licencyjnych. Wszystkie państwa członkowskie UE są uczestniczącymi rządami Grupy Dostawców Jądrowych. Komisja Europejska uczestniczy w niej w charakterze obserwatora.

Obrady Grupy są poufne. UE aktywnie uczestniczyła w sesji plenarnej w 2022 r. (Warszawa, 23–24 czerwca), delegując na nią przedstawicieli Komisji Europejskiej (TRADE/JRC) i ESDZ. Po raz pierwszy w historii Grupa Dostawców Jądrowych nie przyjęła żadnego oświadczenia publicznego.

## Grupa Australijska

Grupa Australijska jest grupą krajów o podobnych poglądach, dążącą do harmonizacji kontroli wywozu chemikaliów, czynników biologicznych i powiązanych technologii podwójnego zastosowania. Liczy 43 członków, w tym UE i wszystkie jej państwa członkowskie.

Obrady Grupy Australijskiej są poufne. W 2022 r. Grupa wznowiła posiedzenia fizyczne po pandemii COVID-19. UE aktywnie uczestniczyła w posiedzeniu plenarnym Grupy Australijskiej w Paryżu 4–8 lipca, w tym w dyskusjach na temat zagrożenia użyciem przez Rosję broni chemicznej i biologicznej oraz dokonaniem ataków na cywilne obiekty biologiczne i chemiczne w Ukrainie i w ich pobliżu, a także w sprawie wspólnych obaw związanych z nieuzasadnionymi twierdzeniami Rosji dotyczącymi broni chemicznej i biologicznej, w tym roszczeń wobec Ukrainy i Stanów Zjednoczonych.

<sup>(20)</sup> UE jest uczestnikiem Grupy Australijskiej i stałym obserwatorem w Komitecie Zanggera. Komisja Europejska jest obserwatorem w Grupie Dostawców Jądrowych. Jednocześnie we wszystkich pięciu systemach kontroli wywozu UE zapewnia polityczną koordynację stanowisk uczestniczących w nich państw członkowskich Unii, na przykład w celu składania oświadczeń w imieniu UE.

## MTCR

Reżim Kontrolny Technologii Raketowych (MTCR) jest nieformalnym i dobrowolnym stowarzyszeniem państw, które wyznają wspólne cele nierozprzestrzeniania bezzałogowych systemów przenoszenia broni zdolnych do przenoszenia broni masowego rażenia i które dążą do koordynacji krajowych wysiłków w zakresie udzielania zezwoleń na wywóz mających na celu zapobieganie jej rozprzestrzenianiu. MTCR ma do odegrania kluczową rolę w zwalczaniu rozprzestrzeniania rakiet balistycznych, pocisków manewrujących i technologii bezzałogowych statków powietrznych. Obecnie 18 państw członkowskich UE jest członkami MTCR. Kwestią o podstawowym znaczeniu dla Unii w kontekście MTCR jest zablokowane przystąpienie dziewięciu państw członkowskich UE: Chorwacji, Cypru, Estonii, Litwy, Łotwy, Malty, Rumunii, Słowacji i Słowenii. Jednolity zestaw unijnych przepisów dotyczących kontroli wywozu na podstawie rozporządzenia UE w sprawie kontroli wywozu wdraża wytyczne i wykazy kontrolne MTCR oraz zapewnia ich skuteczne stosowanie we wszystkich państwach członkowskich UE, w tym tych, które nie są jeszcze członkami MTCR.

Obrady MTCR są poufne. UE zawsze opowiada się za przyjmowaniem zdecydowanych oświadczeń MTCR skierowanych do opinii publicznej, odzwierciedlających międzynarodowe obawy dotyczące przypadków wystrzelenia rakiet balistycznych i znaczących postępów w technologii raketowej poczynionych przede wszystkim przez Iran i KRLD. Posiedzenie plenarne MTCR w 2022 r. odbyło się pod przewodnictwem Szwajcarii w Montreux 17–21 października. Po posiedzeniu MTCR nie opublikowano żadnego oświadczenia publicznego. 8 listopada 2022 r. opublikowano „Przesłanie na 35. rocznicę Reżimu Kontrolnego Technologii Raketowej”, przyjęte przez partnerów MTCR.

## Porozumienie z Wassenaar

Porozumienie z Wassenaar zostało ustanowione, by przyczynić się do regionalnego i międzynarodowego bezpieczeństwa i stabilności poprzez propagowanie przejrzystości i większej odpowiedzialności za transfer broni konwencjonalnej oraz towarów i technologii podwójnego zastosowania. Państwa uczestniczące stosują kontrole wywozu w odniesieniu do wszystkich produktów wymienionych w wykazie towarów i technologii podwójnego zastosowania oraz w wykazie amunicji, które regularnie poddają przeglądowi. Działania te mają zapobiegać nieuprawnionemu transferowi lub ponownemu transferowi tych towarów.

Oba wykazy stanowią podstawę odpowiednio unijnego wykazu kontrolnego produktów podwójnego zastosowania i wspólnego wykazu uzbrojenia UE, które są regularnie aktualizowane przez Radę w następstwie decyzji na mocy porozumienia z Wassenaar. Państwa uczestniczące dążą, poprzez swoje polityki krajowe, do zapewnienia, aby transfery tych produktów nie przyczyniały się do rozwoju lub wzmocnienia zdolności wojskowych, które podważają te cele, i nie były wykorzystywane do wspierania takich zdolności ani nabywane przez terrorystów. Państwa uczestniczące również regularnie wymieniają informacje i są zobowiązane do regularnego zgłaszania transferów uzbrojenia i transferów/zakazów niektórych towarów i technologii podwójnego zastosowania do miejsc przeznaczenia poza państwami porozumienia. Porozumienie z Wassenaar podpisały 42 państwa uczestniczące, w tym 26 państw członkowskich UE.

Obrady państw uczestniczących są poufne. W 2022 r. posiedzenie plenarne porozumienia z Wassenaar, pierwsze od 2019 r. ze względu na pandemię COVID-19, odbyło się 30 listopada i 1 grudnia w Wiedniu. Podczas niego uzgodniono aktualizację obu wykazów kontrolnych systemu.

## POWSTAJĄCE TECHNOLOGIE

W 2022 r. UE nadal rozwijała wiedzę na temat powstających technologii o potencjalnym wpływie na bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe i rozbrojenie oraz uczestniczyła w międzynarodowych wysiłkach na rzecz zarządzania nimi i zarządzania możliwymi zagrożeniami, jakie mogą one stwarzać.

W 2022 r. Unia przyjęła dwie decyzje Rady w tej konkretnej dziedzinie:

- Decyzją Rady (WPZiB) 2022/2269 z dnia 18 listopada 2022 r. wspierającą realizację projektu „Promowanie odpowiedzialnych innowacji w dziedzinie sztucznej inteligencji na rzecz pokoju i bezpieczeństwa” UE wspiera większe zaangażowanie cywilnej społeczności zajmującej się sztuczną inteligencją (AI) w ograniczanie ryzyka, jakie przekierowywanie i niewłaściwe wykorzystywanie cywilnych badań naukowych i innowacji w dziedzinie sztucznej inteligencji przez nieodpowiedzialne podmioty może stwarzać dla międzynarodowego pokoju i bezpieczeństwa.
- Decyzja Rady (WPZiB) 2022/2320 z dnia 25 listopada 2022 r. dotycząca unijnego wsparcia dla realizacji projektu „Odblokowanie potencjału innowacyjności: technologie prorozwojowe i bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe” wspiera prace prowadzone przez UNIDIR w ramach programu bezpieczeństwa i technologii, by poszerzać wiedzę i zwiększać zrozumienie nowych i powstających technologii mających znaczenie dla bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego.

UE nadal odpowiadała na konieczność zapewnienia, aby cała broń, również w dziedzinie powstających technologii, była zgodna z prawem międzynarodowym, a w szczególności z międzynarodowym prawem humanitarnym, z uwzględnieniem odpowiednich aspektów etycznych. Unia dalej propagowała swoje stanowisko, zgodnie z którym to człowiek ma być odpowiedzialny za decyzje dotyczące użycia broni oraz że należy zachować odpowiedzialność człowieka przez cały cykl życia systemu uzbrojenia.

W 2022 r. UE nadal uczestniczyła w pracach Grupy Ekspertów Rządowych ds. Nowych Technologii w dziedzinie Systemów Śmiercionośnej Broni Autonomicznej w ramach Konwencji o zakazie lub ograniczeniu użycia pewnych broni konwencjonalnych (CCW). Unia wspierała prace na forum grupy ekspertów rządowych w zakresie dwustopniowego podejścia do regulacji systemów śmiercionośnej broni autonomicznej, rozróżniając systemy uzbrojenia oparte na powstających technologiach w obszarze Systemów Śmiercionośnej Broni Autonomicznej, które nie mogą być stosowane zgodnie z przepisami i zasadami międzynarodowego prawa humanitarnego, oraz systemy, które mają autonomiczne cechy, ale mogą być stosowane zgodnie z międzynarodowym prawem humanitarnym. UE była rozczarowana faktem, że pomimo znacznych postępów koncepcyjnych w 2022 r. państwom stronom konwencji CCW nie udało się uzgodnić żadnego istotnego sprawozdania.

### WSPÓŁPRACA Z OŚRODKAMI ANALITYCZNYMI I ORGANIZACJAMI POZARZĄDOWYMI

Na podstawie decyzji Rady 2010/430/WPZiB <sup>(21)</sup> z dnia 26 lipca 2010 r. realizacja strategii UE przeciw rozprzestrzenianiu broni masowego rażenia jest aktywnie wspomagana przez Konsorcjum UE ds. Nieprolifracji i Rozbrojenia (EUNPDC), które rozpoczęło działalność w styczniu 2011 r. Trzeci etap projektu EUNPDC był realizowany od 18 maja 2018 r. do 17 maja 2022 r. na mocy decyzji Rady UE (WPZiB) 2018/299 <sup>(22)</sup>. 11 kwietnia 2022 r. Rada przyjęła decyzję (WPZiB) 2022/597 <sup>(23)</sup>, która przedłuża wsparcie UE dla działań konsorcjum na okres 2022–2025 poprzez wykorzystanie dotychczasowych osiągnięć i dodanie nowych projektów.

Działania konsorcjum w znacznym stopniu przyczyniły się do kształtowania unijnej polityki w dziedzinie nieprolifracji i rozbrojenia oraz do zwiększenia wiedzy państw trzecich i społeczeństwa obywatelskiego o wysiłkach podejmowanych przez UE. Konsorcjum jest platformą umożliwiającą nieformalne kontakty między praktykami w tej dziedzinie i stymulującą dialog między różnymi podmiotami. Jego działalność pomogła zwiększyć świadomość wyzwań związanych z bronią masowego rażenia i bronią konwencjonalną i poszukiwać rozwiązań pozwalających sprostać tym wyzwaniom. Opiera się ona na rozległej sieci 109 ośrodków analitycznych i badawczych w całej Europie, skupiającej członków ze wszystkich państw członkowskich UE, a także z Norwegii, Serbii, Szwajcarii, Turcji, Ukrainy i Zjednoczonego Królestwa. W 2022 r. do sieci dołączyły trzy instytuty.

W swoich pracach na rzecz osiągnięcia celów decyzji Rady konsorcjum kładzie szczególny nacisk na uwzględnianie perspektywy płci i promowanie następnego pokolenia naukowców i praktyków w dziedzinie nieprolifracji i rozbrojenia, a także na łączenie luk między naukami przyrodniczymi i naukami społecznymi, między decydentami a środowiskiem akademickim oraz między środowiskiem akademickim a instytutami badawczymi zajmującymi się polityką. W ramach swojego zaangażowania w realizację tych priorytetów konsorcjum organizuje szkolenia informacyjne na temat nieprolifracji dla studentów studiów magisterskich i podyplomowych w dziedzinie nauk przyrodniczych i inżynierskich oraz realizuje program działań i opieki mentorskiej skierowany do nowej generacji i młodych kobiet, który obejmuje również organizację wizyt informacyjnych na uniwersytetach w Europie oraz seminariów internetowych poświęconych określonym tematom. Wszystkie wydarzenia organizowane przez konsorcjum zapewniały różnorodność uczestników i prelegentów pod względem płci, wieku, wiedzy fachowej i reprezentacji geograficznej.

Ze względu na okoliczności związane z pandemią COVID-19 niektóre wydarzenia odbyły się w formie wirtualnym lub hybrydowym. W 2022 r. konsorcjum zorganizowało następujące działania, by wdrożyć różne aspekty decyzji Rady (WPZiB) 2022/597 i (WPZiB) 2022/597:

- Kurs wprowadzający na temat rozprzestrzeniania broni masowego rażenia dla studentów studiów magisterskich i podyplomowych w dziedzinie informatyki i inżynierii „Rozprzestrzenianie broni jądrowej: historia, zagrożenia i rozwiązania” (23–25 lutego)
- Seminaria: „Powstające technologie” (24 lutego); „Wzmacnianie uwzględniania aspektu płci w rozbrojeniu i nieprolifracji” (30 marca); „Broń niejądrowa i strategiczna stabilność w Europie: teoria i praktyka” (29 kwietnia); „Bezpieczeństwo, broń jądrowa i skutki wojny w Ukrainie” (5 maja); oraz „Wojna w Ukrainie: wpływ na międzynarodowy porządek bezpieczeństwa, nieprolifrację, rozbrojenie, kontrolę zbrojeń, kontrolę wywozu” (16–17 maja)

<sup>(21)</sup> Dz.U. L 202 z 4.8.2010, s. 5.

<sup>(22)</sup> Dz.U. L 56 z 28.2.2018, s. 46.

<sup>(23)</sup> Dz.U. L 114 z 12.4.2022, s. 75.

- 11. posiedzenie konsultacyjne UE, z udziałem urzędników UE i ekspertów europejskich (14-15 września)
- 3. wizyta w Brukseli stypendystów ONZ w dziedzinie rozbrojenia (14–16 września)
- 6. doroczne posiedzenie europejskiej sieci niezależnych ośrodków analitycznych zajmujących się nieproliferacją i rozbrojeniem (8 listopada)
- 11. konferencja UE poświęcona nieproliferaacji i rozbrojeniu (14–15 listopada)
- Warsztaty „Next Generation” (14 listopada)
- Kurs wprowadzający na temat rozprzestrzeniania broni masowego rażenia dla studentów studiów magisterskich i podyplomowych kierunków inżynierskich „Nierozprzestrzenianie broni masowego rażenia i ścieżki rozbrojenia” (6–8 grudnia).

W 2022 r. przeprowadzono następujące działania związane z inicjatywą na rzecz młodych kobiet i nowej generacji:

- Inauguracja drugiej edycji programu mentorskiego dla młodych kobiet 15 września (który trwał do 15 maja 2023 r.)
- Ukierunkowane warsztaty na rzecz budowania umiejętności młodych kobiet w ramach działań informacyjnych na rzecz nowej generacji (17 lutego)
- Wydarzenie informacyjne w ramach inicjatywy „Young Women and Next Generation” (YWNGI) pt. „Praca w organizacjach międzynarodowych: wskazówki i spostrzeżenia dla nowej generacji – BWC i OPCW” (31 marca)
- Wizyta na Uniwersytecie w Turynie „Nieproliferaacja i rozbrojenie: bieżące wyzwania i dalsze działania” (5 maja)
- Wizyta na Uniwersytecie Roma Tre promująca prace EUNPDC (10 października)
- Wydarzenie pt. „Możliwości zaangażowania w kontrolę zbrojeń, rozbrojenie i nierozprzestrzenianie broni dla młodych specjalistów i studentów” (19 października)
- Warsztaty na temat zdobywania umiejętności pt. „Nuclear Op-Ed Writing” (18 listopada).

W 2022 r. konsorcjum publikowało comiesięczny biuletyn, jak również wydało cztery dokumenty UE dotyczące nieproliferaacji i rozbrojenia <sup>(24)</sup>. Szkolenia obejmowały kurs e-uczenia się dotyczący nieproliferaacji i rozbrojenia oraz polityk UE, a także wsparcie dla siedmiu staży poświęconych nieproliferaacji i rozbrojeniu w ośrodkach należących do sieci.

## DIALOG I WSPÓŁPRACA Z PAŃSTWAMI TRZECIMI

Zgodnie ze swoją polityką nierozprzestrzeniania BMR i z konkluzjami Rady z 2003 r. UE kontynuowała prace nad włączeniem zobowiązań dotyczących nierozprzestrzeniania BMR do umów z krajami partnerskimi. W 2022 r. UE podpisała z Tajlandią <sup>(25)</sup> i Malesją <sup>(26)</sup> umowy o partnerstwie i współpracy zawierające specjalne klauzule dotyczące broni masowego rażenia i broni konwencjonalnej.

<sup>(24)</sup> Dostępne na stronie internetowej <https://www.nonproliferation.eu/activities/online-publishing/non-proliferation-papers>.

<sup>(25)</sup> Indo-Pacyfik: Unia Europejska i Tajlandia podpisują umowę o partnerstwie i współpracy – Consilium (europa.eu).

<sup>(26)</sup> Indo-Pacyfik: Unia Europejska i Malesja podpisują umowę o partnerstwie i współpracy – Consilium (europa.eu).



Przez cały rok ESDZ nadal angażowała się w dialog na temat nieprolifracji i rozbrojenia z wieloma partnerami. Dialogi na temat nieprolifracji i rozbrojenia przeprowadzono z Indiami i Chinami w lutym 2022 r. oraz z Kubą 22 listopada (poprzedzone seminarium z udziałem przedstawicieli kubańskiego i europejskiego społeczeństwa obywatelskiego 21 listopada) <sup>(27)</sup>. W grudniu 2022 r. przeprowadzono dialog wysokiego szczebla z USA na temat nieprolifracji i rozbrojenia. Ponadto przez cały rok kontynuowano nieformalne konsultacje z wieloma państwami trzecimi i organizacjami międzynarodowymi. Ponadto kwestie związane z nieprolifracją i rozbrojeniem nadal były włączane do różnych dialogów politycznych prowadzonych przez UE z innymi partnerami.

W 2022 r. w ramach G-7 wydano kilka oświadczeń dotyczących nieprolifracji i rozbrojenia, w tym 9 maja oświadczenie Grupy Dyrektorów ds. Nieprolifracji G-7 <sup>(28)</sup>, 14 maja <sup>(29)</sup> i 4 listopada <sup>(30)</sup> – ministrów spraw zagranicznych G-7 oraz 28 czerwca – komunikat przywódców G-7 <sup>(31)</sup>.

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<sup>(27)</sup> Kuba: Dialog polityczny na temat rozbrojenia i nieprolifracji prowadzony z UE/ESDZ (europa.eu).

<sup>(28)</sup> Oświadczenie Grupy Dyrektorów ds. Nieprolifracji G-7 (9 maja 2022 r.) – Ministerstwo Spraw Europejskich i Zagranicznych (diplomatie.gouv.fr).

<sup>(29)</sup> 2022-05-14-g7-foreign-ministers-communique-data.pdf (g7germany.de).

<sup>(30)</sup> Oświadczenie ministrów spraw zagranicznych G-7 – Federalne Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych (auswaertiges-amt.de).

<sup>(31)</sup> 2022-07-14-leaders-communique-data.pdf (g7germany.de).

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## 1. COUNCIL DECISIONS

Overview of EU Council Joint Actions and Council Decisions in the field of Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, including in the framework of the EU Strategy Against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, that were in force in 2022:

### 1.1. NUCLEAR ISSUES

#### 1.1.1. Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1939 of 10 December 2018 on Union support for the universalisation and effective implementation of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT)

**Objective:** With this Decision, the EU is supporting one of the key elements of the global nuclear security and anti-terrorism architecture, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT).

The objectives of the support are to increase the number of adherents to ICSANT, to raise awareness among national policy- and decision-makers, as well as capacity-building to help improve national legislation and to strengthen the capacity of national stakeholders, including criminal justice officials to investigate, prosecute and adjudicate cases of nuclear terrorism. The Council Decision aims to build synergies with ongoing EU projects in support for relevant international legal instruments, such as the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and UN Security Council Resolution 1540. The Council Decision promotes the universalisation and effective implementation of ICSANT through the development and maintenance of a password-protected website on all resources on ICSANT including examples of national legislation; the development of an e-learning module on ICSANT, to be translated into at least four UN official languages; the provision of relevant legislative assistance; capacity-building of relevant stakeholders, including criminal justice officials that could be involved in investigating, prosecuting and adjudicating cases involving nuclear and other radioactive material covered by ICSANT; the holding of global and regional workshops and country visits and by the collection; and the dissemination of good practices.

**Implementing Agency:** United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and United Nations Office for Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT)

**Budget:** EUR 4 999 986

**Official Journal:** L 314, 11.12.2018, p. 41.

**Duration:** Initially 36 months. However, this Council Decision has been amended twice:

**Title:** Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/919 of 7 June 2021 amending Decision (CFSP) 2018/1939 on Union support for the universalisation and effective implementation of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism

**Object:** Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1939 until 30 November 2022

**Official Journal:** L 201, 8.6.2021, p. 27.

**Title:** Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/2185 of 8 November 2022 amending Decision (CFSP) 2018/1939 on Union support for the universalisation and effective implementation of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear terrorism

**Object:** Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1939 until 30 June 2023

**Official Journal:** L 288, 9.11.2022, p. 80.

1.1.2. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/938 of 6 June 2019 in support of a process of confidence-building leading to the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East**

**Objective:**

- (a) To produce a factual narrative of efforts to establish a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone (ME WMDfZ) between 1995 and 2015 to fill an important gap in the research literature and identify lessons for future efforts.
- (b) To identify key issues, opportunities, obstacles and ideas of contemporary relevance to consideration of a ME WMDfZ and efforts to enhance regional security cooperation.
- (c) To engage and obtain perspectives and insights from a wide community of researchers, policymakers and academics in the region on these issues and, in so doing, expand the number and diversity of participants exploring the prospects for dialogue and progress.
- (d) To facilitate dialogue among these experts with a view to fostering networks, communication and engagement that could in turn contribute to future efforts to advance regional security, arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament progress in the region

**Implementing Agency:** United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)

**Budget:** EUR 2 856 278

**Official Journal:** L 149, 7.6.2019, p. 63.

**Duration:** Initially 36 months. However, this Council Decision has been amended:

**Title:** Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/753 of 16 May 2022 amending Decision (CFSP) 2019/938 in support of a process of confidence-building leading to the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East

**Object:** Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/938 until 10 July 2023

**Official Journal:** L 138, 17.5.2022, p. 15.

1.1.3. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/901 of 29 June 2020 on Union support for the activities of the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO) in order to strengthen its monitoring and verification capabilities and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction**

**Objective:** Support the activities of the Preparatory Commission of the CTBTO and in particular strengthen: (1) the capabilities of the CTBT monitoring and verification system, including radionuclide detection; and (2) the capabilities of the States Signatories to the CTBT to fulfil their verification responsibilities under the CTBT.

**Implementing Agency:** Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO)

**Budget:** EUR 6 288 892

**Official Journal:** L 207, 30.6.2020, p. 15.

**Duration:** 36 months

1.1.4. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1656 of 6 November 2020 on Union support for the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the areas of nuclear security and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction**

**Objective:**

- (a) Contribute to global efforts to achieve effective nuclear security, by establishing comprehensive nuclear security guidance and, upon request, promoting the use of such guidance through peer reviews and advisory services and capacity building, including education and training.
- (b) Assist in adherence to, and implementation of, relevant international legal instruments, and in strengthening the international cooperation and coordination of assistance.
- (c) Support the IAEA mandate to play a central role and enhance international cooperation in nuclear security, in response to priorities of Member States expressed through the decisions and resolutions of the IAEA's Policy Making Organs.

**Implementing Agency:** International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

**Budget:** EUR 11 582 300

**Official Journal:** L I 372, 9.11.2020, p. 4.

**Duration:** Initially 36 months. However, this Council Decision has been amended:

**Title:** Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1852 of 4 October 2022 amending Decision (CFSP) 2020/1656 on Union support for the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the areas of nuclear security and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.

**Object:** Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1656 until 31 March 2024 and include among its purposes to assist Ukraine in ensuring the maintenance of its nuclear security regime.

**Official Journal:** L 257, 5.10.2022, p. 10.

1.1.5. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/615 of 15 April 2019 on Union support for activities leading up to the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)**

**Objective:** Support activities aimed at upholding and preserving the integrity of the NPT, through a balanced focus on the three equally important and mutually reinforcing pillars of the NPT: disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

**Implementing Agency:** United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)

**Budget:** EUR 1 299 883,68

**Official Journal:** L 105, 16.4.2019, p. 25.

**Duration:** Initially 18 months. However, this Council Decision has been amended:

**Title:** Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/1695 of 21 September 2021 amending Decision (CFSP) 2019/615 on Union support for activities leading up to the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

**Object:** Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/615 until 15 January 2022

**Official Journal:** L 334, 22.9.2021, p. 22.



## 1.2. CHEMICAL WEAPONS

1.2.1. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/538 of 1 April 2019 in support of activities of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction**

**Objective:** The Council Decision foresees a contribution to the core activities of the Organisation, notably for verification, national implementation, universalisation and the Africa programme. It also contributes substantially to the project of transforming the OPCW laboratory into a Centre of Chemistry and Technology and to the implementation of the decision by the OPCW Conference of States Parties directing the OPCW Technical Secretariat to put into place arrangements to identify the perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic.

**Implementing Agency:** Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)

**Budget:** EUR 11 601 256

**Official Journal:** L 93, 2.4.2019, p. 3.

**Duration:** Initially 36 months. However, this Council Decision has been amended:

**Title:** Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/573 of 7 April 2022 amending Decision (CFSP) 2019/538 in support of activities of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

**Object:** Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/538 until 30 April 2023

**Official Journal:** L 109, 8.4.2022, p. 66.

1.2.2. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/732 of 2 June 2020 in support of the UN Secretary-General's Mechanism for investigation of alleged use of chemical and biological or toxin weapons**

**Objective:** Support the full operationalisation of the UN Secretary-General's Mechanism (UNSGM) for investigation of the alleged use of chemical, biological and toxin weapons in view of growing apprehensions regarding the possibility of the use of biological weapons.

More specifically, the following activities are supported:

- Training of experts on the roster of the UNSGM;
- Participation of laboratories in activities to develop a network capable of supporting an UNSGM investigation into an allegation of the use of biological weapons;
- Outreach activities to ensure nominations of experts and laboratories from the Global South;
- A full field exercise (Capstone Exercise);
- Regular coordination activities/workshops with relevant organisational partners; and
- Implementation of the Secretary General's Disarmament Agenda.

**Implementing Agency:** United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)

**Budget:** EUR 1 418 042

**Official Journal:** L I 172, 3.6.2020, p. 5.

**Duration:** 36 months

1.2.3. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/1026 of 21 June 2021 in support of the Cyber Security and Resilience and Information Assurance Programme of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction**

**Objective:** Upgrading ICT infrastructure in line with the OPCW's institutional business continuity framework, with a strong focus on resilience, and ensuring privileged access governance, as well as physical, logical and cryptographic information management and separation for all strategic and mission networks of the OPCW.

**Implementing Agency:** Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)

**Budget:** EUR 2 151 823

**Official Journal:** L 224, 24.6.2021, p. 24.

**Duration:** 24 months

1.2.4. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2073 of 25 November 2021 in support of enhancing the operational effectiveness of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) through satellite imagery**

**Objective:** Support the project of the OPCW to enhance its operational effectiveness through satellite imagery and imagery analysis provided by SatCen, with the following objectives:

- (a) expanding the OPCW's capacity to support OPCW-mandated activities (the Declaration Assessment Team (DAT), the Fact Finding Mission (FFM), the Investigation and Identification Team (IIT), etc.) through imagery analysis as a source of evidentiary substantiation or corroboration of findings; and
- (b) utilising targeted imagery analysis for areas of interest (sites, routes, etc.) in planning for OPCW-mandated missions (incidents of alleged use (IAUs), challenge inspections (CIs), technical assistance visits (TAVs), etc.) in order to increase security and confidence in verification accuracy.

**Implementing Agency:** Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)

**Budget:** EUR 1 593 353,22

**Official Journal:** L 421, 26.11.2021, p. 65.

**Duration:** 48 months

1.3. BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS

1.3.1. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/97 of 21 January 2019 in support of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in the framework of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction**

**Objective:** Providing essential follow-up and momentum to activities undertaken throughout 2016-2018 in the framework of Council Decision 2016/51/CFSP in support of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), supporting in particular discussions in the BTWC Meetings of Experts in 2019 and 2020, as well as preparations for the Ninth Review Conference of the BTWC finally held in 2022.

The Council Decision covers the following activities: (1) Universalisation; (2) Capacity development for national implementation; (3) Fostering biosecurity networks in the Global South; (4) BTWC inter-sessional programme and Ninth Review Conference; (5) Preparedness to prevent and respond to biological attacks; and, (6) Enabling tools for outreach.

**Implementing Agency:** BTWC Implementation Support Unit, via the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)

**Budget:** EUR 3 029 857,79

**Official Journal:** L 19, 22.1.2019, p. 11.

**Duration:** Initially 36 months. However, this Council Decision has been amended:

**Title:** Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2033 of 19 November 2021 amending Decision (CFSP) 2019/97 in support of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in the framework of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

**Object:** Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/97 until 4 February 2023

**Official Journal:** L 415, 22.11.2021, p. 29.

1.3.2. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2072 of 25 November 2021 in support of building resilience in biosafety and biosecurity through the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention**

**Objective:** Support the implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) by:

- (a) strengthening biosafety and biosecurity capabilities in Africa through increased regional coordination;
- (b) capacity building for BTWC National Contact Points;
- (c) facilitating the review of developments in science and technology of relevance to the BTWC by also involving academia and industry; and
- (d) broadening the support for voluntary transparency exercises.

**Implementing Agency:** BTWC Implementation Support Unit, via the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)

**Budget:** EUR 2 147 443,52

**Official Journal:** L 421, 26.11.2021, p. 56.

**Duration:** 24 months

1.3.3. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/1296 of 31 July 2019 in support of strengthening biological safety and security in Ukraine in line with the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery**

**Objective:** Support three projects of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) aiming at strengthening biological safety and security in Ukraine in line with UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004) and the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. The Council Decision includes the following activities:

- (a) harmonisation of existing Ukrainian regulations on biosafety and biosecurity with international standards;
- (b) establishing of the veterinary surveillance system sustainability in Ukraine; and
- (c) awareness raising, education and training for life scientists on biosafety and biosecurity.

**Implementing Agency:** Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)

**Budget:** EUR 1 913 900

**Official Journal:** L 204, 2.8.2019, p. 29.

**Duration:** Initially 36 months. However, this Council Decision has been amended:

**Title:** Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/2184 of 8 November 2022 amending Decision (CFSP) 2019/1296 in support of strengthening biological safety and security in Ukraine in line with the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery

**Object:** Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/1296 until 14 January 2024

**Official Journal:** L 288, 9.11.2022, p. 78.

1.3.4. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/2108 of 9 December 2019 in support of strengthening biological safety and security in Latin America in line with the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery**

**Objective:**

- (a) Improve the legislative and regulatory basis of biosafety and biosecurity in the beneficiary countries, through the adoption and enforcement of appropriate effective laws which prohibit non-State actors from manufacturing, acquiring, possessing, developing, transporting, transferring or using biological weapons and their means of delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes; and

- (b) Improve biosafety and biosecurity in beneficiary countries by raising awareness among relevant sectors, including through the enforcement of effective domestic measures to prevent the proliferation of biological weapons and their means of delivery.

**Implementing Agency:** Organisation of American States (OAS)

**Budget:** EUR 2 738 708,98

**Official Journal:** L 318, 10.12.2019, p. 123.

**Duration:** Initially 36 months. However, this Council Decision has been amended:

**Title:** Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/2270 of 18 November 2022 amending Decision (CFSP) 2019/2108 in support of strengthening biological safety and security in Latin America in line with the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery

**Object:** Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/2108 until 20 February 2024.

**Official Journal:** L 300, 21.11.2022, p. 21.

#### 1.4. BALLISTIC MISSILES

##### 1.4.1. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2370 of 18 December 2017 in support of the Hague Code of Conduct and ballistic missile non-proliferation in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction**

**Objective:**

- (a) Promote the subscription to the Code by an ever-larger number of States and ultimately its universality.
- (b) Support the full implementation of the Code.
- (c) Promote dialogue among subscribing and non-subscribing States with the aim of helping to build confidence and transparency, encouraging restraint and creating more stability and security for all.
- (d) Reinforce the Code's visibility and raising public awareness about the risks and threats posed by ballistic missile proliferation.
- (e) Explore, in particular through academic studies, possibilities of enhancing the Code and of promoting cooperation between the Code and other relevant multilateral instruments, such as the Missile Technology Control Regime, UNSCR 1540 (2004) and the United Nations Register of Objects Launched in Outer Space.

**Implementing Agency:** Fondation pour le Recherche Stratégique (FRS)

**Budget:** EUR 1 878 120,05

**Official Journal:** L 337, 19.12.2017, p. 28.

**Duration:** Initially 40 months. However, this Council Decision has been amended:

**Title:** Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2074 of 25 November 2021 amending Decision (CFSP) 2017/2370 in support of the Hague Code of Conduct and ballistic missile non-proliferation in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

**Object:** Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2370 until 21 January 2023

**Official Journal:** L 421, 26.11.2021, p. 70.

## 1.5. UNSCR 1540

1.5.1. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/809 of 11 May 2017 in support of the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery****Objective:**

- (a) Enhance the relevant national and regional efforts and capabilities, primarily through training, capacity-building and assistance facilitation in close coordination with other Union programmes and other actors involved in the implementation of UNSCR 1540 (2004), to ensure synergies and complementarity.
- (b) Contribute to the practical implementation of specific recommendations of both the 2009 comprehensive review on the status of implementation of UNSCR 1540 (2004) and the outcome of the comprehensive review conducted during 2016, in particular in the areas of technical assistance, international cooperation and raising public awareness.
- (c) Support the development of voluntary UNSCR 1540 (2004) national implementation action plans upon States' request.
- (d) Promote the engagement of relevant stakeholders from industry and civil society in the implementation of UNSCR 1540 (2004).

**Implementing Agency:** United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)

**Budget:** EUR 2 635 170,77

**Official Journal:** L 121, 12.5.2017, p. 39.

**Duration:** Initially 36 months. However, this Council Decision has been amended twice:

**Title:** Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/1025 of 21 June 2021 amending Decision (CFSP) 2017/809 in support of the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery

**Object:** Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/809 until 25 April 2022

**Official Journal:** L 224, 24.6.2021, p. 22.

**Title:** Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/574 of 7 April 2022 amending Decision (CFSP) 2017/809 in support of the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery

**Object:** Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/809 until 25 February 2023

**Official Journal:** L 109, 8.4.2022, p. 67.

## 1.6. CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

1.6.1. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/2011 of 17 December 2018 in support of gender mainstreamed policies, programmes and actions in the fight against small arms trafficking and misuse, in line with the Women, Peace and Security agenda****Objective:**

- (a) Contribute to international peace, security, gender equality and sustainable development by enhancing the effectiveness of small arms control measures through the promotion of approaches based on systematic gender analysis, the integration of gender perspectives and women's empowerment initiatives.
- (b) Support the implementation of the gender-relevant outcomes of the 2018 Third United Nations Conference to review progress made in the implementation of the PoA.
- (c) Contribute to the broader international policy agenda on gender equality and women's empowerment in line with the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

**Implementing Agency:** United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)

**Budget:** EUR 4 375 507,85.

**Official Journal:** L 322, 18.12.2018, p. 38.

**Duration:** Initially 36 months. However, this Council decision has been amended:

**Title:** Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2138 of 2 December 2021 amending Decision (CFSP) 2018/2011 in support of gender mainstreamed policies, programmes and actions in the fight against small arms trafficking and misuse, in line with the Women, Peace and Security agenda

**Object:** Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/2011 until 31 October 2022.

**Official Journal:** L 432, 3.12.2021, p. 72.

1.6.2. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/1298 of 31 July 2019 in support of an Africa-China-Europe dialogue and cooperation on preventing the diversion of arms and ammunition in Africa**

**Objective:** Contribute to preventing and combating the diversion of arms and ammunition in Africa by:

- (a) raising awareness of stakeholders in Africa, China and the Union on how the illicit flow of arms, particularly small arms and light weapons (SALW) and their ammunition, to unauthorised actors contributes significantly towards exacerbating insecurity and violence in various parts of Africa, thereby undermining social cohesion, public security, socio-economic development and the effective functioning of state institutions;
- (b) promoting accountability and responsibility with regard to the legal arms trade and demonstrating to stakeholders in Africa, China and the Union how effective arms export control can contribute to mitigating the risk of diversion of arms into the illicit market.

**Implementing Actor:** Saferworld

**Budget:** EUR 994 007

**Official Journal:** L 204, 2.8.2019, p. 37.

**Duration:** 36 months

1.6.3. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/2009 of 2 December 2019 in support of Ukraine's efforts to combat illicit trafficking in weapons, ammunition and explosives in cooperation with the OSCE**

**Objective:**

- (a) Enhance capabilities of the State Border Guard Service, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the State Fiscal Service/State Customs Service of Ukraine with respect to preventing and combating illicit trafficking in weapons, ammunition and explosives;
- (b) enhance supervisory capacities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs with respect to their control of the manufacture, marking and record-keeping of weapons, ammunition and explosives corresponding to the needs identified in the needs assessment;
- (c) enhance operational capacities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and of the National Police of Ukraine, which reports to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, with respect to forensics, analysis, detection, tracing, and investigation of illicit trafficking in weapons, ammunition and explosives;
- (d) enhance capacities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the improvement of legislative mechanisms for regulating and controlling the circulation and use of weapons, ammunition and explosives as well as raising public awareness on risks related to illegal possession, misuse and trafficking in weapons, ammunition and explosives corresponding to the needs identified in the needs assessment; and
- (e) enhance inter-agency coordination and cooperation resulting in developing strategic approach, data-collection and analysis in preventing and combatting illicit trafficking in weapons, ammunition and explosives in Ukraine corresponding to the needs identified in the needs assessment.

**Implementing Agency:** Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)

**Budget:** EUR 5 151 579

**Official Journal:** L 312, 3.12.2019, p. 42.

**Duration:** Initially 36 months. However, this Council Decision has been amended:

**Title:** Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/2276 of 18 November 2022 amending Decision (CFSP) 2019/2009 in support of Ukraine's efforts to combat illicit trafficking in weapons, ammunition and explosives, in cooperation with the OSCE

**Object:** Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/2009 until 23 January 2024

**Official Journal:** L 300, 21.11.2022, p. 42.

1.6.4. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/2111 of 9 December 2019 in support of SEESAC disarmament and arms control activities in South-East Europe reducing the threat of illicit small arms and light weapons and their ammunition**

**Objective:** Contribute to improved security in the South-East Europe region and in the Union by combatting the threat posed by illicit small arms and light weapons (SALW) and their ammunition in and from South-East Europe, Belarus and Ukraine.

**Implementing Agency:** South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC), via the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

**Budget:** EUR 11 819 605,20

**Official Journal:** L 318, 10.12.2019, p. 147.

**Duration:** 48 months

1.6.5. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/2191 of 19 December 2019 in support of a global reporting mechanism on illicit conventional arms and their ammunition to reduce the risk of their diversion and illicit transfer ('iTrace IV')**

**Objective:**

- (a) continued maintenance of a user-friendly global information management system on diverted or trafficked conventional arms and their ammunition ('iTrace') documented in conflict-affected areas in order to provide policymakers, conventional arms control experts, and conventional arms export control officers with relevant information to develop effective, evidence-based strategies and projects against the illicit spread of conventional arms and their ammunition;
- (b) training and mentoring of national authorities in conflict-affected states to develop sustainable national illicit conventional arms identification and tracing capacity, encourage sustained cooperation with the iTrace project, better identify physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) priorities, more effectively articulate national arms control and law enforcement assistance requirements, notably Union-funded initiatives, such as Interpol's Illicit Arms Records and tracing Management System (iARMS), and the activities of the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol), and strengthen dialogue with EU missions and initiatives;
- (c) enhanced frequency and duration of in-field research into conventional arms and their ammunition, illegally circulating in conflict-affected areas to generate iTrace data, in response to clear demands made by Member States and Union Delegations;
- (d) tailored support to Member State arms export control authorities and arms control policy makers, including repeat consultative visits by iTrace project staff to capitals of the Member States, a 24-hour help desk to provide instant advice on risk assessment and counter-diversion strategies, the maintenance of secure desktop and mobile dashboard applications to provide instant notification of post-export diversion, and the provision to Member States, on request, of post-shipment verification by iTrace project staff;

- (e) increasing awareness through outreach on the findings of the project, promoting the purpose and available functions of iTrace to international and national policy makers, conventional arms control experts and arms export licensing authorities, and enhancing international capacity to monitor the illicit spread of conventional arms and their ammunition and related materiel, as well as to assist policy makers in identifying priority areas for international assistance and cooperation and to reduce the risk of diversion of conventional arms and their ammunition;
- (f) providing key policy issue reports, drawn from the data generated by field investigations and presented on the iTrace system, about specific areas deserving international attention, including major patterns in the trafficking of conventional arms and their ammunition, and the regional distribution of trafficked conventional arms and their ammunition, and related materiel; and
- (g) the continued tracing of conventional arms and their ammunition, with the cooperation of Member States and non-EU States, as the most effective means to establish and verify, to the fullest extent possible, the mechanisms behind the diversion of conventional arms and their ammunition to unauthorised users; tracing will be supplemented by follow up investigations focused on identifying the human, financial, and logistics networks behind illicit conventional arms transfers.

**Implementing Actor:** Conflict Armament Research (CAR)

**Budget:** EUR 5 490 981,87

**Official Journal:** L 330, 20.12.2019, p. 53.

**Duration:** 36 months

1.6.6. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/257 of 18 February 2021 in support of the Oslo Action Plan for the implementation of the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction**

**Objective:** Contribute to human security by supporting the implementation of the Oslo Action Plan 2020–2024 adopted by the States Parties at the Fourth Review Conference of the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, by:

- (a) supporting the efforts of States Parties to implement the survey and clearance and mine risk education and reduction aspects of the Oslo Action Plan;
- (b) supporting the efforts of States Parties to implement the victim assistance aspects of the Oslo Action Plan;
- (c) promoting the universalisation of the Convention and promote norms against any use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines and on their destruction;
- (d) supporting the efforts of States Parties that retain anti-personnel mines for permitted purposes to increase reporting capabilities, ensure that the number of such mines retained does not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary, and explore alternatives to live anti-personnel mines for training and research purposes where possible; and
- (e) demonstrating the ongoing commitment of the Union and its Member States to the Convention and their resolve to cooperate with and extend assistance to those States Parties that need support in meeting their commitments under the Convention.

**Implementing Agency:** The Implementation Support Unit (ISU) of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, represented by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)

**Budget:** EUR 2 658 139

**Official Journal:** L 58, 19.2.2021, p. 41.

**Duration:** 48 months



1.6.7. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/1694 of 21 September 2021 in support of the universalisation, implementation and strengthening of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW)**

**Objective:**

- (a) Preparation for and follow-up to the Sixth CCW Review Conference;
- (b) Support for the universalisation of the CCW; and
- (c) Facilitation of discussions on under-explored, emerging and cross-cutting issues of relevance to the CCW.

**Implementing Agency:** United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)

**Budget:** EUR 1 603 517,64

**Official Journal:** L 334, 22.9.2021, p. 14.

**Duration:** 24 months

1.6.8. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/2010 of 17 December 2018 in support of countering illicit proliferation and trafficking of small arms, light weapons (SALW) and ammunition and their impact in Latin America and the Caribbean in the framework of the EU Strategy against Illicit Firearms, Small Arms & Light Weapons and their Ammunition ‘Securing Arms, Protecting Citizens’**

**Objective:**

- (a) Strengthen physical security and management systems for national military and other institutional stockpiles through improved site security measures and inventory control;
- (b) Reinforce national capabilities for destruction of seized, excess or unsafe small arms and light weapons (SALW) and ammunition;
- (c) Enhance national SALW marking and tracing capacity and foment regional cooperation on tracing confiscated weapons and ammunition;
- (d) Improve SALW transfer mechanisms through national legislation, border controls, and regional coordination; and
- (e) Promote socially responsible behaviours in selected communities, targeting groups that are severely affected by armed violence, including the use of turn-in campaigns or other strategies designed to reduce local incidence of violent crimes.

**Implementing Agency:** Organisation of American States (OAS)

**Budget:** EUR 3 000 000

**Official Journal:** L 322, 18.12.2018, p. 27.

**Duration:** Initially 36 months. However, this Council Decision has been amended:

**Title:** Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/1693 of 21 September 2021 amending Decision (CFSP) 2018/2010 in support of countering illicit proliferation and trafficking of small arms, light weapons (SALW) and ammunition and their impact in Latin America and the Caribbean in the framework of the EU Strategy against Illicit Firearms, Small Arms & Light Weapons and their Ammunition ‘Securing Arms, Protecting Citizens’

**Object:** Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/2010 until 31 May 2022.

**Official Journal:** L 334, 22.9.2021, p. 12.

1.6.9. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/1726 of 28 September 2021 in support of combating the illicit trade in and proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the Member States of the League of Arab States – Phase II**

**Objective:** Supporting the Member States of the League of Arab States (LAS) with their national implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (the 'UN PoA') and the International Tracing Instrument, by:

- (a) sustainably building the national capacity of LAS Member States to combat the illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW), combat terrorism and enhance security in post-conflict situations while fully respecting international human rights standards;
- (b) sustainably building the regional capacity of the LAS to address the same challenges;
- (c) strengthening LAS Member States' national control over SALW at key stages of their life cycle; and
- (d) enhancing the exchange of best practices and lessons learned.

**Implementing Actor:** Small Arms Survey (SAS), represented by the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, with the assistance of the International Criminal Police Organisation (Interpol) and the World Customs Organization (WCO) and in close cooperation with the LAS Secretariat.

**Budget:** EUR 5 991 726

**Official Journal:** L 344, 29.9.2021, p. 7.

**Duration:** 36 months

1.6.10. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/979 of 7 July 2020 in support of the development of an internationally recognised system for the validation of arms and ammunition management according to open international standards**

**Objective:** Support a project to study the feasibility of establishing an internationally recognised validation system for the validation of policies and practices for the safe and secure management of SALW and ammunition. The project shall consist of two phases:

- (a) During Phase I, in the first year of the implementation, a feasibility study for the development of an internationally recognised Arms and Ammunition Management Validation System (AAMVS) was undertaken to investigate options for appropriate methodologies and tools for the assessment of risk and quality;
- (b) During Phase II, based on the outcome of the feasibility study of Phase I, a concept for the creation of an AAMVS shall be developed

**Implementing Agency:** Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and its specialised agency, the Ammunition Management Advisory Team (AMAT)

**Budget:** EUR 1 642 109

**Official Journal:** L 218, 8.7.2020, p. 1.

**Duration:** Initially 14 months. However, this Council Decision has been amended:

**Title:** Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2075 of 25 November 2021 amending Decision (CFSP) 2020/979 in support of the development of an internationally recognised system for the validation of arms and ammunition management according to open international standard

**Object:** Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/979 until 30 November 2022.

**Official Journal:** L 421, 26.11.2021, p. 72.

**1.6.11. Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2133 of 2 December 2021 in support of the comprehensive programme on supporting efforts to prevent and combat illicit trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and Conventional Ammunition (CA) in South-Eastern Europe**

**Objective:** Reduce risks of illicit trafficking in, and the uncontrolled spread of, SALW in, to or from South-Eastern Europe that undermine safety and security by impeding sustainable peacebuilding and socioeconomic development as well as by contributing to a breakdown in order, fuelling terrorism and criminal violence or leading to a resumption of conflict.

**Implementing Agency:** Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)

**Budget:** EUR 4 208 827

**Official Journal:** L 432, 3.12.2021, p. 36.

**Duration:** 36 months

**1.6.12. Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1788 of 19 November 2018 in support of the South-Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC) for the implementation of the Regional Roadmap on combating illicit arms trafficking in the Western Balkans**

**Objective:** Support Western Balkans partners with the implementation of the 'Regional Roadmap for a sustainable solution to the illegal possession, misuse and trafficking of SALW/firearms and their ammunition in the Western Balkans by 2024', pursuing the support of the Western Balkans partners in reaching the goals set out in the Roadmap, namely:

- (a) By 2023, ensure that arms control legislation is in place, fully harmonised with the EU regulatory framework and other related international obligations and standardised across the region.
- (b) By 2024, ensure that arms control policies and practices in the Western Balkans are evidence based and intelligence led.
- (c) By 2024, significantly reduce illicit flows of firearms, ammunition and explosives into, within and beyond the Western Balkans.
- (d) By 2024, significantly reduce the supply, demand and misuse of firearms through increased awareness, education, outreach and advocacy.
- (e) By 2024, substantially decrease the estimated number of firearms in illicit possession in the Western Balkans.
- (f) Systematically decrease the surplus and destroy seized small arms and light weapons and ammunition.
- (g) Significantly decrease the risk of proliferation and diversion of firearms, ammunition and explosives.

**Implementing Agency:** South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC), via the United Nations Development Programme.

**Budget:** EUR 4 002 587,52

**Official Journal:** L 293, 20.11.2018, p. 11.

**Duration:** Initially 36 months. However, this Council decision has been amended twice:

**Title:** Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2161 of 6 December 2021 amending Decision (CFSP) 2018/1788 in support of the South-Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC) for the implementation of the Regional Roadmap on combating illicit arms trafficking in the Western Balkans

**Object:** Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1788 until 17 October 2022.

**Official Journal:** L 436, 7.12.2021, p. 46.

**Title:** Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1654 of 27 September 2022 amending Decision (CFSP) 2018/1788 in support of the South-Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC) for the implementation of the Regional Roadmap on combating illicit arms trafficking in the Western Balkans

**Object:** Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1788 until 17 January 2023.

**Official Journal:** L 249, 27.9.2022, p. 45.

1.6.13. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/847 of 30 May 2022 in support of efforts to prevent and combat illicit proliferation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and ammunition and their impact in the Americas**

**Objective:** In order to address armed violence in the Americas:

- (a) strengthen the National Firearms Regulatory Framework, considering international normative and good practices;
- (b) improve the operational capacity of national authorities to mark, trace, store, and destroy firearms;
- (c) optimise small arms control through the use of the Regional Communication Mechanism on Licit Transfers of Firearms and Ammunition (MCTA);
- (d) strengthen community resilience to gun violence and reduce access to illicit/and or unwanted firearms;
- (e) develop a Central American Firearms Roadmap to equip the countries with a practical and management tool through a regional, coordinated, and evidence based approach.

**Implementing Agency:** Organisation of American States (OAS)

**Budget:** EUR 4 240 906

**Official Journal:** L 148, 31.5.2022, p. 40.

**Duration:** 36 months

1.6.14. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1965 of 17 October 2022 in support of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects**

**Objective:** Support the full and effective implementation of the UN Programme of Action and the International Tracing Instrument, enhance international, regional and national security, contribute to the realisation of human security, and promote sustainable development through SALW control, by:

- (a) supporting forward-looking global policy developments in the context of the fourth United Nations Conference to Review Progress Made in the Implementation of the UN Programme of Action in 2024;
- (b) strengthening effective national and regional implementation of the Programme of Actions and the International Tracing Instrument; and
- (c) supporting gender-responsive SALW control policies and programmes.

**Implementing Agency:** United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)

**Budget:** EUR 4 524 465,05

**Official Journal:** L 270, 18.10.2022, p. 67.

**Duration:** 36 months

1.7. ARMS EXPORT CONTROLS <sup>(1)</sup>1.7.1. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1464 of 12 October 2020 on the promotion of effective arms export controls (COARM V)****Objective:**

- (a) Promote effective controls on arms exports by third countries in accordance with the principles set out in Common Position 2008/944/CFSP and in the ATT, and seek, where appropriate, complementarity and synergies with Union assistance projects in the field of export controls on dual-use goods; and
- (b) Support third countries' efforts at national and regional levels to render trade in conventional weapons more responsible and transparent, and to mitigate the risk of the diversion of arms to unauthorised users.

**Implementing Agency:** Bundesamt für Wirtschaft und Ausfuhrkontrolle (BAFA)**Budget:** EUR 1 377 542,73**Official Journal:** L 335, 13.10.2020, p. 3.**Duration:** Initially 24 months. However, this Council Decision has been amended:**Title:** Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/848 of 30 May 2022 amending Decision (CFSP) 2020/1464 on the promotion of effective arms export controls**Object:** Among others, extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1464 until 30 November 2023.**Official Journal:** L 148, 31.5.2022, p. 50.1.7.2. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/649 of 16 April 2021 on Union support for activities of the ATT Secretariat in support of the implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty****Objective:** Support the effective implementation and universalisation of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) by supporting the activities of the ATT Secretariat aimed at:

- (a) supporting States Parties to the ATT in strengthening their arms transfer control systems for the effective implementation of the ATT; and
- (b) strengthening the institutional set-up of the ATT Secretariat as the principal body to assist States Parties to the ATT in implementing the ATT.

**Implementing Agency:** ATT Secretariat**Budget:** EUR 1 370 000**Official Journal:** L 133, 20.4.2021, p. 59.**Duration:** 24 months1.7.3. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2309 of 22 December 2021 on Union outreach activities in support of the implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT-OP III)****Objective:** Support the effective implementation and universalisation of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) by:

- (a) reinforcing or developing arms transfer control capacities and expertise for ATT implementation in new and existing beneficiary countries, through instruments such as legal assistance and training of licensing and enforcement officials;
- (b) outreach to other countries, including non-States Parties to the ATT, with a view to supporting universalisation of the ATT at national, regional and multilateral levels.

<sup>(1)</sup> Detailed information on the implementation of the three Council Decisions under this section in 2022 will be made available in the *Twenty-Fifth Annual Report according to Article 8(2) of Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing the control of exports of military technology and equipment* (for 2022).

**Implementing Agency:** Bundesamt für Wirtschaft und Ausfuhrkontrolle (BAFA) and Expertise France.

**Budget:** EUR 3 499 892,39

**Official Journal:** L 461, 27.12.2021, p. 78.

**Duration:** 36 months

1.8. EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES

1.8.1. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/2269 of 18 November 2022 on Union support for the implementation of a project ‘Promoting Responsible Innovation in Artificial Intelligence for Peace and Security’**

**Objective:** Support greater engagement of the civilian artificial intelligence (AI) community in mitigating the risks that the diversion and misuse of civilian AI research and innovation by irresponsible actors may pose to international peace and security, by:

- (a) generating greater understanding of how decisions in the development and diffusion of AI research and innovation can impact the risks of diversion and misuse, and in turn generate risk or opportunities for peace and security;
- (b) promoting responsible innovation processes, methods and tools which can help ensure the peaceful application of civilian innovations and the responsible dissemination of AI knowledge. To that end, the project will support capacity-building, research and engagement activities that enhance the capacity within the global civilian AI community to include and address the peace and security risks presented by the diversion and misuse of civilian AI by irresponsible actors through responsible innovation processes; and strengthen the connection between risk mitigation efforts in responsible AI in the civilian sphere with those already ongoing in the disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation community at an intergovernmental level.

**Implementing Agency:** United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), supported by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

**Budget:** EUR 1 782 285,71

**Official Journal:** L 300, 21.11.2022, p. 11.

**Duration:** 36 months

1.8.2. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/2320 of 25 November 2022 on Union support for the implementation of a project ‘Unlocking Innovation: Enabling Technologies and International Security’**

**Objective:** Support the work that the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) conducts within its Security and Technology Programme (SECTEC) with a view to enhancing knowledge and understanding of new and emerging technologies with relevance for international security.

**Implementing Agency:** United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)

**Budget:** EUR 1 234 011

**Official Journal:** L 307, 28.11.2022, p. 142.

**Duration:** 24 months

1.9. COLLABORATIONS WITH NGOS AND THINK TANKS

1.9.1. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/299 of 26 February 2018 promoting the European network of independent non-proliferation and disarmament think tanks in support of the implementation of the EU Strategy against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction**

**Objective:** For the purposes of contributing to the enhanced implementation of the EU WMD Non-proliferation Strategy, which is based on the principles of effective multilateralism, prevention and cooperation with third countries, to continue promoting and supporting the activities of the European network of independent non-proliferation and disarmament think in order to further the following objectives:

- (a) to encourage political and security-related dialogue and long-term discussion of measures to combat the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems within civil societies and, in particular, among experts, researchers and academics;
- (b) to provide those participating in the relevant preparatory bodies of the Council with the opportunity to consult the network on issues related to non-proliferation and disarmament and to enable the representatives of Member States to participate in the network's meetings;
- (c) to constitute a useful stepping stone for non-proliferation and disarmament action by the Union and the international community, in particular by providing reports and/or recommendations to the representatives of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy;
- (d) to contribute to enhancing third countries' awareness of proliferation and disarmament challenges and of the need to work in cooperation with the Union and in the context of multilateral fora, in particular the United Nations, to prevent, deter, halt and, where possible, eliminate proliferation programmes of worldwide concern; and
- (e) to contribute to the development of expertise and institutional capacity in non-proliferation and disarmament matters in think tanks and governments in the Union and third countries.

**Implementing Agency:** The EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, based on the Fondation pour la recherche stratégique (FRS), the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (HSFK/PRIF), the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the International Affairs Institute (IAI) in Rome and the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (VCDNP).

**Budget:** EUR 4 507 004,70

**Official Journal:** L 56, 28.2.2018, p. 46.

**Duration:** Initially 42 months. However, this Council Decision was amended:

**Title:** Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/648 of 16 April 2021 amending Decision (CFSP) 2018/299 promoting the European network of independent non-proliferation and disarmament think tanks in support of the implementation of the EU Strategy against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

**Object:** Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/299 until 17 May 2022.

**Official Journal:** L 133, 20.4.2021, p. 57.

#### 1.9.2. **Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/597 of 11 April 2022 promoting the European network of independent non-proliferation and disarmament think tanks**

**Objective:** Continue to promote and support the activities of the European network of independent non-proliferation and disarmament think tanks, in order to:

- (a) encourage political and security-related dialogue and long-term discussion of measures to combat the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems within civil societies and, in particular, among experts, researchers and academics;
- (b) provide those participating in the relevant preparatory bodies of the Council with the opportunity to consult the network on issues related to non-proliferation, disarmament and arms export control, and to enable the representatives of Member States to participate in the meetings of the Consortium;
- (c) constitute a useful stepping stone for non-proliferation and disarmament action by the Union and the international community, in particular by providing reports and/or recommendations to the representatives of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy;

- (d) contribute to enhancing third countries' awareness of proliferation and disarmament challenges and of the need to work in cooperation with the Union and in the context of multilateral fora, in particular the United Nations, to prevent, deter, halt and, where possible, eliminate proliferation programmes of worldwide concern;
- (e) contribute to the development of expertise and institutional capacity in non-proliferation and disarmament matters in think tanks and governments in the Union and third countries, including by strengthening non-proliferation and disarmament education, raising awareness of those issues among the younger generations and promoting the next generation of researchers and practitioners in this field, especially women, and in the natural and technical sciences.

**Implementing Agency:** The EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, consisting of the Fondation pour la recherche stratégique (FRS), the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (HSFK/PRIF), the International Institute for Strategic Studies Europe (IISS-Europe), the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the International Affairs Institute (IAI) in Rome and the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (VCDNP).

**Budget:** EUR 4 700 000

**Official Journal:** L 114, 12.4.2022, p. 75.

**Duration:** 36 months

## 2. COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS

### 2.1. NUCLEAR ISSUES

#### 2.1.1. Council Conclusions on Iran (12.12.2022)

Recalling the November 2016 and February 2019 Council conclusions, the European Union reconfirms its resolute commitment to human rights in its policy towards Iran. The European Union expresses its support for the fundamental aspiration of the people of Iran for a future where their universal human rights and fundamental freedoms are respected, protected and fulfilled. In this context, the European Union acknowledges the leading role of women and youth in calling for the defence of these norms and values. The European Union strongly condemns the widespread, brutal and disproportionate use of force by the Iranian authorities against peaceful protesters, including women and children, leading to the loss of hundreds of lives, in clear breach of the fundamental principles enshrined in international law. The right to peaceful assembly must be ensured. The European Union condemns restrictions on communications, including Internet shutdowns, and calls upon Iran to ensure the right to freedom of expression, including freedom to seek, receive and share information and ideas, online and offline. The European Union urges Iranian authorities to uphold their international obligations under international law, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, to both of which Iran is a party.

The European Union calls on the Iranian authorities to cease their widespread resort to arbitrary detentions as a means of silencing critical voices and release all those unjustly detained in relation to the exercise of their rights to peaceful assembly and freedom of expression, including recently arrested protesters as well as children, journalists and human rights defenders. The European Union firmly condemns the widespread use of torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment of detainees in Iranian prisons, reminds the Iranian authorities that the prohibition of torture is absolute under international law and reiterates its call on Iran to ratify without delay the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.

The European Union strongly urges Iran to implement the relevant international treaties and agreements to which it is a party and calls upon Iran to eliminate, in law and in practice, all forms of systemic discrimination against women and girls in public and private life and to take gender-responsive measures to prevent and ensure protection for women and girls against sexual and gender-based violence in all its forms. At the same time, the European Union reiterates its firm call on the Iranian authorities to ensure the full enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all Iranians, including persons belonging to ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities.



The European Union calls on the Iranian authorities to immediately end the strongly condemnable practice of imposing and carrying out death sentences against protesters as well as to annul without delay the recent death penalty sentences that were already pronounced in the context of the ongoing protests and to provide due process to all detainees. The European Union strongly opposes the use of the death penalty at all times and in all circumstances, as an unacceptable denial of human dignity and integrity. The European Union urges Iran to pursue a consistent policy towards the abolition of capital punishment.

The persistent impunity for grave human rights violations in Iran is contributing to the increasing grievances of the population. The European Union will continue to demand that the perpetrators of violence and human rights violations be held accountable and to call on the Iranian authorities to allow for an independent investigation into the widely reported and documented human rights violations, and ensure accountability for perpetrators as also called upon by UNGA 3rd Committee Resolution of November 2022. As a first step, we call on Iran to allow free, full and unhindered access to the country for relevant UN Human Rights Special Procedures mandate holders and to fully cooperate with the independent international Fact-Finding Mission established by the Human Rights Council on 24 November 2022. The European Union will continue to use all available avenues to hold the Iranian authorities to account.

The European Union strongly rejects Iran's practice of arbitrary detention of foreign citizens, including dual nationals, and calls upon Iran to end the distressing practice of detaining innocent foreign civilians with a view to making political gains. The European Union reminds Iran of its international obligations under the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations and urges the Iranian authorities to abide by these obligations.

The European Union will continue to address any issue of concern, including in relation to the way the Iranian authorities are handling the ongoing protest, taking into account all options at its disposal, inclusive of additional restrictive measures.

The European Union strongly condemns and considers unacceptable any type of Iran's military support, including deliveries of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs – 'drones'), to Russia's illegal, unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine, which grossly violates international law and the principles of the UN Charter. These weapons provided by Iran are being used indiscriminately by Russia against Ukrainian civilian population and infrastructure causing horrendous destruction and human suffering. In this context, the European Union recalls that any transfer of certain combat drones and missiles to or from Iran without prior permission by the UN Security Council are in violation of UNSCR 2231. The European Union continues to support the ongoing work by the UN Secretariat team responsible for monitoring the implementation of UNSCR 2231. The European Union notes with great concern the reports of Iranian weapons, including drones, being manufactured with components of international origin, including from Europe, and is considering the appropriate measures to take. The European Union strongly cautions Iran against any new deliveries of weapons to Russia, in particular any steps towards possible transfers of short-range ballistic missiles to Russia, which would constitute a serious escalation. The European Union will continue to respond to all actions supporting the Russian aggression against Ukraine and hold Iran accountable including through additional restrictive measures.

The European Union reiterates its clear determination that Iran must never develop or acquire a nuclear weapon, and recalls Iran's commitments in that respect and its international obligations.

The European Union is deeply concerned by the successive IAEA reports documenting the alarming acceleration of Iran's nuclear programme that gravely departs from its Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) commitments, in particular with regard to the expansion of its nuclear enrichment capacity and production of highly enriched uranium. Iran's actions, which have no credible civilian justification, carry very significant proliferation-related risks. The European Union strongly urges Iran to reverse its alarming nuclear trajectory, to return to its political commitments in the field of nuclear non-proliferation without further delay, and to resume all JCPOA-related monitoring and verification measures, including its Additional Protocol.

Concerning outstanding safeguards issues, the European Union recalls the resolutions adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors on 8 June and 17 November 2022 and calls upon Iran to urgently fulfil its legal obligations, including under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), by providing technically credible explanations and grant necessary access. Timely and full cooperation with the IAEA remains absolutely crucial. Furthermore, the European Union underscores that the JCPOA is separate from Iran's legally binding obligations under the NPT, which are essential to the global non-proliferation regime.

The European Union reaffirms its commitment to, and continued support for, the full and effective implementation of a restored JCPOA. However, the risk of a nuclear non-proliferation crisis in the region has increased as a result of Iran's nuclear trajectory. In this context, the European Union regrets that, despite political support by the EU member States and intense international diplomatic efforts to restore the full implementation of the JCPOA including negotiations in Vienna facilitated by the EU High Representative as Coordinator of the JCPOA Joint Commission, Iran has not made the necessary decisions and not taken the necessary steps, continues to escalate its nuclear programme and makes it increasingly difficult to reach a deal. As a key security priority the EU will continue to invest diplomatically and politically to ensure that Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon. The EU calls on all countries to support the implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015).

Promoting peace and stability and achieving de-escalation of tensions in the wider Gulf region as well as in the broader Middle East are key priorities for the EU. The JCPOA aims to contribute in this regard. Ensuring an exclusively peaceful character of the Iranian nuclear programme could contribute to regional stability and security. Efforts to build confidence should be inclusive. While they should be region-led, the EU remains ready to engage with all actors in the region in a gradual and inclusive approach, in full transparency and with the ultimate objective to facilitate a dialogue process that can help to develop confidence-building measures and arrangements, which provide for greater security in the wider Gulf region, including maritime safety and security. The regional Baghdad Conference on Cooperation and Partnership, and its follow-up process with EU involvement, could serve as a useful example for region-led processes.

While Iran is central to security in the region, the European Union condemns Iran's continued destabilising activities in and around the Middle East. These include Iran's activities with ballistic and cruise missiles, UAVs, and transfers of such advanced weaponry to state and non-state actors. UNSC Resolution 2231 (2015) calls upon Iran not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using such ballistic technology. Such activity, including using space launch vehicles, could pave the way for the development of long-range or intercontinental ballistic missiles. All these actions constitute an important and increasing source of regional instability and risk further escalating already existing high tensions. The EU urges Iran to fully abide by UNSCR 2231 (2015).

The European Union urges Iran to cease these destabilising activities in the form of political, military or financial support, including to non-state actors, in countries such as Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Lebanon. It calls upon Iran to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its neighbours and to fully abide by all relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs), including UNSCR 661, 1483, 1540, 1546, 1701, 2216 and 2231.

The European Union urges Iran to stop all actions or attempts that disrupt or threaten the safety and freedom of navigation in and around maritime routes in the wider Gulf region and respect applicable international law including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

The European Union calls upon Iran to abide by its international obligations. Against the background of the grave actions by Iran on a wide range of issues as expressed above, the European Union reaffirms its commitment to a comprehensive policy approach considering all options at its disposal: critical where necessary, and ready to engage, on the basis of mutual respect, where interests align.

## 2.2. BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS

### 2.2.1. **Council Conclusions on the Ninth Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (21/03/2022)**

The Council welcomes the upcoming Ninth Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). In line with the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction of 2003, the Council reaffirms its unequivocal support for the BTWC as the legally binding global norm against biological weapons and cornerstone of international efforts to prevent biological agents or toxins from ever being developed, produced, stockpiled or otherwise acquired and used as weapons.

The Council is firmly committed to a multilateral and treaty-based approach that maintains and reinforces international peace and security. The BTWC is one of the major pillars of the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture.

The Council recognises that the BTWC was the first Convention in 1975 to ban an entire category of weapons of mass destruction, and reaffirms the importance of universalisation of the Convention. Since the entry into force of the Convention, 183 States have become parties to the Convention, which underlines the universal importance of the BTWC in addressing global threats. The Council calls on all remaining States that have not yet done so to join the Convention and, pending their accession, to adhere to its terms.

The Council recognises the importance of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, also known as the 1925 Geneva Protocol, that is supplemented by the BTWC. The Council calls for the universalisation of the Geneva Protocol and commends the ratifications that have taken place since the adoption of Council Decision on EU position prepared in view of the Eighth Review Conference in 2015.

The Council recognises that biological agents and toxins are widely used for peaceful purposes in line with the BTWC provisions. At the same time, the risk of natural or accidental spread of dangerous pathogens exists. With the COVID-19 pandemic we have witnessed how quickly diseases can cross borders and how dangerous and disruptive they can be. This is why it is more urgent than ever to strengthen the BTWC and its implementation.

Taking into account this context and given the substantive work realised by States parties during the current review cycle, the Ninth Review Conference represents a unique opportunity not only to strengthen the Convention and its implementation, and to improve biosafety and biosecurity globally, but also to advance assistance, cooperation, response and preparedness of the States Parties. This Review Conference represents a timely moment to reinforce the global norm against biological weapons and to further develop the BTWC to prevent misuse of biological agents and toxins as well as of developments in science and technology while promoting their peaceful use.

The Council regrets the inevitable postponement of the Ninth Review Conference due to the global COVID-19 pandemic and stresses the major role of Review Conferences to the implementation, upholding and strengthening of the BTWC.

The Council supports the adoption by the Review Conference of forward-looking decisions and recommendations. These will provide a clear roadmap for the next review cycle, including a robust intersessional programme. The Council's priorities are:

- (a) building and sustaining confidence in compliance;
- (b) establishing a Science and Technology review;
- (c) supporting full national implementation;
- (d) operationalising Article V consultative procedures for solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objective, or in the application, of the BWC;
- (e) operationalising of Article VII on assistance to States that have been exposed to danger as a result of a violation of the Convention;
- (f) supporting the implementation of Article X on cooperation and assistance related to the exchange of equipment, materials and information for peaceful purposes;

- (g) promoting universal adherence to the Convention;
- (h) strengthening the BTWC Implementation Support Unit (ISU) and its role.

The Council welcomes the engagement by EU Member States to mobilise political will and promote implementation of the obligations and objectives of the BTWC through various initiatives during the current review cycle. The Council supports the development of practical initiatives such as the following:

- (a) scientific advisory mechanism;
- (b) set of voluntary guiding principles for scientists (Code of Conduct);
- (c) exchange platform for voluntary transparency exercises under Article IV regarding the requirement to take any national measures necessary to prohibit and prevent the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of biological weapons within a State's territory, under its jurisdiction, or under its control;
- (d) operational database and guidelines in the framework of Article VII;
- (e) online platform dedicated to biosafety and biosecurity under Article X;
- (f) the promotion of biorisk management standards.

The EU will support relevant decisions on these initiatives at the Review Conference.

### 3. STATEMENTS

#### 3.1. GENERAL STATEMENTS

##### 3.1.1. **Statement at the High Level Segment of Conference on Disarmament (Geneva, 1.3/2022)**

Madam President,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union and its Member States. Let me start my intervention with the recent quote of High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Vice-President of the European Commission Josep Borrell: 'At this dark hour, when we see Russia's unprovoked and unjustified invasion of Ukraine and massive disinformation campaigns and information manipulation, it is essential to separate lies – invented to justify what cannot be justified – from facts. The facts are that Russia, a major nuclear power, has attacked and invaded a peaceful and democratic neighbouring country, which posed no threat to, nor provoked it. Moreover, President Putin is threatening reprisals on any other state that may come to the rescue of the people of Ukraine. Such use of force and coercion has no place in the 21st century. What President Putin is doing is not only a grave violation of international law, it is a violation of the basic principles of human co-existence. With his choice to bring war back to Europe, we see the return of the "law of the jungle" where might makes right. The target is not only Ukraine, but also the security of Europe and the whole international rules-based order, based on the UN system and international law'. The European Union condemns in the strongest possible terms the Russian Federation's unprovoked and unjustified military aggression against Ukraine. By its illegal military actions and threats, Russia is grossly violating international law and the principles of the UN Charter and undermining European and global security and stability. The European Union underlines that this includes the right of Ukraine to choose its own destiny. Russia bears full responsibility for this act of aggression and all the destruction and loss of life it will cause. It will be held accountable for its actions.

We also strongly condemn the involvement of Belarus in this aggression against Ukraine and call on it to refrain from such action and to abide by its international obligations, including under the NPT. The deletion of the reference in Article 18 to Belarus's non-nuclear status is another worrying change, which adds to unacceptable attempts to re-define the European security architecture. Russia's military attack against Ukraine – an independent, sovereign and non-nuclear weapon State – is a flagrant violation of international law and the core principles on which the international rules-based order is built. Moreover, Russia has violated its commitment to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or sovereignty of Ukraine under the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 on security assurances, thus disrespecting unequivocal security assurances a nuclear weapon States should honour as part of binding and agreed security arrangements. The loss of credibility of a nuclear weapon state on security assurances seriously undermines the NPT regime and the entire disarmament and non-proliferation architecture.

The European Union demands that Russia immediately ceases its military actions, unconditionally withdraws all forces and military equipment from the entire territory of Ukraine and fully respects Ukraine's territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence within its internationally recognised borders. The European Union calls on Russia and Russia-backed armed formations to respect international humanitarian law and stop their disinformation campaign and cyber-attacks.

The EU strongly condemns threats by president Putin of using nuclear force in this war. These threats are unacceptable, provocative, dangerous and escalatory. Only last month did the Russian Federation, in the context of the P5, reaffirm that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. In the interest of all humanity, Russian Federation must heed its commitments and immediately cease this nuclear brinkmanship. We stand in solidarity with the women, men and children whose lives have been affected by this unjustified and unjustifiable attack and deplore the tragic loss of life and human suffering. The European Union firmly believes that the use of force and coercion to change borders has no place in the 21st century. Tensions and conflict should be resolved exclusively through dialogue and diplomacy. The EU will continue cooperating closely with neighbours and reiterates its unwavering support for, and commitment to, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia and of the Republic of Moldova. It will continue strong coordination with partners and allies, within the UN, OSCE, NATO and the G7.

Madam President,

The integrity of the rules-based international system is key to our collective security. It could be only achieved through effective multilateralism and rules-based global governance. The EU will continue to do its utmost to protect these principles and values.

The CD remains the world's single multilateral disarmament negotiating body and its continued relevance is of utmost importance for the EU. While the EU and its Member States are ready to launch substantive work on all core items, we reiterate that our longstanding priority in the Conference on Disarmament is to immediately commence negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), and we support starting such negotiations in accordance with the document CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein.

In the meantime, we call on all States possessing nuclear weapons that have not yet done so to declare and uphold an immediate moratorium on their production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Furthermore, promoting universal adherence to and the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty CTBT is a top priority for the EU. All EU Member States have ratified the CTBT and are abiding by its obligations. We urge all States that have not yet done so, in particular those listed in Annex II, to sign and ratify the CTBT without any preconditions or further delay.

Lastly, the EU will particularly focus on promoting a successful outcome of the postponed Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The EU's support for the NPT is unwavering and we are committed to uphold and strengthen the NPT, promote its universalisation and enhance the implementation of all its obligations and the commitments undertaken during the previous review conferences.

Thank you for your attention.

### 3.1.2. **EU Statement – UN General Assembly 1st Committee: General Statement (New York, 3.10.2022)**

Mr. Chair,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union.

The candidate countries North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, and the Republic of Moldova, the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the EFTA country Iceland, member of the European Economic Area, as well as Andorra, Monaco and San Marino align themselves with this statement.

In 2022 the paradigms of both the global and the European security architecture changed drastically. The Russian Federation has invaded the sovereign country of Ukraine. It is using wide a range of conventional weapons, as well as cyberattacks, often in a manner that does not comply with International Humanitarian Law, and is using dangerous nuclear rhetoric and reckless repeated threats to use nuclear weapons. As the Special Representative of the EU Foreign and Security Policy, Joseph Borrell emphasised in his statement from 24 February:

'These are among the darkest hours for Europe since World War II [...]. This is not only the greatest violation of international law, it is a violation of the basic principles of human co-existence. It is costing many lives with unknown consequences ahead of us'.

The EU reiterates its strongest condemnation of the unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. The Russian Federation, permanent member of the UN Security Council, is grossly violating international law, including the UN Charter, and it is severely undermining European and global security and stability. We strongly condemn the illegal referenda, which are gross violations of Ukrainian sovereignty and the UN Charter and, which took place under military coercion. The results of such actions are null and void and will not be recognised by the EU and its Member States. We firmly reject and unequivocally condemn the illegal annexation by Russia of Ukraine's Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions. We call on all states and international organisations to unequivocally reject their illegal annexation. We deplore deliberate escalatory steps by Russia, including the partial mobilisation of reservists. Moreover, Russia, as a nuclear weapon State, has violated the security guarantees of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, which Ukraine received after renouncing the nuclear weapons on its territory in the wake of the USSR collapse and joining the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon State. Russia has systemically breached the rules of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), causing superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering, especially among the civilian population. Holding Russia accountable for its violations of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law is key in order to fight against impunity. We also condemn Belarus for its involvement in the Russian aggression against Ukraine.

The European Union's reaction to this brutal act of violence was therefore immediate, proportional, strong and united, in political, diplomatic, and economic terms. In the face of this affront to humanity, the EU and its Member States recall the binding character of the UN Charter in its entirety and stress the universality of the UN's founding principles. The EU reaffirms its conviction that the major challenges of our time cannot be addressed by countries acting alone but must be tackled together through effective multilateralism and rules-based international cooperation. In achieving this we need to work in partnership with others, including civil society, the private sector and other stakeholders.

The Russian war of aggression against Ukraine also heavily impacted the arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation architecture, and hampered both multilateral and bilateral cooperation and work in this field.

The long-awaited 10th Review Conference on the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), which took place in August, was not able to adopt a final outcome document due to Russia blocking consensus. The EU, which was strongly engaged in preparations for the Conference as well as throughout the Review Conference, deeply regrets that no consensus was achieved. Nevertheless, the legally binding obligations enshrined in the NPT and commitments from the past Review Conferences remain valid. We are looking forward to the next review cycle. It will offer yet another urgent opportunity to achieve the progress that is needed to strengthen the NPT as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament in accordance with Article VI of the NPT and an important element in the development of nuclear energy applications for peaceful purposes in accordance with Article IV of the NPT.

The EU reaffirms its resolute commitment to and continued support for the full and effective implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The EU is increasingly concerned at Iran's continued actions inconsistent with the JCPOA and with severe, and in the case of R&D activities, irreversible proliferation implications. Some of these actions do not have any plausible civilian justification. The EU strongly urges Iran to return without delay to full JCPOA implementation, including all transparency measures. The EU supports the intensive diplomatic efforts within the JCPOA Joint Commission and the contacts of the EU High Representative as JCPOA Coordinator with all relevant partners to achieve a return to the JCPOA by the United States and the resumption of full implementation of all JCPOA commitments by the United States and Iran. The EU Member States regret

that Iran has chosen not to seize the diplomatic opportunity as of yet and call on Iran to accept so that the JCPOA would be fully restored. We wish to underscore that the JCPOA negotiation is separate from Iran's legally binding obligations under the NPT, which are essential to the global non-proliferation regime. The EU urges Iran to cooperate in full with the IAEA without any further delay or conditionality to resolve all pending safeguards issues, in accordance with its legally binding obligations under its NPT Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.

The DPRK's unlawful launches of ballistic missiles this year threaten international and regional peace and security and warrant an appropriate response by the UN Security Council. The DPRK's declarations that it will continue to develop its unlawful nuclear and missile capabilities, that it would be prepared to engage in the first use of nuclear weapons and that it will not engage in negotiations aimed at returning to compliance with its obligations under UN Security Council resolutions are a matter of grave concern, as are reports of continued activity at the Punggye-ri nuclear test site. The EU urges the DPRK to engage in meaningful discussions with all relevant parties to build a basis for sustainable peace and security and to take steps aimed at pursuing complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula. The DPRK must abandon its nuclear weapons, any other weapons of mass destruction and its ballistic missiles and related programmes in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner. The EU strongly underlines that the actions taken by the DPRK cannot confer the status of a nuclear weapon State in accordance with the NPT or any special status whatsoever. Until the DPRK complies with its obligations under UN Security Council Resolutions, the EU will continue to implement strict sanctions and we urge all UN Members to fully implement all UNSC sanctions.

Furthermore, promoting universal adherence to and the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) remains a top priority for the EU. The CTBT has become an effective instrument and we reiterate our full confidence in the Treaty's verification regime, which has demonstrated its ability to provide independent and reliable data that will help to deter noncompliance with the Treaty once it enters into force, and to respond to threats to international peace and security. All EU Member States have ratified the CTBT and are abiding by its obligations. We urge all States, which have not yet done so, to sign and ratify the CTBT, to abide by a moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosion, and to refrain from any action that would defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty.

Mr. Chair,

Advancing disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control will be a vital part of the UN's 'New Agenda for Peace'. The EU will continue to support the multilateral instruments against chemical and biological weapons in order to uphold the comprehensive legal prohibitions of these categories of weapons of mass destruction, and to ensure there can be no impunity for those who use them. We are firmly committed to contributing to a successful outcome of the Ninth Review Conference of the BTWC and the Fifth Review Conference of the CWC. The EU also strongly supports the UN Secretary-General's Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, which is the only independent international instrument for investigating alleged use of biological weapons.

The EU is committed to promoting the full application of existing international law in cyberspace and will work with international partners to prevent conflict and advance cooperation and international peace and security through the normative framework for responsible State behaviour in cyberspace, the implementation of confidence building measures, and support for cyber capacity building. Regarding the work ahead of us, the EU will prioritise strengthening the existing strategic framework for conflict prevention and stability in cyberspace. In particular, the EU will work with Member States and international partners to advance the proposal of a forthcoming resolution to establish a Programme of Action to Advance Responsible State Behaviour in Cyberspace (Cyber PoA).

The EU will also continue to support and strengthen conventional arms control instruments as well as the multilateral export control regimes. Russia's violation of existing Confidence and Security Building Measures and conventional arms control commitments damaged the European security architecture. We will strive to universalise the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention and the full implementation of the Oslo Action Plan. We also fully support the humanitarian goal of the Cluster Munition Convention. The EU will further address emerging challenges including those related to lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) within the framework of the CCW, advocate responsible military use of new technologies, promote responsible space behaviours, and support efforts for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We also call on all UN Member States to join the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and strongly encourages the full implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) in All Its Aspects.

We especially welcome as an important achievement of international community, the conclusion of the Political Declaration Process on Strengthening the Protection of Civilians from the Humanitarian Consequences arising from the use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas (EWIPA), in a process led by Ireland following the launch by Austria at an international conference in Vienna in 2019. The Declaration aims at reducing harm and strengthening the protection of civilians in armed conflict. This is a positive sign that the international community can still work together to achieve a tangible outcome despite the extremely challenging international circumstances.

Mr. Chair,

Gender equality and the empowerment of all women and girls are important cross-cutting priorities for the EU. We commend the UN Secretary-General for the continued implementation of the entire Women, Peace and Security agenda and welcome his efforts to promote gender equality and improve women's full, active, equal, and meaningful participation and agency, including in leadership positions in disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control fora.

I thank you, Mr. Chair.

## 3.2. NUCLEAR ISSUES

### 3.2.1. **EU Statement – 10th Review Conference on the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: General Statement (New York, 1.8.2022)**

Mr. President,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. The candidate countries North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova, the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as Georgia, Monaco and San Marino align themselves with this statement.

Please accept my congratulations on the assumption of your duties as the President of the 10th NPT Review Conference. Your diplomatic skills, dedicated efforts and numerous consultations supported by the NPT Review Conference Bureau members as well as UNODA, have finally allowed the Review Conference to convene, despite the difficult and unexpected circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic. You can count on our full support.

The EU has contributed actively to this NPT review cycle through thematic and regional seminars, a number of working papers as well as side events. We have made proposals for concrete, future-oriented actions and EU Member States have reported on their respective measures and initiatives in their national implementation reports.

Mr. President,

The EU reiterates its strongest condemnation of the unprovoked and unjustified aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. The Russian Federation's invasion of a sovereign country is a gross violation of international law, including the UN Charter and it severely undermines European and global security and stability. We also condemn Belarus for its involvement in the Russian aggression against Ukraine.



The EU resolutely supports Ukraine's inherent right of self-defence and the Ukrainian armed forces' efforts to defend Ukraine's territorial integrity and population in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter. The EU demands that Russia immediately cease its military actions, withdraw all its troops from the entire territory of Ukraine and fully respect Ukraine's territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence within its internationally recognised borders. The international community will hold Russia accountable for its atrocities. The EU remains strongly committed to the fight against impunity.

Mr. President,

The Russian aggression against Ukraine and President Putin's threats of nuclear use seriously undermines and has a significant negative impact on the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament architecture. The blatant violation by Russia of the Budapest Memorandum, reckless threats of using nuclear weapons, as well as other irresponsible acts against nuclear safety and security in Ukraine, in particular the ongoing occupation of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, are detrimental to the NPT.

Therefore, it's of utmost importance for all States Parties to the NPT, as well as the EU, to reiterate the unequivocal support for the NPT as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament in accordance with Article VI of the NPT and an important element in the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. We are firmly convinced that a multilateral and treaty-based approach provides the best way to maintain and reinforce international peace and security.

The EU reaffirms the importance of universalising the NPT and calls on all States that have not yet done so to join the Treaty as non-nuclear weapon States and, pending their accession, to adhere to its terms. The EU recognises the NPT's historic achievements in limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, in facilitating cooperation on nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and in significantly reducing nuclear weapon stockpiles in previous decades. The NPT has an enduring value and its full implementation is needed now more than ever.

The EU strongly supports all three pillars of the NPT and will continue to promote comprehensive, balanced and substantive full implementation of the 2010 Review Conference Action Plan. We stress the need to implement all obligations under the NPT, and commitments during previous Review Conferences, including the need for concrete progress towards the full implementation of Article VI, with the ultimate goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons. We are resolved to seek a safer and more secure world for all in accordance with the goals of the Treaty in a way that promotes international stability, peace and security. Ensuring the implementation of the 64 actions in the 2010 Action Plan is a collective responsibility shared by all States Parties to the NPT without exception.

In the current security environment marked by increasingly high tensions and serious proliferation crises and challenges, renewed efforts must be pursued in the area of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control. The EU calls on all States concerned to abstain from any steps that would risk further escalating tensions and undermine the significant reductions achieved after the end of the Cold War. A new nuclear arms race must be avoided.

Before the Russian aggression against Ukraine, there were some welcomed developments, including the agreement reached between the United States and the Russian Federation to extend the New START Treaty for an additional five years as well as the relaunch of the bilateral strategic stability dialogue and the restatement of the Reykjavik Summit declaration at the June 2021 summit in Geneva. The EU attaches the highest importance to the New START Treaty and regards it as a crucial contribution to international and European security. Recalling the obligation for all nuclear weapon States arising from Art. VI of the NPT, we underline that the two nuclear weapon States with the largest arsenals hold a special responsibility in the area of nuclear disarmament and arms control. The EU encourages seeking further reductions of their arsenals under the New START Treaty, including strategic and non-strategic, deployed and non-deployed nuclear weapons and further discussions on confidence-building, transparency, risk reduction, verification activities, laying the ground for even more robust future arms control agreements and reporting. We call on China to actively contribute to these processes.

The EU welcomes discussion between Presidents Biden and Xi on nuclear issues, and encourages them to establish a dialogue on strategic stability and arms control.

The EU notes the very severe consequences associated with nuclear weapons use and emphasises that all States share the responsibility to prevent such an occurrence from happening.

The EU considers the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) to be of crucial importance to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and its entry into force is a top priority for the Union. We call on all States that have not yet done so, in particular those listed in Annex II, to sign and ratify the CTBT without preconditions or further delay.

The EU calls for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament of a Treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other explosive devices (FMCT) and that it can support the start of the negotiations in accordance with the document CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein.

The EU acknowledges the critical importance of existing nuclear weapon free zones for peace and security and remains committed to the implementation of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 NPT Review Conference. The EU notes the convening of the UN Conferences in 2019 and 2021 on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems and it is encouraged by their outcomes.

The EU recognises the important work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The EU stresses that the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement together with the Additional Protocol constitute the current verification standard under the NPT and calls for their universalisation without delay.

The EU is resolved to ensure the highest standards of nuclear safety, security and safeguards, recognizes IAEA's central role in this regard and the Union's significant funding of its activities.

The EU reiterates its resolute commitment to and continued support for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The JCPOA is a key element of the global nuclear non-proliferation architecture, endorsed unanimously by the UN Security Council through its resolution 2231 (2015). The EU supports the ongoing intensive diplomatic efforts within the JCPOA Joint Commission and the contacts of the EU High Representative as the Coordinator of the Joint Commission with all relevant partners.

The EU expresses its serious concern that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) continues action to further develop its illegal nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programmes. The EU calls on the DPRK to take concrete steps in dismantling its weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missile and existing nuclear programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner as decided by United Nations Security Council Resolution 2397 (2017). The EU urges the DPRK to engage in meaningful discussions with all relevant parties to build a basis for sustainable peace and security and to take steps aimed at pursuing complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula.

The EU reaffirms its support for the inalienable right of all Parties to the NPT to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with the NPT.

The EU underlines that gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls is a top horizontal priority and believes it is important to integrate gender perspectives into discussions across the three pillars of the NPT. The EU fully supports and promotes the equal participation of women and men in the field of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control.

Thank you, Mr. President.

### 3.2.2. **Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty: Statement by the High Representative Josep Borrell on the occasion of the closure of the Tenth Review Conference of the Parties (Brussels, 29.8.2022)**

The European Union deeply regrets that, in spite of all tireless efforts, no substantial outcome of the Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was reached due to Russia's unwillingness to join the consensus.

In the current severe security environment, a meaningful outcome strengthening existing norms, and through those, the rules-based international order, would have been needed more than ever.

The EU regards the NPT as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and an important element in the development of nuclear energy applications for peaceful purposes.

We recognise its enduring value and historic achievements in limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, in facilitating cooperation on nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and in significantly reducing nuclear weapon stockpiles in previous decades.

In the current security environment, marked by increasingly high tensions due to Russia's aggression against Ukraine as well as other serious crises and challenges, renewed efforts must be pursued in the area of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control. Therefore, we stress the need to implement all obligations under the NPT, and commitments made at the previous Review Conferences, including concrete progress towards the ultimate goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons.

We are resolved to seek a safer and more secure world for all in accordance with the goals of the Treaty in a way that promotes international stability, peace and security.

### 3.2.3. EU Statement – 66th session of the General Conference (Vienna, 26.9.2022)

Mr. President,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. The following countries align themselves with this statement: North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Iceland and San Marino.

Let me congratulate you, Mr. President, on your election and thank the IAEA Director General and the Secretariat for their excellent work over the past year.

The European Union attaches great importance to the IAEA's technical, independent and impartial work across its mandate.

We are meeting in unprecedented circumstances. The European Union condemns, in the strongest possible terms, the Russian Federation's unprovoked and unjustified aggression against Ukraine which is a gross violation of international law, notably the UN Charter, and severely undermines European and global security and stability.

Russia's actions pose serious and direct threats to nuclear safety and security and the Agency's safeguards verification activities in Ukraine, as highlighted in the Board resolutions adopted in March and September. We are deeply concerned that each of the seven indispensable pillars outlined by the IAEA Director General, has been compromised as a result of the Russian aggression. As stated by the Director General, a nuclear accident must not be added to the tragedy of this war.

The EU strongly supports the Agency's work to assist Ukraine, notably the IAEA Support and Assistance Mission to Zaporizhzhia (ISAMZ) and the Agency's continued presence at the facility. We also support the Director General's proposal to establish a nuclear safety and security protection zone around the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), the modalities of which would still need to be agreed. We emphasise there is only one sustainable solution: The Russian Federation must stop its illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, unconditionally withdraw all its armed forces and military equipment from the entire territory of Ukraine, notably from the ZNPP, and fully respect Ukraine's territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence within its internationally recognised borders.

The EU reaffirms its resolute commitment to and continued support for the full and effective implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The EU is increasingly concerned at Iran's continued actions inconsistent with the JCPOA and with severe, and in the case of R&D activities, irreversible proliferation implications. Some of these actions do not have any plausible civilian justification. The EU strongly urges Iran to return without delay to full JCPOA implementation, including all transparency measures. The EU supports the intensive diplomatic efforts within the JCPOA Joint Commission and the contacts of the EU High Representative as JCPOA Coordinator with all relevant partners to achieve a return to the JCPOA by the United States and the resumption of full implementation of all JCPOA commitments by the United States and Iran. The EU Member States regret

that Iran has chosen not to seize the diplomatic opportunity and call on Iran to accept it so that the JCPOA would be fully restored. We wish to underscore that the JCPOA negotiation is separate from Iran's legally binding obligations under the NPT, which are essential to the global non-proliferation regime. The EU urges Iran to cooperate in full with the IAEA without any further delay or conditionality to resolve all pending safeguards issues, in accordance with its legally binding obligations under its NPT Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.

The EU condemns the DPRK's continued engagement in nuclear and ballistic missile activities which are a matter of grave concern. It is highly regrettable that the DPRK has not taken concrete, verified action towards denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula. We urge the DPRK to comply with its obligations under multiple UN Security Council Resolutions, to refrain from nuclear tests and ballistic missile launches, and to engage in a meaningful dialogue with all relevant parties to build a basis for sustainable peace and security. We also urge the DPRK to return to negotiations and take immediate and concrete steps towards abandoning all nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles and related programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner.

Mr. President,

The EU regrets that the 10th Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) could not achieve consensus on a final outcome document because of the Russian Federation blocking consensus. We will spare no efforts to continue promoting the full and effective implementation of the NPT as well as its universalisation, and will build upon the substantial discussions held tirelessly over the course of the 10th Review Conference to prepare for the new review cycle. The NPT remains the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament in accordance with Article VI of the NPT and an important element in the development of nuclear energy applications for peaceful purposes in accordance with Article IV of the NPT. Its legally binding obligations and past commitments remain valid. The EU reaffirms its full support for the establishment of a zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems in the Middle East, as agreed at the 1995 NPT Review Conference. The EU also affirms its full support for the decision to establish a working group to strengthen the review cycle.

The EU supports the strengthening of the IAEA safeguards system and remains of the view that Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements, together with the Additional Protocol, constitute the current verification standard under the NPT. We call for their universalisation without delay. The EU also urges all States, which have not yet done so, to amend their Small Quantities Protocols or apply the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement in full, especially those States that are already building a nuclear power plant or a research reactor.

The EU and its Member States attach utmost importance to nuclear safety, and its continuous improvement. Over the past decades, we have established and further developed an advanced, legally-binding nuclear safety framework applicable in all EU Member States. We also provide financial and human resources to help improve nuclear safety in countries outside the EU, including through the European Instrument for International Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC), with a budget of EUR 300 million.

Furthermore, the EU stresses the need to continue strengthening nuclear security worldwide in order to prevent nuclear terrorism and facilitate peaceful uses of nuclear technology. We encourage all Member States to promote a strong nuclear safety and security culture and continuously implement the highest possible nuclear safety and radiation protection standards. We recognise the IAEA's central role in facilitating international cooperation and providing technical assistance to Member States.

We reaffirm our strong political commitment to international nuclear safety and security conventions, support their implementation and call upon all States to join them. We stress the need to consider new legally-binding international rules specifically prohibiting armed attacks against any nuclear installation devoted to peaceful purposes.

Mr. President,

The EU and its Member States reaffirm their longstanding commitment to and strong support for the IAEA's Technical Cooperation Programme and support the Agency's work in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology in order to reach the Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris Agreement commitments including in the context of COP27. We acknowledge that Member States pursue different approaches to ensure energy security at affordable cost and that all countries have the sovereign right to decide whether or not to include nuclear power as part of their own energy mix to collectively achieve the 2030 climate target and the Paris Agreement commitments. The EU acknowledges the role played by nuclear technologies in relation to the global efforts to limit climate change and mitigate its negative effects. The EU also welcomes the new 'Rays of Hope' initiative and the organisation of this year's Scientific Forum on this topic.

We welcome the strong commitment to gender equality and encourage the Secretariat to continue its efforts to achieve gender parity and mainstream gender in its programmes and projects. The EU is proud to be the largest donor to the IAEA's Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellowship Programme.

We remain among the IAEA's largest donors and expect efficient and effective programme delivery. Given the importance of the IAEA's work, we hope the Member States will do their utmost to ensure sustainable funding for the IAEA's key activities.

Thank you, Mr. President.

#### 3.2.4. **EU General Statement on the safety, security, and safeguards implications of the situation in Ukraine – 66th session of the General Conference (Vienna, 29.9.2022)**

Mr. President,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. The following countries align themselves with this statement: North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, the Republic of Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and San Marino.

The European Union condemns, in the strongest possible terms, the Russian Federation's unprovoked and unjustified aggression against Ukraine. It is a gross violation of international law, notably the UN Charter, and threatens peace and security in Europe and worldwide. The Russian Federation's aggression has caused immense human suffering to the Ukrainian population, massive destruction of the civilian infrastructure, and has severe global consequences for food and energy security. It has significantly increased the risk of a nuclear incident or accident, with potentially grave radiological consequences for human health and the environment in Ukraine and beyond. We condemn the Russian Federation's behaviour and nuclear safety and security threats.

Such an unprecedented situation requires a strong response from the IAEA as a multilateral body with a Statute based on the UN Charter. We therefore welcome the adoption of the IAEA Board of Governors Resolutions on 3 March and 15 September 2022 and express our full support for the Joint Statement delivered at this General Conference on the safety, security and safeguards implications of the situation in Ukraine.

As documented by the IAEA Director General in his recent reports, each of the seven indispensable pillars on nuclear safety and security derived from IAEA safety standards and nuclear security guidance has been compromised since the Russian Federation launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine and illegally seized control of the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone and then the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. Russia's actions continue to pose serious and direct threats to Ukrainian nuclear facilities and they have impeded the Agency from fully and safely conducting safeguards verification activities in Ukraine.

The EU strongly supports the Agency's work to assist Ukraine, notably the IAEA Support and Assistance Mission to Zaporizhzhia (ISAMZ) and the Agency's continued presence at the facility. We also support the IAEA Director General's proposal to establish a nuclear safety and security protection zone around the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), the modalities of which would still need to be agreed.

We emphasize, once again, that there is only one sustainable solution: The Russian Federation must stop its illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, and immediately, completely and unconditionally withdraw all its troops and military equipment from the entire territory of Ukraine, notably from the ZNPP, and fully respect Ukraine's territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence within its internationally recognised borders. The ZNPP must be returned to full and exclusive control of the Ukrainian authorities and remain connected to the Ukrainian electricity grid. We are grateful to the Ukrainian regulator and the operators who continue their work in the most critical circumstances.

We will never recognise the results of the illegal sham 'referenda', which have no legal validity or effect, and we remain unwavering in our support for Ukraine's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders.

We stand with Ukraine.

Thank you, Mr. President.

### 3.2.5. **EU Statement at the 59th session of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission (Vienna, 21.11.2022)**

Mr. Chairman,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union and its Member States. The following countries align themselves with this statement: North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iceland, Norway, Andorra and San Marino.

The European Union reiterates in the strongest possible terms its condemnation of the unprovoked and unjustified invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation, which constitutes a blatant violation of the UN Charter and international law, and demands that Russia immediately cease its military actions, unconditionally withdraw all forces and military equipment from the entire territory of Ukraine and fully respect Ukraine's territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence within its internationally recognised borders. We strongly condemn the Russian Federation's attempts to illegally annex Ukrainian regions, which have no legal validity or effect.

We also reiterate our call on Russia to refrain from any action that would endanger the integrity of the International Monitoring System (IMS) – including stations in the region – and data availability through the verification regime.

Moreover, Russia's irresponsible actions, as well as the continuing effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, have caused significant economic pressures for many States Signatories and correspondingly have repercussions for the financial outlook of international organisations.

Mr. Chairman,

We thank the Executive Secretary for his comprehensive reports, and express our support for the recommendations contained in the reports of Working Groups A and B, as well as of the Advisory Group. We also welcome the return to a full scale Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) session, for the first time since 2019, and thank the PTS, its directors and all CTBTO staff for their resilience and efforts in ensuring business continuity for both verification and non-verification related activities to the benefit of States Signatories.

The efforts to promote and facilitate signature and ratification of the CTBT remain a top priority for the EU. All EU Member States have ratified the Treaty and consistently call upon the remaining eight Annex II States: China, Egypt, Iran, Israel and the USA who still need to ratify the Treaty and the DPRK, India and Pakistan who still need to sign and ratify it in order to bring it into force, to do so without any preconditions or further delay. In the meantime, it is crucial that all States fully observe the moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosion, and refrain from any action contrary to the object and purpose of the Treaty.

We warmly welcome the recent ratifications of the CTBT by Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome and Principe, and fully support the efforts of the Executive Secretary to further promote and facilitate signature and ratification of the Treaty.

The EU looks forward to the upcoming Science and Diplomacy Symposium 2022 which will be another opportunity to promote the entry into force of the Treaty, based on innovative approaches. On this occasion, the EU is pleased to organise a side-event on 6 December, on promoting gender equality and empowerment of early career women in STEM.

Mr. Chairman,

The EU urges the DPRK to cease its unlawful and destabilising actions that undermine regional and international peace and security and instead engage in dialogue with relevant partners. The DPRK must comply with its obligations under relevant UN Security Council resolutions to refrain from testing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Any nuclear test or other reckless action must be met with a swift, united, and robust international response.

The DPRK cannot and will never have the status of a nuclear weapon State in accordance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). We urge the DPRK to abandon its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes as well as programmes to build delivery systems and other weapons of mass destruction in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner as required by UN Security Council resolutions. We urge the DPRK to return to compliance with the NPT and the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement including by signing and ratifying the Additional Protocol – and signing and ratifying the CTBT. It is critical that sanctions, which target the DPRK's unlawful weapons development, remain in place while its programmes exist. The EU calls on all UN Member States to ensure the full implementation of UN Security Council resolutions to prevent the DPRK from procuring materials, knowledge and finance that support its illegal weapons programmes. The EU stands ready to support any meaningful diplomatic process and is committed to working with all relevant partners to build a basis for sustainable peace and security and take steps aimed at pursuing complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula.

Mr. Chairman,

The EU would like to thank the Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) for providing the final 2023 Budget update proposals, which take into account comments made by States Signatories, and supports the recommendation of Working Group A to the Commission to approve them.

The highly sophisticated CTBT verification system, the preservation of its value, continuous sustainment and recapitalisation of the IMS, and the further development of on-site inspection operational capabilities and related capacity-building activities require substantial financial input. As noted by the Executive Secretary, the current budget allocated to cover the sustainment and recapitalisation of the IMS is inadequate. A solution needs to be found urgently and be agreed for the next 2024–2025 biennium. This will require States Signatories to make tough but important choices about budget allocation.

We welcome the commitment made by the Executive Secretary to provide a detailed technology and station specific analysis as a basis for a budgetary gap determination and mitigation strategy. We encourage the PTS to launch regular discussions with States Signatories on this issue and on the 2024–2025 Programme and Budget more broadly, as soon as possible. We also encourage the PTS to continue its important operations, including building, certifying, operating and repairing IMS stations.

Moreover, it is crucial for the operation of the verification regime of the Treaty, and for the wider organisation's financial health, that all States demonstrate their political commitment and honour their legal obligation to pay their assessed contributions, on time and in full.

The EU, materialising its full commitment to the Treaty and its implementation, has so far contributed 29.5 million Euros to support CTBTO monitoring and verification activities. These funds are being used to improve the auxiliary seismic station network, to strengthen on-site inspection and noble gas monitoring capabilities, and to provide technical assistance to countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean region, allowing them to participate fully in the CTBTO's verification regime. The EU has already commenced consultations with the PTS regarding its next voluntary contribution through EU Council Decision IX.

We have noted with interest the proposal of a Funding mechanism for the 2025 Integrated Field Exercise (IFE). Since the Commission has approved an exercise programme culminating in an IFE, it is clear that adequate resources will need to be identified. In this regard, we welcome the related draft decision which includes an opt-out possibility with respect to national legal constraints by some States.

Mr. Chairman,

Background studies using mobile monitoring systems have been going on for years to improve the performance of the verification regime and ensure the correct detection of events. This activity is part of, and helps carry out the mandate of the PTS. We look forward to the swift appointment of a new team of co-facilitators and fully support the continuation and finalisation of discussions on this topic.

Regarding the development of guidelines for holding non-scheduled sessions of the Commission, while we reiterate our support for the 2019 GRULAC proposal, we thank Ambassador Duarte of Brazil for his efforts and for the new version of his proposal, which includes many positive elements. We look forward to advancing discussions with a view to finalising this issue.

As for appointments to the Advisory Group, we encourage States to ensure that they nominate experts of high-recognised standing and experience in financial matters at the international level. We welcome the nominations of Mr Matheus Pires Uller from Brazil and Ms Yue Ping from the People's Republic of China and can support them.

On the draft decision on possible procedures for the appointment of the Chairperson and Vice-Chairpersons of the Advisory Group, we consider that the current draft needs further consideration and revision, and stand ready to engage in further consultations as appropriate.

In conclusion Mr. Chairman,

We wish to express our deep appreciation to you and to the Vice-Chairs for ably steering the Commission during this year, and reiterate our full support and cooperation for a constructive and successful 59th Session of the Commission. The EU stands ready to support your efforts to fill current vacancies in the Commission and its subsidiary bodies.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

### 3.2.6. **EU Briefing on behalf of the High Representative – UN Security Council: Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (Iran) (New York, 19.12.2022)**

Mr. President,

It is an honour to have again the opportunity to address the Council in this session on behalf of the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Mr Josep Borrell, in his capacity as Coordinator of the Joint Commission of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (the JCPOA).

My first expression of gratitude goes to Secretary-General António Guterres and to the Secretariat for their work related to the implementation of Resolution 2231 and in particular the report prepared for today's discussion. I also want to thank Ireland as the Facilitator of Resolution 2231 and the work done to keep members informed of the current state of play.

I would like also to underscore the important role of the IAEA as the sole impartial and independent international organisation mandated by the Security Council to monitor and verify the implementation of the nuclear non-proliferation commitments under the JCPOA.

Last June, we described the intense negotiations efforts to restore the JCPOA undertaken by all JCPOA participants, and the United States, since April 2021. Following this process and based on all the key positions of the participants in negotiations, the EU High Representative had been able to put forward in early August a compromise text that reflects his understanding of the most realistic equilibrium in view of a deal. The text lays down the necessary steps for the US to return to the JCPOA and for Iran to resume the full implementation of all its JCPOA commitments. However, since then, new developments have added significant new layers of complications that makes it increasingly difficult to reach a deal. Nevertheless, the coordinator remains in close contact with all JCPOA participants and the United States on this issue.



Mr. President,

Since the discussion on the previous report of the UN Secretariat on the implementation of the UNSCR 2231, the IAEA documented thoroughly the alarming further acceleration of Iran's nuclear programme that gravely departs from its JCPOA commitments. IAEA DG's reports of 10, 22 and 29 November documented the expansion of Iran's nuclear enrichment operations and capacity. This includes more enrichment of uranium at the level of 60 % in two facilities and more cascades of advanced centrifuges going to operation while others are being installed.

Let me also recall that Iran's unilateral decision in June 2022 that all Agency's JCPOA-related surveillance and monitoring equipment be removed from operation has further aggravated existing concerns related to the fact that from 23 February 2021 onwards, the IAEA's verification and monitoring activities have been seriously affected as a result of Iran's decision to stop the implementation of transparency measures as envisaged in the JCPOA, including the Additional Protocol.

Furthermore, Iran, which conditioned a deal on the restoration of the JCPOA on the settlement of the 'outstanding safeguards issues', needs to cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

We continue to recognise that Iran has faced and continues facing very serious negative economic consequences following the US's withdrawal from the JCPOA and the re-imposition of previously lifted US unilateral sanctions which we deeply regret. Since our last discussion in June, the US has imposed additional nuclear-related sanctions against Iran, including in the area of oil and petrochemicals. The restoration of the JCPOA remains the only way for Iran to reap the full benefits of the JCPOA and reach its full economic potential as it will result in a comprehensive sanctions' lifting that will encourage greater cooperation by the entire international community with Iran.

I recall in this context that the EU has lifted all its nuclear-related economic and financial sanctions since the JCPOA Implementation Day and this remains the case. But let me also clarify that EU measures relating to the unacceptable repression of protests in Iran over the past months and Iran's military support to Russia are outside the JCPOA.

Mr. President,

In addition to the advancement of the nuclear programme of Iran, the European Union is indeed extremely worried about Iran's military support to Russia's war of aggression in Ukraine including through deliveries of drones. The EU will continue to respond to this, as necessary, not least as this also affects the implementation of SCR 2231.

On 12 December last, the Council of the European Union recalled that any transfer of certain combat drones and missiles to or from Iran without prior permission by the UN Security Council is in violation of Resolution 2231. On this occasion, the EU reaffirmed its support to the ongoing work by the UN Secretariat team responsible for monitoring the implementation of the Resolution. The EU also recalled that Resolution 2231 calls upon Iran not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using such ballistic technology.

Mr. President,

The process to conclude a deal and bring the JCPOA back on track has been seriously challenged by the various developments over the last few months as described earlier.

However, I shall be straightforward: the High Representative does not see any sustainable alternative. To echo the statement made by the UN Secretary-General in his report, let me reaffirm here that diplomacy and restoring the JCPOA's full implementation is still the best option for preventing Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. This is also instrumental to the security of the whole region and remains in our fundamental common interest.

For almost two years, the Agency has been deprived of an essential part of its knowledge of Iran's activities on the entirety of Iran's nuclear fuel cycle. Let me recall that the Additional Protocol to Iran's Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, which substantially strengthened legal capacities of the IAEA in terms of verification, is only made applicable under a fully implemented JCPOA. Moreover, while the agreement is in the shadow, Iran's programme runs quickly with irreversible proliferation implications in particular in the field of research and development. The combination of continued nuclear progress by Iran and decreasing visibility over its programme raises more concerns than ever.

The Procurement Channel, another benefit of the JCPOA, continues to be fully operational. It remains a vital transparency and confidence-building mechanism. It gives assurances to Member States and the private sector that transfers of nuclear and dual-use goods and services are fully in line with Resolution 2231 and the JCPOA.

For all these reasons, on 12 December, the Council of the EU reaffirmed its commitment to, and continued support for, the full and effective implementation of a restored JCPOA. It called on all countries to support the implementation of Resolution 2231. The EU also underscored that the JCPOA is separate from Iran's legally binding obligations under the Non-proliferation Treaty, which are essential to the global non-proliferation regime.

Drawing on this unambiguous support from the Foreign Ministers from the 27 EU countries, the High Representative is determined to continue working with the international community towards a full and effective implementation of a restored JCPOA. He joins his voice to that of the UN Secretary-General to encourage all parties to intensify diplomatic efforts to this end.

Thank you, Mr. President.

### 3.3. CHEMICAL WEAPONS

#### 3.3.1. **Chemical Weapons Convention: Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union to mark the 25th anniversary (Brussels, 19.4.2022)**

On 29 April 2022, we mark the 25th anniversary of the entry into force of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC). With 193 States Parties, the Convention today enshrines the international norm against the use of chemical weapons.

Since it entered into force, 99 % of the world's declared chemical weapons stocks have been verifiably destroyed under the control of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). However, despite the tangible progress, the re-emergence of use of chemical weapons is one of the most serious threats to international peace and security.

In recent years, the world has witnessed the horrific use of chemical weapons in Syria, causing hundreds of victims, including children. In 2020, a toxic nerve agent 'Novichok' was used in the assassination attempt on the Russian opposition politician Alexei Navalny in the territory of the Russian Federation. Chemical weapons have also been used in Malaysia in 2017 to assassinate Kim Jeung-On's half-brother Kim Jeung-Nam, and in the United Kingdom in 2018 in the attempted assassination of Sergei and Yulia Skripal, which resulted in the death of a British citizen.

The European Union reiterates its strong condemnation of the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian Arab Republic and its failure to respect its international obligations under the Convention, as substantiated through comprehensive and thorough investigations carried out by the United Nations and the OPCW. The European Union and its Member States will continue to work at national and international levels in order to address chemical weapons attacks and other atrocities committed in the Syrian Arab Republic.

The European Union also reiterates its strong concern that the Russian Federation has still not reacted to international calls to fully cooperate with the OPCW to ensure an impartial international investigation on the attempt to assassinate the Russian opposition politician, Alexei Navalny. The poisoning of Mr. Navalny in Russia by a military chemical nerve agent of the 'Novichok' group in August 2020 (a substance developed by Russia), has been confirmed, beyond doubt, by specialised laboratories in Germany, France and Sweden, as well as by the OPCW. The European Union has condemned the poisoning in the strongest possible terms.

The use of chemical weapons by anyone, anywhere, at any time and under any circumstances constitutes a violation of international law and can amount to the most serious crimes of international concern – war crimes and crimes against humanity.

The EU supports collective efforts to ensure accountability for perpetrators of chemical attacks through the International Partnership against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons.

Impunity for the use of chemical weapons must not and will not be tolerated. Under its chemical weapons sanctions regime, the EU has imposed restrictive measures against multiple Russian and Syrian individuals and entities for their involvement in chemical weapons attacks.

The pace of developments in science and technology are both a challenge and an opportunity to foster peaceful uses of chemistry. The transformation of the OPCW laboratory into a Centre for Chemistry and Technology (CCT) will be key to strengthen the Convention and enhance the Organisation's capacity to perform its core tasks of verification, inspection and capacity building. In this context, the European Union reiterates its full confidence in the OPCW Technical Secretariat, its professionalism, impartiality and well-established technical expertise.

On this important anniversary, the European Union and its Member States reaffirm their unwavering support for the CWC and for the work of the OPCW. The OPCW's diligence, professionalism and impartiality while addressing the use of chemical weapons offer a vital first step towards accountability and an end to impunity. Any use of chemical weapons is an affront to international law on which we all depend for our security and wellbeing.

The candidate countries Turkey, North Macedonia, Montenegro and Albania, the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the EFTA countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, as well as Ukraine, Republic of Moldova and Georgia align themselves with this declaration.

### 3.3.2. **Day of Remembrance for all Victims of Chemical Warfare: Statement by High Representative/Vice-President Josep Borrell (Brussels, 30.11.2022)**

25 years ago, the Chemical Weapons Convention entered into force with one purpose: to put an end and eliminate chemical weapons once and for all. Today it is the global norm against chemical weapons.

Since 1997, over 99 % of chemical weapon stockpiles declared have been verifiably destroyed. Yet chemical weapons remain one of the most serious threats to international peace and security.

Despite the progress made, we are still witness to the horrific consequences of these heinous weapons. In Syria, they have caused hundreds of victims, including children. In August 2020, a military grade nerve agent 'Novichok' was used in the assassination attempt on the Russian opposition politician Alexei Navalny in the territory of the Russian Federation. Chemical weapons have also been used in Malaysia in 2017 to assassinate Kim Jeung-On's half-brother Kim Jeung-Nam, and in the United Kingdom in 2018 in the attempted assassination of Sergei and Yulia Skripal, which resulted in the death of a British citizen.

No one should use chemical weapons, anywhere, at any time and under any circumstances.

In view of the continued threat posed by the proliferation and use of chemical weapons, the EU has applied restrictive measures against 25 individuals and three entities.

We will continue supporting the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention, independently and impartially.

On this day of Remembrance for all Victims of Chemical Warfare, we remember those who have died and suffered because of the use of chemical weapons. We recall that the use of chemical weapons is a violation of international law and can amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Those responsible must and will be held accountable. We will continue to fight against impunity and working towards full accountability for those responsible at national and international levels.

## Background

Under its regime of restrictive measures dedicated to fighting the proliferation and use of chemical weapons and their precursors, the European Union has imposed restrictive measures on persons and entities in Russia linked to the Salisbury attack in 2018 and the poisoning of Mr Navalny in 2020. In Syria, the EU has imposed restrictive measures on entities and persons responsible for development and use of chemical weapons, in particular for the attacks that took place in August 2013 in Ghouta, March 2017 in Ltamenah and 2018 in Douma. Moreover, the European Union continues its active participation in the Partnership Against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons.

### 3.3.3. Statement of the European Union at the 27th Session of the Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (The Hague, 28 November 2022)

Mr. Chairperson,

Mr. Director-General,

Distinguished delegates,

I have the honour of speaking on behalf of the European Union.

The candidate countries Albania, North Macedonia, Republic of Moldova, Montenegro and Ukraine, the potential candidate countries Bosnia and Herzegovina and Georgia, and the EFTA (European Free Trade Association) countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the EEA (European Economic Area) align themselves with this statement.

Andorra, Monaco and San Marino also associate themselves with this statement.

The European Union (EU) would like to pay tribute to Ambassador Bård Ivar Svendsen of Norway, Chairperson of the 26th Conference of States Parties, and Ambassador Ziad Al Atiyah of Saudi Arabia, Chairperson of the Executive Council, for their efforts and outstanding performance in fulfilling their duties. We also warmly congratulate Ambassador Vusumuzi Madonsela of South Africa for his election as the Chairperson of the 27th Conference of States Parties. I would like to assure him of our full support in steering the work of the Conference.

We also take this opportunity to commend the leadership of OPCW Director-General, Ambassador Fernando Arias, and reiterate our full confidence in the OPCW Technical Secretariat (TS), its professionalism, impartiality and well-established technical expertise in implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and tasks assigned by the States Parties. The European Union recalls that on 13 October 2022 the United Nations General Assembly First Committee reaffirmed its strong support for the Chemical Weapons Convention and the OPCW in the resolution on the implementation of the CWC (A/C.1/77/L.55) prepared annually by Poland.

Mr. Chairperson,

The year of 2022 has completely changed the paradigm of global, as well as European security architecture. Russia's unjustifiable, unprovoked and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine is an attack on our common principles and it grossly violates the UN Charter. The EU resolutely condemns the Russian aggression and demands that Russia withdraws all its troops and military equipment from the entire territory of Ukraine. Moreover, as part of its aggression against Ukraine, Russia has engaged in a campaign of disinformation and state-controlled propaganda in spreading unsubstantiated and unfounded allegations against Ukraine and others regarding chemical weapons programmes. It is well established that Ukraine is a responsible member of, and in full compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention.

The Syrian regime's failure to respect its international obligations under the Convention is substantiated through comprehensive and thorough investigations carried out by all the established mechanisms, notably the Joint UN – OPCW Investigation Mechanism (JIM), the Declaration Assessment Team (DAT), the Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) as well as the Investigation and Identification team (IIT). We commend the Director-General's continuous efforts to engage with Syria. Unfortunately, there is no progress reported to the Council in any of the open issues. We urge Syria to act constructively, as there is no alternative to cooperation, as explicitly required by the UNSCR 2118 and the respective decisions by the Conference of States Parties.

The EU has condemned in the strongest possible terms the poisoning of the Russian opposition politician Alexei Navalny in August 2020 with a military grade nerve agent of the 'Novichok' group. We continue to urge the Russian Federation to provide substantial answers to the questions posed by 45 States Parties in the framework of Art. IX and to ensure without further delay the disclosure of the circumstances of the assassination attempt against Mr. Navalny.

The European Union remains fully committed to counter the proliferation of chemical weapons and to support the fight against impunity for the use of chemical weapons. On 14 November 2022, the EU imposed further restrictive measures linked to the poisoning of Mr Navalny and the production of chemical weapons delivery systems in Syria. Measures under the EU's chemical weapons sanctions regime now apply to a total of 25 individuals and three entities.

Mr. Chairperson,

The EU supports the Director-General's proposed revision of the programme and budget for 2023 that enables the OPCW to continue its vital work including cooperation and assistance projects. In this context, the EU calls upon all States Parties to pay their assessed contributions in full and on time.

The EU has noted with great concern that the Technical Secretariat will face a high turnover in the Inspectorate Division in 2023, affecting its operational capacity. This situation underlines the need for amending the OPCW Tenure Policy to help maintain key expertise required to ensure the continued implementation of the Convention. As an interim measure, a new decision on re-hiring of inspectors is warranted.

The EU strongly believes that gender equality and mainstreaming of gender are and should continue to be an integral part of the work of the OPCW and implementation of the CWC. A wide diversity of views is essential for decision-making and in helping us tackle the challenges we face with greater effectiveness. We commend the Director-General and the Technical Secretariat for the work they have carried out thus far and look forward to further progress towards gender equality in the Organisation, including through the enhancement of gender mainstreaming in all areas of the Technical Secretariat's work.

I would like to reiterate the importance of engaging all relevant stakeholders, ranging from chemical industry to think tanks, civil society organisations and non-governmental organisations, in the OPCW work, and their meaningful and broadest possible participation in the Conference of States Parties, including the Fifth Review Conference.

Mr. Chairperson,

The Fifth Review Conference will be an opportunity to consider how to strengthen implementation of the Convention as a key instrument of the international non-proliferation and disarmament regime. Achieving a common vision on countering the re-emergence of chemical weapons and safeguarding the global non-use norm is a shared responsibility of all States Parties. The work programme of the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) allows all delegations to effectively express their priorities on relevant topics for the future of our Organisation. The EU and its Member States actively and constructively contribute to the discussions, and we encourage all States Parties to engage in this preparatory process. In this context, I would like to express our gratitude to the Chairperson, Ambassador Lauri Kuusing of Estonia, for leading the work in an open and inclusive manner, with the goal of building consensus.

I would kindly ask you to consider this statement as an official document of the Twenty-Seventh Session of the Conference of the States Parties and post it on the OPCW external server and public website.

Thank you.

#### 3.4. BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS

##### 3.4.1. **Second Preparatory Committee for the Ninth Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (Geneva, 11.4.2022)**

Mr. Vice-Chair,

I speak on behalf of the European Union. The candidate countries Turkey, the Republic of North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Albania, the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as Ukraine, and Georgia align themselves with this statement.

In the context of Article X, the EU strongly encourages local and regional ownership to ensure long-term sustainability of activities, stronger partnerships between donors and beneficiary States, and further coordination among donors. Developing national action plans, with the involvement of relevant agencies and stakeholders, and enhancing international, regional and sub-regional cooperation will help to achieve effective and sustainable outcomes. We support in particular further South-South cooperation for detecting, reporting and responding to outbreaks of infectious disease, or biological weapons attacks.

The EU has a long history of providing support to cooperation and assistance relevant for Article X. Currently the EU provides, through a number of Council Decisions, nearly EUR 10 million in support of assistance and capacity-building projects in third countries, including improving legislative and regulatory basis of biosafety and biosecurity, awareness-raising among relevant sectors as well as enhancing infectious disease surveillance, detection and control.

At the Ninth Review Conference of the BTWC, the EU will support proposals further strengthening the implementation of Article X.

More specifically, the EU will support the proposal made by France, Senegal and Togo to establish an online platform dedicated to biosafety and biosecurity under Article X.

The EU will furthermore support initiatives to develop biorisk management standards within the life sciences community. Biorisk management standards can play a complementary and supportive role in the implementation of the obligations of the BTWC. We therefore encourage States Parties to provide assistance, where appropriate, for the implementation of biorisk management standards in life science institutions in accordance with Article X.

##### 3.4.2. **EU General Statement at the Ninth Review Conference of the BTWC (Geneva, 28.11.2022)**

Mr. President,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union.

The candidate countries North Macedonia, Montenegro, Ukraine and Republic of Moldova and the potential candidate countries Bosnia and Herzegovina and Georgia, and the EFTA country Norway, member of the European Economic Area, align themselves with this declaration.

Let me start by congratulating you, Ambassador Bencini, for your nomination as President of this Review Conference and by commending you for your efforts in preparation of this very important meeting. We have full confidence in your capacity to guide us through the deliberations as we strive for a successful outcome. You can count of the EU's support in this endeavour.

The EU is firmly committed to a multilateral and treaty-based approach that maintains and reinforces international peace and security. The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) is one of the major pillars of the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture. It embodies the important and legally-binding norm that the development, production, stockpiling and usage of biological agents and toxins as weapons is unacceptable.

The EU recognises that biological agents and toxins are widely used for peaceful purposes in line with the BTWC provisions. At the same time, the risk of natural or accidental spread of dangerous pathogens exists. With the COVID-19 pandemic we have witnessed how quickly diseases can cross borders and how dangerous and disruptive they can be. This is why it is more urgent than ever to strengthen the BTWC and its implementation.

Taking into account this context and given the substantive work realised by States Parties during the current review cycle, the Ninth Review Conference represents a unique opportunity not only to strengthen the Convention and its implementation, and to improve biosafety and biosecurity globally, but also to advance assistance, cooperation, response and preparedness of the States Parties.

As a long-term supporter of the BTWC, the EU is firmly committed to contributing to the success of the Ninth Review Conference of the BTWC. Our primary aim is to adopt forward-looking decisions and recommendations, which will provide a clear roadmap for the next review cycle, based on a productive intersessional programme.

As part of this strong commitment to a successful Ninth Review Conference, the EU has provided substantial support to this end. In particular, I would like to mention the series of EU-sponsored Regional Workshops for Europe and the Middle East, the Americas, Asia and Africa that were organised by the ISU in preparation for the Review Conference. The goal of these workshops was to increase common understanding of key issues and challenges and to facilitate building consensus on the need for, and measures required for, reinforcement of the Convention. The report of these Regional Workshops will be presented during a side event on 1 December. I would also like to note that the EU is sponsoring 28 delegates from 25 States to participate in this Review Conference.

The EU Position on the Ninth Review Conference has been submitted to the Review Conference as a Working Paper. It includes a broad range of specific measures supported by the EU with a view to strengthening the BTWC. This statement will only emphasise certain priority issues while we remain ready to provide further information on EU position on all topics, as appropriate, during the upcoming deliberations.

Mr. President,

The European Union regards verification as a central element of a complete and effective disarmament and non-proliferation regime, including within the BTWC. The EU reiterates its readiness to explore the issue of verification in greater depth, taking into account the developments in science and technology relevant to the Convention as well as the evolution of the threat. In this regard, the EU encourages the Review Conference to take action on near-term, concrete measures that would immediately strengthen the BTWC while negotiating further measures to strengthen the BTWC and its implementation in the upcoming intersessional period, including on increasing transparency and enhancing assurance in compliance. We call on States Parties to approach these issues in a constructive and ambitious manner and welcome concrete proposals.

Taking into account the rapid developments in life sciences and in technology relevant to the Convention, the EU furthermore supports the Ninth Review Conference in delegating certain decision-making powers to the Meeting of States Parties.

The EU also supports the concrete implementation of Article X of the BTWC through the numerous assistance programmes the EU and its Member States have undertaken. We consider international cooperation and assistance for peaceful purposes in the framework of the BTWC one of the most important aspects of the Convention, especially considering the experiences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Further action to enhance international cooperation, assistance and exchange in biological sciences and technology for peaceful purposes, on promoting capacity building in the fields of disease surveillance, detection, diagnosis, and containment of infectious diseases is of utmost importance. We stand ready to explore relevant initiatives aiming at reinforcing biosafety and biosecurity.

In addition, the EU supports the promotion of biorisk management standards as a concrete measure to strengthen biosafety and biosecurity at the international level.

Furthermore, the EU supports a Science & Technology Review Process based on more frequent and focused assessments of relevant scientific and technological developments, which may have implications for the BTWC. Such a Review Process has gathered widespread support since the Eighth Review Conference and its establishment is urgent and necessary to keep pace with advancements. The EU specifically supports the establishment of a dedicated board of experts and scientists. Such a mechanism could help identify emerging risks of potential misuse of technologies and expertise in dual use research and their potential relevance to the goals and objectives of the BTWC. The EU also supports the adoption of a voluntary code of conduct for scientists as an element in this process, as well as the establishment of a science and technology officer position within the ISU.

The EU also supports the operationalisation of Article VII, regarding assistance to States Parties that have been exposed to danger as a result of a violation of the Convention. Building on agreements reached at the Eighth Review Conference, which supported 'the establishment of a database open to all States Parties to facilitate assistance under the framework of Article VII' as well as the establishment of guidelines for seeking assistance under Article VII, we particularly support the proposal by France and India to establish such a database.

Another priority of the European Union and its Member States is universal adherence to the Convention. We are pleased that since the Eight Review Conference in 2016, six States have joined the Convention: Samoa, Palestine, Niue, Central African Republic, Tanzania and Namibia. We furthermore call on all States not party to the Convention to adhere thereto without further delay. We encourage them to participate as observers in formal BTWC meetings and to implement, on a voluntary basis, its provisions. In line with this priority, the EU has carried out, in the run up to this Review Conference, demarches on universal adherence to the BTWC with States not party to the Convention.

We welcome the fact that in 2021 a record number of reports on Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) was submitted by States Parties. We strongly encourage all States Parties to use EU-funded assistance tools such as the CBM guide and the electronic CBM facility to submit their annual CBM reports to the ISU. The EU furthermore recalls its long-standing support to further confidence building measures such as peer reviews, voluntary visits and other initiatives that contribute to enhance transparency.

At the same time, we also encourage States Parties to participate in peer review initiatives and voluntary visits to relevant facilities and other transparency and confidence-building initiatives. It is important to note that these initiatives are not designed to be substitutes for a legally-binding verification mechanism, but to strengthen national implementation and thereby the BTWC.

The assistance the ISU provides to States Parties for the implementation of their Treaty obligations and to the inter-  
sessional work programme is invaluable. The EU continues to support the strengthening of the ISU's role.

Timely and full contributions to the BTWC budget are the essential requirement for the functioning and strengthening of the Convention, including for convening regular meetings and sustaining the ISU. Once again, we call on all States to fulfil their financial obligations under the Convention and to pay their assessed contributions on time and in full. We urge States Parties in arrears to pay their dues without further delay.

Mr President,

Since 2006, the European Union has provided substantial financial support of circa EUR 12 million to BTWC core activities. The two Council Decisions that are being implemented by the ISU provide approximately EUR 5 million in support of the BTWC. The latest decision was adopted in November 2021 and it provides EUR 2 million support notably to activities in Africa in the context of the Global Partnership Signature Initiative strengthening Biosecurity in Africa. There will be several side events on projects conducted as part of European Union support to the BTWC.

Moreover, the EU is a staunch supporter of the UN Secretary-General's Mechanism for investigation of alleged use of chemical and biological weapons, the UNSGM. Currently we provide EUR 1,4 million in support of UNODA's efforts to further operationalise and strengthen this mechanism, which is the only existing international independent mechanism for investigating alleged use of biological weapons.



In this context, I also wish to also mention the important EU CBRN Centres of Excellence Initiative that aims at enhancing the institutional capacity of partner countries to mitigate CBRN risks, whether deliberate, accidental, or natural in origin. Under this initiative, more than 90 projects have been funded, with one third of them addressing biological security amounting in overall to EUR 85 million. There will be a Side Event today (28 November) at 13:00 presenting the EU CBRN Centres of Excellence.

Mr President,

The EU underlines that gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls is an important horizontal priority for the Union and emphasises the importance to integrate gender perspectives into discussions in the BTWC. Furthermore, as a firm supporter of Action 36 of United Nations Secretary-General's Agenda for Disarmament, which focuses on the 'Full and Equal Participation of Women in Decision-Making Processes', the EU fully supports and promotes the equal participation of women and men in the field of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control and encourages women's participation at the BTWC Review Conference.

We also support disarmament and non-proliferation education, to which the EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, the European network of independent think tanks, is contributing with various activities. In line with the EU Youth Strategy, the EU also encourages the inclusion of youth in the debate relating to the BTWC. To that end, the EU recalls that on 21 January 2019 it adopted a Decision that provides funding in support of a project aimed at providing capacity-development opportunities for young policymakers, scientists and academics from the Global South engaged in fields related to the BTWC. A side event on the presentation of the recommendations of the Youth for Biosecurity initiative partners for the Review Conference will take place on 30 November.

Mr President,

We note that Russia has invoked procedures under Article V and Article VI of the Convention. Regrettably, this long-awaited Ninth Review Conference of the BTWC takes place at a time when Russia's unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine rages on, and Ukraine's civilian population and civilian infrastructure is being deliberately targeted and destroyed. We condemn in the strongest possible terms Russia's aggression, which grossly violates international law and the UN Charter, and undermines international peace and security. As part of its aggression against Ukraine, Russia has been engaged in a campaign of disinformation in spreading unsubstantiated and unfounded claims, among other things, regarding alleged development of biological weapons in Ukraine.

Articles V and VI are crucial in ensuring confidence in compliance with the BTWC. They should therefore be invoked only on a well-founded basis. Efforts to misrepresent or undermine legitimate health related research and capacity building, including for strengthened biosafety and biosecurity, only weaken the Convention and undermine international cooperation for peaceful purposes under Article X. This includes important efforts to prevent, detect and control possible outbreaks of disease, which the European Union strongly supports.

The processes under Article V and VI have been concluded. Any further discussion here on the allegations would only prove the lack of good faith towards this Review Conference's goals. The States Parties should focus on the important task ahead of us: to strengthen the BTWC and its implementation, to ensure the Convention remains responsive to S&T developments, and to pave the way towards a productive intersessional period.

Mr President,

Allow me to assure you once again that the European Union and its Member States have a strong interest in a successful Ninth Review Conference and will spare no effort to this effect.

Thank you.

3.4.3. **9th Review Conference of the States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention – Closing remarks (Geneva, 16.12.2022)**

Mr. President,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. The candidate countries North Macedonia, Montenegro, Ukraine and Republic of Moldova, the potential candidate countries Bosnia and Herzegovina and Georgia, the EFTA country Norway, member of the European Economic Area, as well as Canada align themselves with this declaration.

At the outset, we wish to express our appreciation for your leadership, tireless determination, diplomatic skills and dedicated efforts throughout the last three weeks. We also commend the significant work of your team, the Chairs of the Committee of the Whole and the Drafting Committee, all the facilitators, and the whole Implementation Support Unit.

As a long-term supporter of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), we have actively contributed to the success of the Ninth Review Conference. We have clearly reaffirmed our aspiration to adopt forward-looking decisions and recommendations, which would facilitate full and effective implementation of this important Convention, which relevance has been underscored by the disruptive pandemic of COVID-19.

We are pleased to see that a future-oriented package, although limited in its ambitions, has been adopted. But at the same time we regret that a few countries decided to take hostage the much larger aspirations of a wide membership of the BTWC across all three regional groups. The majority of States Parties not only aimed at addressing current challenges and significantly strengthening the convention but also at meeting today's needs through advancing assistance, cooperation, response and preparedness of the States Parties.

In particular, we welcome the establishment of a Working Group to strengthen the effectiveness and to improve the implementation of the Convention in all its aspects, the decision to develop a mechanism for international cooperation and assistance and for the review of scientific and technological developments. This opens a new opportunity to move this global norm into the 21st century. This is especially important in view of the current security environment marked by mistrust, increasingly high tensions and serious proliferation crises and challenges.

We deeply regret that despite the commendable efforts by you, Mr. President, the Chairs of the Committee of the Whole, the Drafting Committee, and all the facilitators, in lengthy negotiations over the past three weeks, it has not been possible to achieve consensus on a progressive Final Declaration that would advance commitments of the States Parties to the purposes of the Preamble and all the provisions of the Convention. We missed the unique opportunity to make tangible progress in all aspects of the Convention.

Moreover, we regret that in the Final Document we could not take into account the lessons learned of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The EU remains firmly committed to a multilateral and treaty-based approach that maintains and reinforces international peace and security. The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) is one of the major pillars of the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture. It embodies the important legally-binding norm that the development, production, stockpiling and usage of biological agents and toxins as weapons is prohibited. It is our hope that in a not very distant future there will be another occasion to join forces and work together with the whole international community to advance our common objective of strengthening this Convention and its implementation.

Thank you, Mr. President.

### 3.5. BALLISTIC MISSILES

#### 3.5.1. **DPRK: Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launch (Brussels, 25.3.2022)**

The EU strongly condemns the launch by the DPRK of an intercontinental ballistic missile on 24 March. This is a violation of multiple United Nations Security Council Resolutions and a serious threat to international and regional peace and security. The EU calls on the DPRK to refrain from any further action that could increase international or regional tensions. The DPRK must comply with UN Security Council resolutions by abandoning all its nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missile programmes and existing nuclear programmes, in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, and cease immediately all related activities. The DPRK cannot have the status of a nuclear weapons state. The EU calls on all UN Members to take action to implement in full the UN Security Council sanctions. The EU stands ready to implement and complement if necessary any action that could be taken by the UN Security Council in response to this event. The DPRK's blatant violations of international law divert resources from its own people, prevent its economic development and undermine the welfare of its people. The EU urges the DPRK to cease destabilising actions, respect international law, and resume dialogue with relevant partners. The EU stands ready to support any meaningful diplomatic process.

Ahead of the tenth NPT Review Conference, the EU insists that the DPRK returns to compliance with the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon State and the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, and brings into force the Additional Protocol. At the same time, the EU urges Pyongyang to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

The candidate countries Turkey, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Albania, the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the EFTA countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, as well as Ukraine, The Republic of Moldova and Georgia align themselves with this declaration.

#### 3.5.2. **EU Statement at the 21st Annual Regular Meeting of the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCoC) (Vienna, 20.5.2022)**

Chair,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. The following countries align themselves with this statement: the Republic of North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iceland, Norway, Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Georgia, Andorra and San Marino.

This year's Annual Regular Meeting takes place while one Subscribing State is conducting a full scale military invasion against another Subscribing State. The European Union condemns in the strongest possible terms this unprovoked and unjustified invasion of Ukraine by the armed forces of the Russian Federation. The Russian invasion is a blatant violation of the UN Charter. It shows complete and utter disrespect for the territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty of Ukraine. Russia bears full responsibility for this act of aggression and for all the human suffering, loss of life and destruction it is causing. Russia will be held accountable for its actions.

We demand an immediate and unconditional termination of the Russian military invasion, and a complete withdrawal of all Russian forces and military equipment from the entire territory of Ukraine. We remain deeply concerned over recorded flights of Russian cruise missiles over Ukrainian territory, including over the South Ukraine Nuclear Power Plant (NPP). We call on Russia to immediately cease such reckless actions, which pose a serious and direct threat to safety and security, significantly raise the risk of a nuclear accident and endanger the civilian population of Ukraine, neighbouring states and the entire international community.

Chair,

The HCoC is the only multilateral instrument aiming at both preventing ballistic missile proliferation and increasing transparency for the benefit of the Subscribers. The EU and its Member States reaffirm their strong support for the HCoC by actively promoting the universalisation, full implementation and efficient functioning of the

Code. We call on all UN Member States that have not yet done so, to subscribe to the Code. This will help build confidence, encourage restraint and create more peace and security for all. In this regard, the EU has actively engaged in diplomatic outreach to UN Member States that have not yet subscribed to the Code.

Since 2008, the EU has continued to provide significant political and financial support for the Code, a number of outreach events and meetings having taken place in cooperation with the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique and the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). In the framework of the current EU Council Decision, we have accomplished seven expert missions, eleven regional seminars, thirteen outreach events and published a number of papers related to the Code.

Chair,

The EU and its Member States remain gravely concerned by the continued proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, in particular the pursuit by several countries of concern of ballistic missile programmes in violation of UN Security Council resolutions. We call for the immediate dismantlement of such programmes, which are a source of mistrust and contribute to regional instability.

Since the last HCoC Annual Regular Meeting, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has launched a number of ballistic missiles, including yet another an intercontinental ballistic missile on 24 May 2022. The repeated ballistic missile launches by the DPRK represent a grave threat to regional and international peace and security and violate multiple UN Security Council Resolutions. We urge the DPRK to abandon its nuclear weapons and delivery systems programme in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner and to fully comply with all its international obligations and commitments. In particular, we call on the DPRK to comply with Security Council resolutions demanding that it shall not conduct any further launches that use ballistic missile technology, nuclear tests, or any other provocation and to cease all activities linked to a ballistic missile programme. Until this happens, the EU and its Member States will continue to strictly enforce existing sanctions and call on all other States to do the same. Furthermore, the EU and its Member States recall that all UN Member States are obliged to implement the restrictions targeting the DPRK's illegal activities, as imposed by the UN Security Council, and should do their utmost to curb proliferation of goods and technology which could contribute to the DPRK's nuclear, other weapons of mass destruction or ballistic missile-related programmes, including the transfer of dual-used items and their financing.

The EU remains resolutely committed to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The EU supports the intensive diplomatic efforts undertaken within the JCPOA Joint Commission and the contacts of the EU High Representative as JCPOA Coordinator with all relevant partners to facilitate a return to the JCPOA by the United States and the resumption of full implementation of all JCPOA commitments by the United States and Iran. Full and verified implementation of Iran's nuclear-related commitments will enable the international community to receive the necessary assurances. It is high time for Iran to seize the opportunity currently on the table to bring negotiations which started in Vienna more than fourteen months ago to a successful conclusion.

The EU urges Iran to refrain from any ballistic missile activities that are inconsistent with UN Security Council Resolution 2231, notably its Annex B which calls upon Iran not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using such ballistic missile technology. Iran's space programme in particular is enabling it to test technology that is essential to the development of ballistic missiles, including future long-range delivery systems, as demonstrated again with Iran's announcement on 8 March of a launch of a military satellite. We urge Iran to cease all these activities and fully abide by UNSCR 2231 (2015). The EU continues to fully apply UNSCR 2231 provisions which prohibit the export of missile-related items to and from Iran unless authorised by the UN Security Council, and calls upon Iran to fully respect all relevant UN Security Council resolutions related to the transfer of missiles and relevant material and technology to state and non-state actors. We deplore the missile attack by the IRGC on Erbil on 13 March 2022 and reiterate our long-standing serious concern about the regional military build-up.

Since December 2012, the Syrian regime has launched numerous ballistic missiles, ranging from liquid-propellant Scud-based missiles but also more accurate and more operational solid-propellant Short Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs). The Syrian activities related to missile technology, along with strong indications of technical and financial support from third countries and resulting proliferation of missile technologies from the Syrian soil to non-state actors in the region, constitute a source of concern for the international community.

These developments in countries that are currently not subscribing to the Hague Code of Conduct only further highlight the importance of universalisation of the Code, which we will continue to promote through various activities funded under the EU Council Decision.

Chair,

This year marks the 20th anniversary of the Code and the EU, the Netherlands and France, with the support of the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, organise an outreach event on 1 June, in Vienna, in order to mark this important occasion and discuss the further universalisation of the Code. In four sessions, experts and diplomats working on the Code will share their views on a number of relevant issues, from negotiating the Code back in 2002 to discussing its relevance today. This event will constitute a key milestone in the run-up to the vote on the biannual UNGA resolution in support of the Code, at the end of this year.

Let me conclude by warmly welcoming Nigeria's Ambassador Umar as the new Chair for 2022 to 2023 and expressing our gratitude to Ambassador Ainchil of Argentina for all the work and efforts undertaken during his HCoC chairmanship. We also thank Austria for its efficient support to the Code as the Immediate Central Contact (ICC) in Vienna.

The EU would also like to assure you of our full support and cooperation for the issuance of a communiqué by this Annual Regular Meeting which should help to increase awareness and mobilise further international support for the HCoC.

Thank you Chair.

### 3.5.3. **DPRK: Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the recent launch of multiple missiles (Brussels, 5.11.2022)**

The EU strongly condemns the significant increase of illegal missile launches by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), including, an intercontinental ballistic missile and the short-range ballistic missile that landed south of the Northern Limit Line.

These actions represent a dangerous escalation in the DPRK's repeated violation of UN Security Council resolutions. The unprecedented number of DPRK ballistic missiles launched in 2022 represents an alarming illustration of its intention to continue undermining the global non-proliferation regime. This poses a grave threat to all nations and undermines international and regional peace and security.

The DPRK's actions demand a resolute and united response by the international community. The EU calls on all UN Member States, especially Members of the UN Security Council, to ensure the full implementation of sanctions to prevent the DPRK from procuring materials, knowledge and finance that support its illegal weapons programmes.

The DPRK must immediately comply with UN Security Council resolutions by abandoning all its nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missile programmes and existing nuclear programmes, in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner and cease all related activities.

The EU stresses yet again that the illegal actions taken by the DPRK cannot and will never confer upon it the status of a nuclear-weapon State in accordance with the NPT or any other special status in this regard. The EU urges the DPRK to return immediately to full compliance with the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

The EU expresses its full solidarity with Japan and the Republic of Korea and reiterates its call on the DPRK to cease its aggressive and destabilising actions, respect international law and resume dialogue with all relevant parties. The only route to sustainable peace and security lies in dialogue. The EU reiterates its readiness to support a meaningful diplomatic process aimed at building peace and security and pursuing complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula.

The candidate countries Türkiye, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Albania, Ukraine and Republic of Moldova, the potential candidate countries Bosnia and Herzegovina and Georgia, the EFTA countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, align themselves with this declaration.

**3.5.4. DPRK/North Korea: Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile (Brussels, 19.11.2022)**

The EU strongly condemns the DPRK's launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile that landed in Japan's Exclusive Economic Zone on 18 November. The EU is deeply concerned by such dangerous, illegal and reckless action.

Pyongyang's continuing efforts to develop ever more menacing means to deliver weapons of mass destruction threatens all countries. The EU urges the DPRK to immediately stop destabilising actions that violate United Nations Security Council resolutions and raise international and regional tensions.

The EU calls upon the DPRK to comply with its obligations under UN Security Council resolutions. The DPRK must abandon all its nuclear weapons, any other weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missile programmes and existing nuclear programmes, in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, and cease immediately all related activities.

The DPRK cannot and will never have the status of a nuclear weapon state under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It is critical that the United Nations Security Council responds in an appropriate manner in order to address the growing threat the DPRK poses to international peace and security. The EU recalls the duty for all UN Members to take action to fully implement sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council.

The EU insists that the DPRK returns to full compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapon State and the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, and brings into force the Additional Protocol. At the same time, the EU urges Pyongyang to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

The EU expresses its solidarity with Japan and the Republic of Korea and once again urges the DPRK to resume meaningful dialogue with all the main parties concerned. The EU stands ready to support any meaningful diplomatic process and is committed to working with all relevant partners to build a basis for sustainable peace and security and to take steps aimed at pursuing the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula.

**3.6. UNSCR 1540**

**3.6.1. EU Statement – UN 1540 Committee: Comprehensive Review of UNSCR 1540 (New York, 1.6.2022)**

Mr Chairman,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union.

Let me start by congratulating you, Ambassador de la Fuente Ramírez and your team for organising these Open Consultations as a part of the Comprehensive Review on the status of Implementation of Resolution 1540. It is an essential step towards a meaningful and inclusive review process. I would also like to thank the members of the 1540 Committee and the Group of Experts for their work on the review.

Mr Chairman,

Security Council Resolution 1540 is a central pillar of the international non-proliferation architecture, a key part of the global efforts to prevent the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, including to terrorists and other non-state actors.

The EU Member states are at the forefront of implementing the provisions of Resolution 150 in national legislation. However, the protection against proliferation of materials and know-how only works if it is executed and monitored across borders and sectors. That is why we work with partner countries to strengthen their capacity to adhere to the provisions of

Resolution 1540 and support the UN agencies in their work to promote understanding and compliance. Let me underline that the implementation of Resolution 1540 is not only about non-proliferation; it also encourages and strengthens a wide range of other goals: border control, trade and export control, environmental protection and public health. The unfolding of Russia's unjustified war against Ukraine has thrown a light on the broader relevance of this regime and exposed the vulnerability of chemical, biological and nuclear facilities and the vital importance of ensuring control and monitoring.

We are encouraged to see that the Group of Experts has registered progress in implementing the provisions of Resolution 1540 in national legislation. With the voluntary cooperation and sharing of know-how and best practices promoted by the Group of Experts, the necessary frameworks and mechanisms to ensure enforcement are also established. We are and will remain strong supporters of this work.

Mr Chairman,

The Comprehensive Review provides an important opportunity to take stock of the implementation of UNSCR 1540 and discuss how the regime can be adjusted: build on what is working and address new challenges.

An essential element of the 1540 regime is the 2011 decision to establish a Group of Experts. The nine group members have undertaken important work to monitor implementation and, just as importantly, support and assist member states in raising awareness, coordinating assistance, and identifying and sharing best practices. The importance of the Group of Experts' active outreach should be underlined and emphasised in the next mandate.

The development of new technologies to produce and deliver Weapons of Mass Destruction is moving quickly. To remain relevant and effective, the next mandate needs to reflect scientific advances in nuclear, chemical and biological research and related technological developments.

Also, the provisions to counter proliferation financing have to be strengthened as recommended by the Financial Actions Task Force.

Finally, the Women, Peace and Security agenda should also be considered in the new mandate. The Secretary-General's 'Agenda for Disarmament' points out that empowering women and ensuring their equal and meaningful participation in disarmament and arms control decision-making processes can lead to more inclusive, effective and sustainable policy outcomes.

Mr Chairman,

The EU and its Member States will remain strong and active supporters of the full and universal implementation of Security Council Resolution 1540. The provisions of the Resolution are implemented through national legislation and, as a regional organisation based on tight trade relations, the establishment of EU-wide regional preparedness against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear security risks and security policy, emphasising cross-border and cross-sectoral cooperation. The aim is to ensure the legitimate commercial exchange and peaceful use of sensitive materials and technologies while keeping them safe from criminal and terrorist actors. Importantly, the EU helps others implement the 1540 obligations through bilateral cooperation and assistance partnerships and support to the UN and regional organisations.

Firstly, we currently provide a total of over UDE 48 million in support of non-proliferation efforts globally through international organisations, most importantly UNODA, OSCE, IAEA, OPCW and OAS. The aim is notably to help partner countries develop relevant regulatory frameworks; improve the safety and security of their biological and chemical laboratories and to raise awareness of their scientists.

Secondly, the EU Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Centres of Excellence Initiative provides significant assistance to mitigate risks from accidental, natural or criminal incidents in partner countries. This needs- and demand-driven initiative strengthens all-hazards security governance, both at national and regional levels. With a budget of almost USD 180 million in 2021–2028, the CBRN Centres of Excellence support capacity building through real-time, large-scale cross-border exercises with 62 countries.

Thirdly, the EU also helps States mitigate CBRN risks through the EU Partner-to-Partner Export Control Programme for Dual-Use Goods, which focuses on reducing the risk of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by strengthening international cooperation in the field of dual-use trade controls and strengthening national and regional capacity.

Finally, the EU remains a strong supporter of the implementation of the conventions and regimes and initiatives related to non-proliferation and disarmament of Weapons of Mass Destruction, most importantly the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), UN Secretary General's Mechanism for the investigation of alleged use of chemical and biological weapons (UNSGM), the Hague Code of Conduct as well as the Global Partnership against the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

Mr Chairman,

The EU and its Member States will continue to actively contribute to the universal implementation of Resolution 1540 through national programmes and our expansive help and assistance to other countries, bilaterally and through international and regional organisations. The new mandate should strengthen what works best and adjust with a view to new challenges, risks, and vulnerabilities to ensure that the 1540 regime remains a relevant and effective instrument.

Thank you.

### 3.7. CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

#### 3.7.1. **EU Statement on the consideration of the implementation of the Programme of Action – Eighth Biennial Meeting of States (New York, 27.7.2022)**

Mr. Chair,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union and its Member States. The candidate countries Turkey, North Macedonia, Montenegro and Albania, the EFTA country Norway, member of the European Economic Area as well as the Republic of Moldova and Georgia align themselves with this statement.

Allow me first to congratulate you on your appointment as chairperson. The European Union (EU) welcomes the transparent and inclusive way you have steered preparations for this meeting.

Mr. Chair,

We convene here today amid Russia's unjustifiable, unprovoked and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, which has increased global insecurity. Nations from every corner of the world have united at the UN General Assembly in calling for peace, demanding that Russia immediately, completely and unconditionally withdraws from the territory of Ukraine, within its internationally recognised borders, demanding civilian protection and humanitarian access in Ukraine.

Russia, bears full responsibility for the loss of life, the human suffering and all the destruction it causes in Ukraine. The EU fully acknowledges Ukraine's right to self-defence and the Ukrainian armed forces' efforts to defend Ukraine's territorial integrity and population in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter. We commend the Ukrainian people's strength, courage and resistance to withstand Russia's aggression and we stand with them in firm solidarity.



Mr. Chair,

The diversion, illicit trade and unauthorised use of small arms and light weapons continues to constitute a serious impediment for peace, growth, development, and security in the world. Ever since its adoption in 2001, the EU has actively promoted the implementation of the UN Programme of Action (UN PoA) to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in SALW in all its aspects. The EU considers that the UN PoA continues to provide an effective framework for states valid and effective strategy to consider, commit to, and implement activities to address such impediments.

In order to further strengthen its action against the destabilising accumulation and spread of SALW and their ammunition, the Council of the European Union on 19 November 2018 adopted the EU strategy against illicit firearms, small arms and light weapons and their ammunition 'Securing arms, protecting citizens'.

With regard to the implementation of the UN PoA, the EU supports the inclusion of the following elements in the outcome document of the BMS8.

BMS8 should promote the exchange of information between states on identified diversion in order to expose and cut off arms trafficking channels, and in order to improve the capacity for risk assessment in the context of arms export control (link with Article 11 of Arms Trade Treaty). The prevention of diversion of small arms to unauthorised actors constitutes an undeniable link between the UN PoA and the Arms Trade Treaty, especially with the first programmed meeting of the Diversion Information Exchange Forum (DIEF) during CSP8. The EU deplores that some states deny this link, thereby remaining blind for the synergies between the UN PoA and the ATT. The EU would like to see BMS8 recognise that the Arms Trade Treaty and the Firearms Protocol contribute to the implementation of the UN PoA, which is supported by synergies with international instruments with similar objectives.

States should underline their commitment to promote national implementation by means of, where appropriate, dedicated interagency coordination bodies, national action plans and strategies, national points of contact, national legislation, including penal clauses, regulations, administrative procedures and record-keeping. The monitoring of the relevant aspects of the SALW life cycle including manufacturing and marking, trade, export control, safe and secure stockpiling and disposal is also critical.

States should confirm their commitment to transparency by sharing national points of contact for the UN PoA, submitting their biennial reports on the status of the UN PoA and the International Tracing Instrument (ITI) implementation, by including SALW in their reports for the UN Register of Conventional Arms, and by promoting synergies on that matter with other related international instruments such as the Arms Trade Treaty.

Controlling the export and import of arms is an important tool in the fight against illicit SALW. The risk of SALW diversion can significantly be reduced by effective arms export control and risk assessment prior to authorising a transfer. The use of authenticated end-user agreements, as supported by the UN PoA, should be promoted.

BMS8 should confirm that, in line with the 2030 Agenda, including SDG Targets 16.1 and 16.4. that are shared objectives with the UN PoA, sustainable development cannot be realised without peace and security and that peace and security will be at risk without sustainable development. Curbing the illicit trade in SALW and ammunition is crucial in this regard.

The EU supports BMS8 discussions on increasing the measurability of the impact of cooperation and assistance in SALW control. We should promote and support the implementation of standards and best practices for the handling and stockpiling of small arms and ammunition, such as the Modular Small-arms-control Implementation Compendium (Mosaic) and the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG). The application of new technologies should be considered with a view to improved Physical Security and Stockpile Management (PSSM).

SALW-control should be promoted in bilateral and interregional security cooperation, including cross-border cooperation and information sharing between law enforcement and customs agencies. Regional and sub-regional organisations have an important role in assisting states in their implementation of the UN PoA. BMS8 should reiterate the important role played by researchers, civil society and industry in the UN PoA related activities. Civil society plays an essential role in increasing accountability and transparency in conventional arms control as well as informing and shaping all levels of decision-making.

In the outcome document, States should underscore the importance of a gender sensitive approach to SALW-control, acknowledge the differing impacts of armed violence on women, men, girls and boys, and, with the aim of improving their effectiveness, promote a strong role of women in the implementation of the UN PoA and gender mainstreaming in SALW control actions. The EU would like to see a reference to UNSCR 1325 of 2000 on Women, Peace and Security in the BMS8 outcome document, and in this regard a special reference to UNSCR 2242 of 2015 that specifically encourages empowering of women with the efforts related to the fight against illicit SALW.

BMS8 should address the issue of illicit manufacture through illicit reactivation of deactivated firearms and the illicit conversion of blank firearms. They should consider the establishment of an international standard for irreversible deactivation and a standard for manufacturing norms for blank firearms, with a view to rendering impossible this source of illicit firearms.

The scope of the UN PoA must include preventing, combatting and eradicating the illicit trade in ammunition. In this context, we welcome the work of the Open-ended working group (OEWG) on conventional ammunition in the context of UNGA Resolution 76/233 of 24 December 2021 and we look forward to building upon the outcomes of this body in the implementation of safe and secure management of ammunition over its whole life-cycle with a focus on preventing diversion and unintended explosions.

BMS8 should highlight the role of the UN PoA in the fight against terrorism. The EU supports the reference to Man-Portable Air-Defence Systems (Manpads) to be included in the outcome document as these weapons pose a very specific risk when diverted into unauthorised hands.

The outcome document should also address the growing importance of internet and online transactions, including the intangible transfer of technology and design, with regard to the illicit trade in SALW and their parts and components.

BMS8 should call for increasing capacities to monitor and enforce arms embargoes, i.a. by supporting the work of UN panels that monitor arms embargoes. UN and regional peace support missions should improve exchange of information on illicit flows of SALW with UN panel of experts when present in the same region.

Finally, BMS8 should also pay attention to addressing illicit SALW in conflict-affected areas, i.a. by encouraging the involvement where appropriate, of UN and regional peace support operations in the collecting, recording, tracing and destruction of illicit SALW and their ammunition, and support national capacities to track and trace the origins of illicit SALW and ammunition. This should also include taking account of SALW and ammunition in post-conflict reconstruction programmes and Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) and Security Sector Reform (SSR) programmes in particular.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

**3.7.2. EU Statement – On consideration of the implementation of the International Tracing Instrument, 8th Biennial Meeting of States on the UN POA to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (New York, 28.6.2022)**

Mr. Chair,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union and its Member States. The candidate countries Turkey, North Macedonia, Montenegro and Albania, the EFTA country Norway, member of the European Economic Area as well as the Republic of Moldova and Georgia align themselves with this statement.

The EU welcomes today's opportunity to assess the state of play in the implementation of the International Tracing Instrument (ITI). The EU is a convinced supporter of the ITI. We consider it as one of the most important achievements of the UN Programme of Action and an essential tool in the fight against diversion, un-authorised re-export and the illicit trade in SALW.

The ITI provides the only global standard on how and where to mark SALW. Through the ITI all States have committed themselves to mandatory marking and record-keeping of SALW and to cooperate internationally with the tracing of seized and collected illicit SALW. The ITI is therefore a unique and essential component of the capacity of states to identify and fight arms trafficking. It is the responsibility of this Biennial Meeting to make sure that the ITI can continue to deliver this essential contribution, also in the light of developments in manufacture, technology and design of SALW.

In relation to this, the EU is concerned that the ITI does not properly address the developments in manufacture, technology and design of SALW like modular and polymer frame weapons. The EU therefore wants BMS8 to agree on the establishment of an Open-Ended Technical Expert Group and on its modalities, to ensure the effectiveness and applicability of the ITI in the light of developments in SALW manufacturing, technology and design.

The absence of a global standard on how and where to mark modular weapons risks gradually undermining the capacity to trace these weapons if there is no agreement on what constitutes the essential component which should bear the marking. This process should also reflect other implications of developments in SALW technology and design, including increased use of polymers, 3D-printed weapons, and developments in marking, recordkeeping and tracing.

Given the limited space that is fit for durable marking on SALW with polymer frames, the increased use of polymer frames complicates the application of markings that are required or recommended by the ITI, including import markings. The EU is therefore of the view that the outcome document should promote import marking, if possible, at time of manufacture.

Developments in SALW technology and design do not only pose challenges for the implementation of the ITI. They also offer opportunities for more effective marking, recordkeeping and tracing, and hence more secure control of SALW in general.

The EU and its Member States have been flagging this issue since BMS4 in 2010, already eleven years ago. The issue is real and well documented. All stakeholders, including law enforcement agencies and industry, have flagged it since many years. It is our responsibility to start this process at BMS8.

Finally, the EU promotes the tracing of SALW in conflict affected areas. Conflict tracing can contribute to the identification and containment of illicit arms flows and trafficking channels into conflict zones and to the reduction of violence. UN and regional peace support operations may take up a role in the collection, recording, tracing and destruction of illicit SALW and their ammunition, in accordance with their mandates and resources, where possible, in cooperation with UN expert groups in charge of monitoring UN arms embargoes. Conflict tracing can also be supported through capacity development for local security and law enforcement agencies for tracing and investigation, in combination with promotion of the iARMS database of Interpol and other relevant databases; and by supporting initiatives such as iTrace by Conflict Armament Research.

States should call for increasing capacities to monitor and enforce arms embargoes, inter alia by supporting the work of UN panels that monitor arms embargoes.

Thank you, Mr. Chair

### 3.7.3. **EU Statement – 2022 Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (Geneva, 16.11.2022)**

Mr. President,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union.

The candidate countries North Macedonia, Montenegro, Ukraine and the potential candidate country Bosnia and Herzegovina and Georgia align themselves with this declaration.

I would like to begin by congratulating Poland on its assumption of the Presidency of the CCW Meeting of High Contracting Parties and assure you of the EU's full support. I would also like to take this opportunity to thank France for its skilful chairing of the Review Conference last year.

The EU recalls that the CCW and its Protocols are an essential and integral part of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and reiterates the commitment of the European Union and its Member States to respect and comply fully with IHL, as well as to continue implementing fully the EU Guidelines on the promotion of compliance with IHL. The EU emphasises the importance of the universalisation of the Convention and its Protocols, which remains a top priority and supports all efforts to this end. We call upon all countries that have not yet done so to join them as soon as possible.

The EU underlines that the CCW is a unique international forum gathering diplomatic, legal and military expertise. In light of the particular challenges of weapons deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects, this expertise has previously led to the adoption of prohibitions or restrictions on the use of specific weapons, such as incendiary weapons, as codified in Protocol III, as well as to prohibitions on the use of specific weapons, such as reflected in Protocol IV on blinding laser weapons. The Convention offers, inter alia, a flexible way to respond to new developments in weapons technologies and to support the implementation of an essential part of IHL, which contributes to preventing and reducing the suffering of both civilians and combatants

In addition, we need to underline the importance of transparency and confidence building in the implementation of the CCW and its Protocols and encourage High Contracting Parties to complete detailed reports on a regular basis. We are also fully committed to mainstreaming a gender perspective into all disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control efforts, including by promoting women's meaningful participation in the CCW and other disarmament fora.

In this context, the EU welcomes the work done over the past years by the Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems and acknowledges its substantial contribution and ongoing efforts to find common understanding of this complex issue. The EU underlines that the CCW is the relevant international forum in this regard, and that we expect it to deliver results, given that the topic of Lethal Autonomous weapons systems is an important topic that should be addressed taking into account operational, legal, technological aspects and bearing in mind ethical perspectives. The EU emphasises that it is important that the GGE continue its efforts, according to its mandate, building on past achievements to allow for progress. We need, therefore, to address these issues with urgency as the research and development of new weapons technologies progresses at a rapid pace.

The EU remains committed to pursue its efforts in the GGE with a view to ensuring that the outcome reflects the necessity of compliance with International Law, in particular International Humanitarian Law, taking into account relevant ethical considerations. Human beings must make the decisions with regard to the use of lethal force, exert control over weapons systems that they use and remain accountable for decisions over the use of force in order to ensure compliance with International Law, in particular International Humanitarian Law across the life cycle of these weapon systems. We believe that a two-tier or dual track approach to weapons systems based on emerging technologies in the area of LAWS merits further consideration. This approach is based on the prohibition of systems that cannot be used in compliance with IHL, and the regulation of other types of systems featuring autonomy in order to ensure the compliance with the rules and principles of IHL.

The EU remains deeply concerned about the continued severe global impact of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and their indiscriminate use and effects, in particular in the perpetration of terrorist acts and the use of IEDs by non-state actors. In this context, we welcome the updated political Declaration on IEDs adopted last year by the High Contracting Parties to CCW Amended Protocol II and remain in full support of the relevant United Nations General Assembly Resolutions.

The EU highlights the humanitarian impact and the heavy consequences on social and economic development caused by the indiscriminate and disproportionate use of Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines (MOTAPM). While acknowledging that MOTAPM are legitimate weapons, Parties are obliged to ensure that they are used in accordance with IHL, including by taking all feasible precautions, to protect civilians from the effects of these weapons. The EU urges States Parties to further discuss how to ensure compliance with Amended Protocol II, also with respect to MOTAPM. MOTAPM should therefore remain on the CCW agenda in order to ensure that High Contracting Parties can continue to consider the matter in a constructive and transparent manner.

The EU remains concerned about the reported use of incendiary weapons against civilians or against targets located within a concentration of civilians, their indiscriminate use causing cruel effects and unacceptable suffering. We call on all States not yet party to join Protocol III of the Convention, which prohibits in all circumstances to make the civilian population as such, individual civilians or civilian objects the object of attack by incendiary weapons and we urge all States to fully comply with its provisions. We regret that Protocol III issues were removed from the CCW agenda because of the opposition by one High Contracting Party and we request to have them back next year. Our work is based on the clear understanding that appropriate time has to be allocated to allow a structured debate on the implementation of the Convention and all of its Protocols.

Mr. President,

We face one of the most significant challenges to global peace and security. Russia's unjustifiable, unprovoked and illegal war of aggression is an affront to everything we work for here. We condemn in the strongest possible terms Russia's gross violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and the use of anti-personnel landmines and cluster munitions as well as the use of other explosive weapons, such as rockets and artillery shells or improvised explosive devices (IEDs) directed against civilians in Ukraine. The EU actively supports the work of the International Criminal Court in ensuring accountability for the most serious international crimes.

We recall that the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine confirmed in its report of 18 October to the UN General Assembly (A/77/533) that war crimes, violations of human rights and international humanitarian law have been committed in Ukraine since 24 February 2022 by in particular Russian armed forces.

We demand the Russian Federation to immediately, completely and unconditionally withdraw all of its military forces from the territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders.

I thank you, Mr. President.

#### 3.7.4. **EU Statement – Twentieth meeting of the States Parties of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (Geneva, 21.11.2022)**

Mr. President,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union and its Member States.

The candidate countries North Macedonia and Montenegro and the potential candidate country Bosnia and Herzegovina align themselves with this declaration.

At the outset, allow me to congratulate you, Ambassador Alvaro Enrique Ayala Melendez of Colombia, for assuming the Presidency of the Twentieth Meeting of the States Parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention. I wish to also acknowledge all efforts of your predecessor Ambassador Arango Olmos and her team for skilfully steering the preparations for this important meeting.

Over the last 25 years, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, has become a success story of multilateral diplomacy with a total of 164 countries bound by the global norm it established. Since then, considerable progress has been made to stop the suffering caused by anti-personnel mines. By virtue of this joint multilateral effort, significantly fewer people have been injured or killed because of an anti-personnel mine.

This remarkable result could not have been achieved without the devotion and commitment of the mine ban community, in particular the commitment of survivors and civil society, who work globally and in mine affected countries, often risking their own lives. The EU is fully committed to ensuring the full, equal and effective participation of mine victims in society, based on respect for human rights, gender equality, inclusion and non-discrimination.

With all its Member States being parties to the Convention, the EU is strongly united in upholding the prohibition of the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines. The EU continues to be fully committed to strengthen the ban against anti-personnel mines and to achieve a world free of anti-personnel mines, and free of any new victims. Furthermore, it is of utmost importance that we continue our collective efforts in order to meet the obligations under the Convention; to achieve the destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines, the clearance of mine-contaminated land, provide mine risk education assistance to mine victims and sustainable national capacities. The MSP represents a key platform to share information on progress made and maintain the momentum towards the full implementation of the Oslo Action Plan.

The EU is also committed to mainstreaming a gender perspective into its mine action work and we continue to support the work of stakeholders in mine action to integrate gender perspective and take diverse needs and experiences of people in affected communities into their humanitarian mine action policies.

While we celebrate this anniversary, this year we are witnessing a significant challenge to this norm. In this respect, the EU deplores the alleged use of anti-personnel mines by Myanmar, a terrible assault on collective international efforts banning this weapon. Moreover, the EU condemns the continued use in ongoing conflicts, in particular in Ukraine.

We condemn Russia's unjustifiable, unprovoked and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine. This war of aggression is not only a blatant violation of international law but also a humanitarian catastrophe for Ukraine and its people brought about by the Russian Federation in flagrant disrespect for international humanitarian law and human rights law. We condemn in the strongest possible terms Russia's use of anti-personnel landmines and we call for immediate cease of use of this insidious weapon in Ukraine.

We call on Russia to immediately stop its military activities and demand the immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal from the territory of Ukraine, within its internationally recognised borders. The EU also calls on all stakeholders to refrain from the production, stockpiling, trade in and transfer of anti-personnel mines and strongly condemn their use anywhere, at any time, by any actors, whether States or non-States actors.

In conclusion, we invite all partners to renew efforts to eliminate the violent impact of anti-personnel mines and explosive ordnance. The EU remains committed to mine action and will continue to be dedicated to assist in achieving our common goals from Colombia to Cambodia and elsewhere to achieve an anti-personnel mine free world. Let us step up our efforts to ensure the rigorous implementation of the Ottawa Convention.

In conclusion, we expect from this meeting the reaffirmation that human life, human dignity and human rights are at the core of our work. We thank the entire international community and we are pleased to partner with the UN entities, the ICRC, GICHD, international and regional organisations and civil society. We extend our special appreciation to the Implementation support Unit of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention for excellently implementing the EU's projects and for their dedication and invaluable work in the implementation of the Conventions' goals.

Thank you, Mr. President.

### 3.8. EXPORT CONTROL REGIMES

#### 3.8.1. **EU Explanation of Vote – UN General Assembly 1st Committee: Promoting international cooperation on peaceful uses in the context of international security (New York, 3.11.2022)**

Mr. Chairman,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the Member States of the European Union.

The candidate countries North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania and the Republic of Moldova, and the EFTA countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, San Marino and Canada align themselves with this statement.

The EU calls upon States to vote against the Chinese draft resolution L.56 submitted to the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, titled 'Promoting International Cooperation on Peaceful Uses in the context of International Security'.

This resolution further builds last year's Resolution 76/234. And despite the fact that divergent views and serious concerns were expressed since the adoption of that resolution, there is no reflection of these concerns in the draft text.

This resolution continues to suggest a false dichotomy between peaceful uses of nuclear, chemical and biological materials on one hand, and export control regimes and other non-proliferation measures on the other.

We recall that a number of export control regimes and related arrangements have been established to contribute to the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery. These include the Australia Group, Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Wassenaar Arrangement and Zangger Committee. These multilateral regimes contribute to the enhancement of international peace and security by preventing the diversion of sensitive materials, technology and equipment to end-users of concern. They further contribute to the implementation of treaty obligations on non-proliferation and UN Security Council resolutions. The export control regimes are setting clear guidelines and control lists, which give the exporting states necessary assurances to export sensitive products to trusted recipients.

Export control regimes are open to membership based on transparent, objective and non-discriminatory criteria. All States can adhere to, and benefit from, the guidelines of the regimes and apply the control lists, as they are public documents available on the regimes' websites. Outreach is also conducted through the regimes to non-Participating States in order to inform them about changes in the control lists, address membership issues and answer other questions non-Participating States might have. Specific topics, including those with regard to peaceful uses, can be raised on these occasions. Individual trade restrictions can always be addressed bilaterally and/or through the appropriate multilateral bodies. The EU fully supports this transparency.

The EU is concerned with the unfounded suggestion that export control measures and regimes put 'undue restrictions' on exports of sensitive items. This assertion is not based on facts. Unfortunately, this negative approach to export controls could ultimately undermine international trade as well as scientific and technological cooperation, which requires robust and trustworthy export controls.

The draft implies export control authorities of UN Member States do not exercise their task correctly, considering that export control decisions fall within the national competence of States, based on their national, regional and international obligations. In mentioning 'undue restrictions', the draft resolution disregards the content of the report of the UN Secretary-General (A/77/96), in which no evidence or facts have been presented to support the claim that existing export controls are excessive or undue. The report also highlighted that there are no findings in the comprehensive review of UNSC Resolution 1540 that 'undue restrictions' through export controls would inhibit sustainable development. Furthermore, in contributions to the report no suggestions were submitted for concrete initiatives outside the existing frameworks whereas this draft resolution keeps the way open to the creation of a new framework on peaceful uses, which would be parallel to the one already existing.

On the contrary, the report contained, in the submissions, various initiatives to strengthen the IAEA, BTWC, and CWC frameworks. These initiatives should be addressed in the frameworks of these respective instruments.

The EU fully supports international cooperation on peaceful uses and already actively promotes it, for instance by supporting the role of the IAEA or of the OPCW in third countries and financing concrete projects in support of peaceful uses. The EU and its Member States are the largest donor of the OPCW Centre for Chemistry and Technology that will provide better training facilities for developing countries. The EU and its Member States are also among the largest contributors to the IAEA's Technical Cooperation Programme. Many countries have benefited from these EU-funded projects. The EU is providing widespread support to partner countries in setting up or enhancing their own export control systems, as required by UNSC Resolution 1540 in order to prevent illicit exports of sensitive goods to non-state actors, through the CBRN Centres of Excellence in 64 countries and the EU P2P export control outreach programme.

Given the important contribution of multilateral export control regimes to international peace and security as well as facilitating legitimate trade and international cooperation, this framework must not be undermined. Unfortunately, we do not see an impartial and balanced approach in this draft, and therefore call upon States to vote against the resolution

In addition and on top of what has been said, we would like to recall that the main sponsor is a member of export control regimes like the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), which puts the motivation of this initiative into question.

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